



Co-funded by
the European Union



KING

Knowledge for INtegration Governance

Evidence on migrants' integration in Europe

edited by Guia Gilardoni, Marina D'Odorico and Daniela Carrillo



February 2015

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank all the researchers involved in the project (see the list of contributors), policy makers and experts who agreed to be interviewed for this research.

The project has been carried out also thanks to the support provided by European Policy Centre (EPC) - Bruxelles

University of Birmingham - **Institute for Research into Superdiversity (IRiS)**

Fundacja Osrodek Badan Nad Migracjami – Center of Migration Research, Warsaw

Central European Labour Studies Institute (CELSI), Bratislava

This report is the result of the KING project, co-funded by the European Commission, Directorate-General Home Affairs, under the Action HOME/2012-2013/EIFX/CA/CFP/4000004268.

KING is coordinated by the ISMU Foundation, based in Milan (Italy)

in partnership with Fondazione Cariplo

State of Hessen - Hessisches Ministerium für Soziales und Integration

Obra Social La Caixa, Institut de Recherches

Formations et Actions sur les Migrations (IRFAM)

Start date: 15 September 2013; end date: 15 March 2015

This report is edited by Guia Gilardoni, Marina D’Odorico and Daniela Carrillo, with the contribution of Veronica Riniolo, Giulia Mezzetti and Pierre Georges Van Wolleghem

All the research papers and the reports of the project can be downloaded from the website www.king.ismu.org
Twitter: @KING_Project_EU

© 2015 Fondazione ISMU, Milan



All Rights Reserved.

No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form, or by any means, without due permission, in writing, from Fondazione ISMU – Iniziative e Studi sulla Multiethnicità. Licenced to the European Union under conditions.

This project has been funded with support from the European Commission.

This publication reflects the views only of the authors, and the European Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.



Contents

List of contributors	p. 1
Introduction	» 5
1. The European context in brief. Population, labour market and attitudes	» 11
1.1 Europe's demographic changes	» 12
1.2 The role of the labour market structure	» 19
1.3 Receiving societies: between discrimination, misconceptions and xenophobia	» 21
2. The framing of migrant integration policy	» 25
2.1 General assumption, orientations and basic concepts used	» 25
2.1.1 Immigration: how policy makers perceive it	» 26
2.1.1.1 Who is the preferred type of migrant?	» 27
2.1.2 Integration: how policy makers perceive it	» 29
2.1.2.1 Old files, same aims	» 29
2.1.2.2 EU calls for rights and obligations comparable to those of EU-citizens	» 31
2.1.2.3 Integration as a two way process	» 32
2.1.3 The policy shift: integration is a challenge to whom?	» 34
2.2 Target group: Who has the right to be/become an immigrant and to be integrated?	» 38
3. The governance of migrant integration policy	» 41
3.1 Actors	» 42
3.1.1 Who has the authority over what?	» 42
3.1.2 National and local competences	» 44
3.1.3 Tension between levels of governance	» 45
3.1.4 The role of civil society in filling the gaps	» 46
3.1.5 Migrant organisations and networks	» 48
3.2 Organisation of policy making and implementation	» 50
3.2.1 Europe diving integration: an intricate mix of actions	» 50
3.2.1.1 Harmonisation of national rules	» 50
3.2.2 National and local level: an erratic organisation of migration and integration governance	» 53
4. Local integration policies in three different dimensions	p. 55

4.1 Integration policy in the legal-political dimension	» 57
4.1.1 Access to legal status and citizenship: the role of cities	» 58
4.1.2 Political participation of migrants: direct or indirect participation	» 59
4.1.2.1 The right to vote	» 59
4.1.2.2 Consultative committees: role and limits	» 60
4.1.3 Migrant associations and integration in the legal-political dimension	» 62
4.1.4 The attitude of receiving societies on migrant integration in the legal political dimension	» 63
4.2 Integration policy and migrants' integration in the socio-economic dimension	» 64
4.2.1 Labour market	» 65
4.2.2 Education and training	» 68
4.2.3 Health care	» 72
4.2.4 Housing	» 74
4.3 Integration policy in the cultural-religious dimension	» 76
4.3.1 Language instruction	» 78
4.3.2 Civic integration	» 80
4.3.3 Religion	» 81
5 Integration strategies	» 85
5.1 Mainstreaming	» 85
5.2 Monitoring	» 91
5.3 Non discrimination	» 96
Conclusion	» 101
References	» 109

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Diego Acosta is a Lecturer in European Law at the University of Bristol. He is the author or co-editor of several books and publications in the area of EU Migration Law: *The Long-Term Residence Status as a Subsidiary Form of EU Citizenship* (Martinus Nijhoff, 2011), *EU Immigration Law: Text and Commentary* (Martinus Nijhoff, 2012, with S. Peers, E. Guild, K. Groenendijk and V. Moreno-Lax), and *EU Justice and Security Law: After Lisbon and Stockholm* (Hart, 2014, with C. Murphy). He is co-supervisor of the five-year research project titled "Prospects for International Migration Governance (MIGPROSP)" for which Professor Andrew Geddes, as principal investigator, has obtained a European Research Council grant.

Anne Bathily is project officer at the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), where she follows integration policies at the EU level, coordinates the core group on integration as well as the Refugee alliance. She has also worked as a consultant for the UNHCR/IOM and as a freelance journalist.

Gian Carlo Blangiardo is Professor of Demography and director of the Department of Statistics at the University of Milan Bicocca. He is member of the European Commission's group of experts in Demography, of the Scientific and Technical Board of the Region of Lombardy (social affairs), of the National Observatory on Family, of the Scientific Board of the ISMU Foundation, of the Lombardy's Regional Observatory for Minors, of the Regional Observatory on Social Exclusion. Since 2001 he coordinates the Regional Observatory on Integration and Multiethnicity.

Tiziana Caponio is Professor of Dynamics and Processes of Migration at the University of Turin, Italy and research affiliate at the Collegio Carlo Alberto, Turin. She is the author of *Competing Frames of Immigrant Integration in the EU: geographies of social inclusion in Italian regions*, *Policy Studies*, 34:2, 162-179, 2013, with Francesca Campomori., "Theories of Multiculturalism Italian Style: Soft or Weak Recognition?", in R. Taras (ed), *Challenging Multiculturalism: Managing Diversity in Europe*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2012, *The Local dimension of migration policymaking*, Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, IMISCOE Report Series, 2010, with Maren Borkert.

Daniela Carrillo holds a PhD in Anthropology from the University of Florence. Since 2006, she has been working for the ISMU Foundation as a member of the Health and Welfare Unit. She co-edited, with Nicola Pasini, *Migrazioni Generi Famiglie. Pratiche di escissione e dinamiche di cambiamento in alcuni contesti regionali*, Franco Angeli : Milano, 2009, on the practice of Female Genital Mutilation in the migratory context, and, with Trinidad Osteria and Annavittoria Sarli, *The Health Dimension of Asian Migration to Europe*, Asia-Europe Foundation - De La Salle University Publishing House:Manila, 2013.

Paola Coletti has a PhD in Public Policy Analysis at University of Pavia and received a post-doctoral research fellowship at Polytechnic of Milan in Public Policy Analysis (2007-2010). She is the author of *Evidence for Public Policy Design: How to Learn from Best Practices* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

Gray Craig is Professor of Community Development and Social Justice at Durham University, UK and Emeritus Professor of Social Justice at the Wilberforce Institute for the study of Slavery and Emancipation, Hull. Recent books include *Social Justice and Public Policy*, *Child Slavery Now*, *Community Development: a Reader*; and *Understanding 'Race' and Ethnicity*.

Mariachiara Di Cesare is research Associate in Population Health at Imperial College London. Where she carries out research about risk factors associated to communicable and non-communicable diseases. In particular she has been working on inequalities in non-communicable diseases, risk factors contribution to overall and chronic diseases mortality, and the role of early nutrition on child development. She is the author of Di Cesare M, Sabates R, Lewin KM, 2013,

A double prevention: How maternal education can affect maternal mental health, child health and child cognitive development, *Longitudinal and Life Course Studies*, Vol:4, pp. 166-179 and Di Cesare M, Bennett JE, Best N, *et al.*, 2013, The contributions of risk factor trends to cardiometabolic mortality decline in 26 industrialized countries, *International Journal of Epidemiology*, Vol:42, ISSN:0300-5771, pp. 838-848.

Marina D’Odorico holds a Ph.D. in Sociology and Social Research Methods from the Catholic University of Milan. As a member of the Immigration and Asylum Law unit since 2001, she has been working for ISMU Foundation, where she has been taking part in the planning and execution of national and international projects particularly on integration issues. She co-authored, with Ennio Codini, *Democracy and Citizenship in the 21st Century, Critical Issues and Perspectives*, McGraw-Hill Education, Milan, 2014; with Daniela Carrillo and Guia Gilardoni, *EMILL : A tool reading integration practices and their respective contexts*, ISMU Foundation, Milan, 2013, and, with Ennio Codini and Manuel Gioiosa, *Per una vita diversa. La nuova disciplina dell’asilo*, FrancoAngeli, Milano, 2009. She also contributed to *Exploring avenues for protected entry in Europe*, 2012, authored by Christopher Hein and Maria De Donato, final report of the E.T. project – *Entering the Territory*, carried out by CIR onlus.

Gabriela Fuhr-Becker is research associate in the Hessen Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration of the Federal State of Hessen (Germany), carrying out empirical studies on immigrants and enhancing monitoring of integration processes.

Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas is Juan de la Cierva postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Political and Social Sciences of the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona. She holds a PhD cum laude in Social Sciences (2010) from the University of Amsterdam. Her PhD thesis was awarded the Dutch Sociological Association (NSV) biennial prize for the best sociological dissertation defended in the Netherlands and analysed immigration policies in Malaysia and Spain.

Guia Gilardoni is the coordinator of the KING project. She is senior researcher and project manager at the ISMU Foundation, Milan. She holds a PhD in Social Research and Methodology (2008) from the Catholic University of Milan where she is a post doctoral fellow. Her publications include “Segmented assimilation in Italy? The Latinos case”, in *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, vol. 16(4), 2011, pp. 450-464; “Cross-cutting social circle configurations in the lives of sons and daughters of mixed parentage”, in *Italian Journal of Sociology of Education*, vol. 2(1), 2010, pp. 154-191. She co-authored, with Daniela Carrillo and Guia Gilardoni, *EMILL: A tool reading integration practices and their respective contexts*, ISMU Foundation: Milan, 2013.

Florian Götsche was research associate in the Hessen State Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration (Germany), carrying out a project financed by the European Fund for the Integration of non-EU immigrants (EIF) on social-policy and integration-policy programs for immigrants at the transition between school and labour market in a local region in Hessen.

Martin Guzi is postdoctoral researcher at Masaryk University in Brno, supported by the programme "Employment of Best Young Scientists for International Cooperation Empowerment". He obtained a PhD in Economics at CERGE-EI in 2013. He was Resident Research Affiliate between at IZA 2009/2013. His empirical research focuses on work migration, income adequacy, social welfare programs, and subjective well-being.

Eva Heidbreder is Professor of Political Science at the Heinrich Heine University of Düsseldorf, Germany. Her research interests concentrate on European integration

Rachel Humphris is a PhD candidate at the Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology of the University of Oxford. Her main research interests include new migrants and their relationships with front line public services providers within the context of changing legal and welfare structures. She holds an MPhil in Migration Studies from Oxford University. She has also worked as a research assistant for The Department of International Development, Oxford University; COMPAS, Oxford University; Fundamental Rights Agency, Vienna.

Martin Kahanec is Associate Professor at the Central European University, Budapest, and Deputy Program Director at the Institute for the Study of Labour (IZA), Bonn. He is also Co-founder and Scientific Director of Central European Labour Studies Institute (CELSI), Bratislava.

Paweł Kaczmarczyk is Robert Schuman Fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute - Migration Policy Centre. He is also vice director of the Centre of Migration Research at the University of Warsaw (since 2009). In 2008-2011 he was a member of the Board of Strategic Advisers to the Prime Minister of Poland.

He is IZA fellow and TFMI (Transcontinental Forum on Migration and Integration) fellow, and SOPEMI correspondent for Poland at OECD. His main research areas include causes and consequences of labour migration (with special attention paid to analysis of migration processes in CEE countries), highly skilled mobility, methodology of migration research, labour economics, international economics and migration policy.

Kamran Khan obtained his joint Ph.D at the University of Birmingham in the UK and the University of Melbourne in Australia, and is a recipient of an IRiS seedcorn fund which has supported his post-doctoral research as a Research Associate. His research interests concern ethnic relations, integration, the social issues around testing and notions of becoming.

Walter Kindermann is Director-General for Integration at the Hessen State Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration.

Marta Kindler is a researcher fellow at the Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw. She holds a Ph.D. in socio-cultural anthropology from the European University Viadrina, Frankfurt/Oder. From 2009 till 2011, she also worked as a Migration and Freedom of Movement Adviser at the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Her publications in English include: *Risky business? Ukrainian migrant women in Warsaw's domestic work sector*, Amsterdam University Press: Amsterdam 2012, "Integration: A supplementary driver of immigration?" (co-author) in: (eds.) Górny A., Grabowska-Lusinska I., Lesinska M., Okólski M. *Immigration to Poland: policy, employment, integration*, Scholar: Warszawa.

Liliya Levandovska is fellow at Central European Labour Studies Institute (CELSI) in Bratislava.

Alberto Martinelli is Emeritus Professor of Political Science and Sociology at the University of Milan, Italy. He is President of the International Social Science Council. Between 1998-2002, he was President of the International Sociological Association (ISA). He is the author of *Transatlantic Divide. Comparing American and European Society*, Oxford University Press.

Patrycja Matusz Protasiewicz is senior lecturer at the Institute of International Studies at the University of Wrocław (Poland), where she obtained her Ph.D. She has carried out extensive research on local integration policies, particularly in Poland and the Baltic states, and was involved in the CLIP project - *European network of cities for local integration policies for migrants*. She is a member of the European Network of Excellence IMISCOE.

Lucia Mýtna Kureková She is Senior Researcher at Slovak Governance Institute in Bratislava, where she works on NEUJOBS and STYLE FP7 research projects. She earned her Ph.D. In political science from Central European University (CEU) in 2011. Her research interests concern the area of migration and labor market; education and skill-formation systems; and social and economic policy. She has participated in several EU-funded collaborative research projects and works as a consultant for various international organizations.

Yves Pascouau is senior Policy Analyst and Head of the European Migration and Diversity Programme at the European Policy Centre (EPC), Brussels. He co-edited *Which Integration Policies for Migrants? Interaction between the EU and its Member States*, with Tineke Strik (Wolf Legal Publishers, 2012).

Nicola Pasini is Associate Professor at the University of Milan, where he teaches Political Science, Public Administration and Local Government at the Faculty of Political Sciences, Economics and Social Sciences. He has been coordinator of the Welfare and Health Unit of ISMU Foundation, Milan, since 1995.

Rinus Penninx has been Professor of Ethnic Studies at the University of Amsterdam since 1993. He founded the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES) at the University of Amsterdam in 1993 and served as the Institute's Director until October 2005. From 1999 till March 2009, he has also acted as European Co-Chair of International Metropolis. In April 2004, he became Coordinator of the European Commission-funded Network of Excellence IMISCOE (International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe).

Jenny Phillimore is Professor at the Institute of Applied Social Studies of the University of Birmingham and Director of the Institute for Research into Superdiversity (IRiS). She has researched widely in the fields of migration and superdiversity. Jenny co-directs the New Migration and Social Policy MA programme, sits on the University Senate, and is a Fellow of the RSA. She has advised local, regional, national and European Government. As well as working at IASS she is also an investigator at the Third Sector Research Centre where her focus is on social networking and civil society actions and the impacts of grassroots community activity with a specific interest in migrant communities.

Monica Poletti is a postdoctoral fellow at the London School of Economics-Methodology and European Institute Departments and at the University of Milan-Social & Political Science Department. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Sociology (University of Milan /MZES-Mannheim). Her research interests are in political participation, public opinion, electoral behaviour, Italian politics, and immigration perceptions.

Marta Regalia holds a PhD in Political Science and collaborates with the departments of political science of the University of Milan and of the University of Turin. Her research interests concern political and electoral systems, electoral geography and democratization.

Hannah Schwarz recently finished a Research Master in Social Science at the University of Amsterdam, focusing on Immigrant Integration, as well as Quantitative Social Science Methods. She is currently working at the Gesis Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences in Cologne.

Maria Rita Testa Maria Rita Testa is senior researcher at the Vienna Institute of Demography and at the Vienna University of Economics and Business. She is FWF-Stipendiatin (Elise-Richter-Stelle) since 2014. Her research interests include family demography, reproductive decision-making, fertility, multilevel models, panel data analysis, climate change, inter-marriage. Her research findings have been published, inter alia, in: *Population and Development Review*, *European Journal of Population*, *Demographic Research*, *Population*, *Population Research and Policy Review*, and *Population & Environment*.

Dietrich Thränhardt is Emeritus Professor of comparative politics and migration research, University of Münster. He edits "Studies in Migration and Minorities" and coordinates "Mediendienst Integration" for the Council on Migration. He published forty books and 200 articles, particularly on comparative migration and integration and on German politics and post-war history.

Alessandra Venturini is Professor of Political Economy at the University of Turin and Deputy Director of the Migration Policy Centre (MPC) at the European University Institute (EUI), Florence. She holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the European University Institute, and has held senior academic positions at the Universities of Florence, Bergamo, and Padua.

Ingrid Wilkens is Head of the Unit of Integration Research at the Hessen State Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration.

Introduction

This report summarizes the main outcomes of a multidisciplinary study carried out from September 2013 to March 2015 by a group of forty researchers from different disciplines (7) and countries (10).

The project *Knowledge for Integration Governance (KING)* was co-funded by the European Commission DG Home Affairs and its activities have been steered by the Ismu Foundation with the aim to feed the debate on integration governance and provide knowledge on the state of play of migrant inclusion throughout the European Union.

To ensure the study's comprehensiveness **seven disciplines** were involved: demography, economics, political science, social science, applied social studies, public administration and European policy. This different expertise deepened the research through utilizing various perspectives. Notably, the inclusion of public administrators in the research team provided insights on the importance of the policy vision.

An analytical and prescriptive combined approach was used. Therefore, moving from the Common Basic Principles on migrants' integration KING's frame is partly shaped on the heuristic model of R. Penninx. This model analyses integration as it occurs in three dimensions (legal-political, socio-economic, cultural-religious) taking into account migrants' and receiving societies' role and position at institutional, collective and individual levels. By looking at these dimensions, KING provides **evidence on integration processes and policies useful to provide recommendations** for a better implementation of the Common Basic Principles of migrants' integration.

The outcomes of the project's analysis have produced more than **fifty papers that** have been used to inform the **background papers** of both the European Integration Forum of April 2014 and the Ministerial Conference under the Italian Presidency of the Council of the European Union (5-6 November 2014).

The **methodology** used included a comprehensive literature review from the seven disciplines. A crucial moment of the project was the subsequent lively brain-storming, that involved all KING researchers, which was carried out during the initial stages of the project. Then, each discipline conducted in-depth studies informed by the projects' outcomes disciplinary concerns: statistical elaboration (demography), quantitative regressions (economics), case studies (political science, social science¹ and public administration), migrants' interviews (applied social studies), and further documents analysis (European policy).

¹ The eight case studies are: Amsterdam, Barcelona, Milan, Turin, Turku, Prague, Warsaw, and Stuttgart. They were studied in depth by the Social Science Unit of KING project and can be downloaded from www.king.ismu.org

Additionally, due to the renewed interest in the Common Basic Principles of Migrants' Integration, the outcomes of the project have also been reorganized to provide **policy recommendations supported by evidence** suggesting concrete application of the principles at different level of governance.

These materials, together with two summaries produced in two different moments of the project, are downloadable from the website: www.king.ismu.org

KING is the acronym of *Knowledge for Integration Governance*

The importance of producing knowledge for understanding integration processes and different mechanisms of governance were the essence of the project since its inception. Indeed, the leading assumption is that knowledge is essential for guiding policies and thus the process of integrating migrants. For achieving this goal, knowledge should shed light on the existing ways to govern integration at the different authority levels and give advice to support sharing activities among diverse contexts.

○ **Knowledge**

Knowledge on integration could be considered as the **awareness on the phenomenon in terms of migration flows, migrants' presence and population's needs**. More deeply, knowing the phenomena changes, by considering quantitative data as well as qualitative information, is the crucial aspect for tracking the transformation occurring in modern societies, understanding necessities and so identifying targets.

In this regard, monitoring represents the main strategy for feeding knowledge and hence guiding policies.

At the same time, the first Common Basic Principle defines integration as a mutual accommodation between migrants and receiving societies. However, to achieve this, it is pivotal that **mutual knowledge, and therefore adjustment, between the two actors takes place**. On one side, Member States, supported by the European Union, ask migrants to learn languages, rules, principles and elements of the receiving country's culture. On the other side, receiving society has been mainly indirectly targeted sponsoring many studies and research that have been carried out to provide information and data on migration and integration. In the frame of this "educative mission" media have also been asked to play a part. Indeed, the result has not achieved the goal; and misleading information is disseminated producing **fake myths** on the matter.

Much of the public discourse about migrants claims they are simply seeking to access benefits, however small, of established welfare states. This undermines the communitarian attitudes towards welfare provision which led originally to welfare systems being established. A growing tendency to blame migrants for a range of social and economic ills, and minorities for poor levels of achievement and social integration, have often exacerbated tensions which are easily manipulated by nationalist and, more recently, even mainstream political parties.

As both groups – migrants and receiving society - should be addressed by policy measures, efforts should therefore be made in **providing education about the reality of migration, introducing majorities to minorities, teaching intercultural communication skills and embedding migrants in organisations to try and help them adapt to insider perspectives**.

The perverse effects of misperceptions and discriminatory attitudes strongly hamper both economic and social integration. For example, some aspects related to cultural or religious identity are often easily stigmatized generating prejudice and discrimination by (individuals, organisations or institutions of) the receiving society.

Sharing knowledge and experiences is one important way to decrease the risks linked to misperceptions and to shape successful inclusive strategies. Knowledge exchange is a well-established idea among the EC's strategies for fostering integration. In fact, comparative studies and research carried out in different countries

and/or analysing different groups have generated a great deal of knowledge regarding the mechanisms of interaction between migrants and receiving societies as well as of other modalities of policies implementation.

This methodology, inspired by the concept of reciprocal teaching, is, however, strongly contextually mediated. In other words, **sharing knowledge implies becoming familiar with experiences of other contexts but taking into account the own environment features.**

Last but not least, **knowledge also has a crucial role in implementing efficient and effective integration policies.** In this regard, observatories are practical measures implemented for guaranteeing longitudinal data and information that is pivotal for policy makers. The final outcome could be the **development of a ‘virtuous circle’ consisting of monitoring and evaluation activities functional to policy implementation and consequentially to integration.**

- **Integration**

Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States (CBP 1). This definition sheds light on the necessity to balance responsibilities between migrants and natives in order to make the integration process effective. From the moment immigrants arrive in a new society, they have basic needs such as finding a home, a job, schools for themselves and their children and health facilities. They also need to establish cooperation and interaction with other individuals and groups, and get to know and use institutions of the new society. This last element indicates the receiving societies’ crucial role in promoting integration. They are called to both provide services addressed to migrants, and accept and manage diversity.

The current picture of migrants’ integration processes in Europe puts the concept of **acceptance of whom is “other by me”** as a starting point for supporting efficient integration paths. On the one hand, people need to get reciprocally closer and, on the other hand, chances – in terms of resources, opportunities and capitals – have to be enjoyed alike by migrants and natives so that integration can be fulfilled.

Becoming an active part of the receiving society implies the need for safety and reassurance. In this regard, it has clearly emerged that **acts of racism and harassment, of which migrants and people belonging to minorities are often the victim, reduce social confidence and so affect the whole process of integration.**

One of the most neglected aspects regarding integration knowledge concerns the perspective of migrants themselves.

The main questions addressed by the KING report asked (i) do migrants seek to be accepted by receiving societies by participating actively and voluntarily in their integration process?; (ii) what kind of aids migrants perceive as useful to their integration?

The KING project found that there is **a strong necessity to create fruitful relations among the different levels of governance, and between governance and the direct target of their policies.**

KING’s results highlighted how often migrants talk about the need to be accepted and the desire to contribute to the receiving society: integration is seen as desirable, as a key goal.

Integration supported by different policies is sought and greatly appreciated. In particular, several measures seemed to be extremely important: opportunities offered to learn and practice the receiving country’s language; providing information about everyday life – particularly regarding systems, rules and regulations governing migration and settlement; offering opportunities and places to meet native people and get to know them; supporting access to employment suited to professional qualifications; recognition of skills and training; training and help to become self-employed; offering volunteering opportunities; help to become independent – by supporting organizations to help migrants solve problems for themselves rather than resolving problems for them.

Acceptance is associated with material security but also with contribution offered to the receiving country, such as being able to access the labour market. Therefore, adaptation is accepted and sought, in particular concerning language and institutional culture, but also in aspiring to living conditions enabling people to succeed. Mixing with a wide range of people is also desired as a form of reciprocal and mutual exchange, although it is rarely achieved.

- **Governance**

Migrant integration governance is still a challenge. It involves different actors across different policy areas at local, national and supranational levels. Responsibilities are divided between the different administrative levels with areas of coordination.

Governance concerns who has the authorities over what. As far as integration is concerned, Member States are in charge. This means that **the national level decides how policies have to be implemented and who their target is.**

However, **at supranational level the EU plays an important role by offering a coherent framework for guiding and supporting Member States' implementation of their policies.**

In addition, depending on contextual characteristics, **some Member States also benefit from the active participation of their subnational levels such as federal states, regions or cities.** These actors can also have a voice in designing integration-related policies. Indeed, the role of local authorities in delivering integration services is a pivotal aspect of integration governance.

Cities, in general, demonstrate the ability to design inventive manners to deal with top-down policies that rarely seem to understand the necessities coming from the ground. Indeed, municipalities are called to concretize national policies by carrying out practices that are able to match the local integration needs on the one hand and the national desires on the other.

At the same time, analysing integration requires consideration of **the existing interconnections between the two silos of migration and integration governance.** As said above, the virtuous circle for implementing efficient and effective policies would foresee a specific attention by policy makers to their context of reference. This means, as previously highlighted, that monitoring becomes a strategic tool guiding policymaking activities. One of the elements to monitoring is the impact and interconnectedness of migration policies on integration processes and policies. To illustrate this, one element of the project focused on the influence of detention upon arrival and integration.

Integration can be governed following a mainstreaming strategy based on the consideration that migrants' inclusion is a cross-cutting issue. This also highlights the dilemma between policies directly addressed to migrants rather than those having the entire population as target.

The report's structure

This report has been conceived in order to fulfil two different goals. The first, is to provide a new contribution to the scientific debate on integration in Europe, and therefore contribute to existing knowledge; the second, is to supply policy makers with evidence and recommendations on how to foster integration processes at different levels of governance. Giving the large amount of material produced not all data from the papers could be included however they are all downloadable from the website www.king.ismu.org.

Therefore, **Chapter 1** describes some aspects of the migration presence in Europe. In particular, the demographic and economic dimensions are explored to better understand the previously established claim that Member States require inflows of migrants in order to replace shrinking populations and ageing work forces. This requires the openness of institutions to the new arrivals together with the open mind-set of European citizens. These two aspects are also investigated.

Chapter 2 reviews how migrant integration policy has been framed in Europe. In doing this, the two silos of integration and migration are considered, in order to understand how policy makers have perceived and therefore tackled those issues. The aim is to highlight the inner tension between the asserted pressure of immigration and the recognition of benefits which has resulted in a willingness to control migrant flows through a process of strict selection. Obviously, this narrow strategy is contrasted by the “shared values” Europe claims to pursue. Moreover, the growing importance of the European level is described as well as the undeniable shift from integration to securitization. This trend has changed how the integration process is perceived in terms of: who is asked to do what. Hence, the KING project has also analysed which groups the different policies target. Finally, the project added depth and nuance to these findings by including the voices of migrants themselves.

The mechanisms of migrants’ integration governance and the different levels of political action are the subjects of **Chapter 3**. European, national, subnational, and local levels are considered in their own specific role, and also in their relation to the other levels. The struggle for competences has clearly appeared as well as tensions between desired goals and reasonable needs. Therefore, alliances between levels, primarily European and city levels and secondly among cities have been put in place. The second has been largely pushed by the European level seeking to face integration needs in the frame of a broader vision of integration, rather than the narrow lens usually used by national policy makers. The result of this complex picture is an intricate mix of actions where civil society and migrant associations play an increasingly larger role. Notwithstanding, despite the urgency of giving direct voice to migrants in order to let them to participate in the policy making process, this remain a slow *work in progress*.

How integration takes place in the three dimensions cited by Penninx’ heuristic model - legal-political, socio-economic, and cultural-religious - is tackled in **Chapter 4**. The KING project has broadly examined how cities have dealt with those issues. This has been based on the awareness that integration challenges are faced primarily by the local level. Therefore, the three dimensions of integration have been analysed, resulting in policy recommendations for the different level of governance.

Chapter 5 is focused on the integration strategies of mainstreaming, monitoring and non-discrimination. **Mainstreaming** has been considered as a desirable, coordinated and harmonised process of decision-making, which brings together different entities. This should be done at all levels in a frame of both horizontal and vertical multilevel governance. Secondly, mainstreaming concerns the way the target population is conceptualized. Specifically, mainstreaming follows the logic of “we as a whole” rather than “us and them” when possible. **Monitoring**, is a strategy that should be put in place at each level of governance. Collecting information on the characteristics and needs of the population makes policy guidance and processes more fruitful. At the same time, monitoring practices provides the data in order to evaluate modalities and results and therefore to rectifying interventions that are not achieving their goals. **Non-discrimination** is also a cross-cutting strategy. As mentioned above, integration policies and practices help migrants’ inclusion into the receiving society but other variables play a crucial role in supporting or hampering the process of becoming integrated. Discriminatory behaviours, particularly at institutional level, are a key barrier to integration. Therefore, implementing policies that are able to foster and propagate non-discriminatory attitudes is a necessity.

In order to make the reading easier, the present report does not have bibliographic references with the exception of KING projects’ papers. Bibliography can be found in each of the project’s papers.

1. THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT IN BRIEF. POPULATION, LABOUR MARKET AND ATTITUDES

Immigration to Europe is by no means a new phenomenon. However, immigration regulation was an invention of the XXth century. As for integration policies, they emerged on national and European political agendas even later, after Western European countries realized that guest workers were not set out to return to their country of origin. Accordingly, integration policies were not designed *ab nihilo* but, on the contrary, were inserted in an already pre-existing and complex context. Consequently, even if the aim (i.e. the need to integrate new migrants into receiving societies) was similar from one place to another, the output; the policy response, was bound to differ. This section offers an overview, though not exhaustive, of the various factors that affect integration policies namely, economics, demography and receiving society's attitude towards the phenomenon.

Migration is a constant aspect of human history, but the scope and features of the phenomenon change according to world economy and politics and vary through different geographical regions. Even within Europe, the story of migration is very different. If immigration started in the Northwest-European countries, other countries such as **Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Norway and Finland**, that used to be emigration countries until the 1980s, started to experience significant immigration in the 1990s and 2000s. In a different manner, still other countries, among them most of the new EU-Member States that accessed in 2004 or after, are experiencing emigration, transit migration and immigration at the same time (Penninx *et al.*, 2014).

Due to contemporary globalization, migration to Europe has accelerated in speed and scale and has become highly diverse in terms of immigrants' characteristics and patterns of spatial distribution. The geographical position of Europe, not surrounded by oceans, but part of the unstable continent of Eurasia, with Africa and the Middle East a few miles away, causes unavoidable propensity to be chosen as destination by migrants. Thousands of asylum seekers drown at sea trying to reach Europe each year.

In the last twenty years, more than 26 million people have migrated to the EU (not including the new member states' migrants after 2004 and 2007) and the percentage of non-communitarian citizens living in the EU is now close to 7% (quite unevenly distributed in the various member states). The trend is likely to continue in the next decades both because of push factors such as high socio-economic inequalities between developed and developing countries that foster job seekers, and the many regional conflicts and authoritarian regimes that create asylum seekers. Pull factors also encourage migration such as the decline and aging of the EU population and the refusal of many native workers to perform low prestige jobs. This fosters the demand for workers willing to accept those jobs and who also pay the related taxes and social insurance contributions (Martinelli, 2014a).

The current anti-migrant, anti-multiculturalism ideology is often created and perpetuated by politicians and the media, making some migrants and minorities too fearful to fully engage with the host society. This impacts upon their mental and physical health and hinders their access to social and economic opportunities. Such ideology legitimises racism while the move towards welfare chauvinism enhances vulnerability and exclusion. There is a need to base the immigration debate on facts and evidence rather than myths and to highlight the important role that migrants play in economies and society and to accept the inevitability of population diversity in a globalised world. Understanding that the world (rather than just particular localities) is changing and highlighting the reality behind immigration may help to generate a more sensible discussion (e.g. surveys have shown that residents think that migration levels are 3 times higher than they are) (Martinielli, 2014a).

1.1 Europe's demographic changes²

○ Migration over the last decade


We now know that the European population is ageing. Total fertility rates in most EU countries fall under two children per woman and the old-age dependency ratios are already fairly high. The trend therefore indicates a shrinking workforce. The rise of social expenditure for welfare and migration seems the ideal solution, provided migrants can contribute to increase the workforce and also act to rejuvenate the host society with the support of “young” population.

Over the past ten years, significant numbers of migrants entered the EU area. Inflows however are not distributed evenly across Europe. Some countries observe a rising net number of migrants (difference between those that arrive and those that leave over a given period) whereas others can still be regarded as emigration countries. To be more specific, over the period 2001-2011, three clusters of countries show three different trends.

A first cluster is made up of five countries (Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) which receive the largest number of migrants compared to the number of departures (a positive net balance, annually around 100 thousand people or above). A second group includes 16 EU countries (Belgium, Sweden, Ireland, Austria, Portugal, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Greece, Denmark, Hungary, Cyprus, Finland, Croatia, Luxembourg, Slovenia and Malta) in which the annual net contribution in 2001-2011, although positive, was not as big as in the previous group: no more than 50 thousand people. A third cluster covers countries with a negative balance in the decade 2001-2011. They all belong to the Eastern Europe, namely: Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, and Estonia (Figure 1). Within this latter group Romania was the country with the largest negative net balance (minus 161 thousand people annually) while Estonia was the country with the smallest negative net migration (minus one thousand people) (Testa, 2014a; Blangiardo, 2014a).

² Contents taken from G.C. Blangiardo, 2014b

Figure 1 - Average net contribution (thousands of people added/lost annually) in the 28 EU countries. Years 2001-2011.




Source: Testa, 2014a; based on Eurostat data

Influxes are mostly made up of people in their working age (15-64) and therefore considerably contribute to increasing the European workforce.

The contribution of migration to the EU working age population more than doubled over the period 1991-2011. Overall, there were almost 13 million people added to the EU-28 working-age population (15-64) in the decade 2001-2011 compared to 5.6 million in the previous decade 1991-2001. There were considerable differences by age. A peak of additional people in the age group 25-29 can be observed for the EU-28 as a whole (Figure 2). At these ages there were around 1,304 thousand women and 1,120 thousand men added to the EU population in the decade 2001-2011 (there were slightly more for the male population in the subsequent age group 30-34). In the previous ten years the number of EU additional people in the same ages (25-29) due to migration was considerably smaller: around 554 thousand women and 337 thousand men; moreover in this former period, a second peak of migrants is visible in the 35-39 age group for males (see Figure 2). This is larger than that observed at ages 25-29 (364 thousand men). This result seems to suggest that the workforce added between 1991 and 2001 was not only of a smaller size but also had a different age structure, i.e., more mature than that arrived in the most recent years. At each working-age group, the net contribution of migration to the EU workforce was larger in the most recent decade, 2001-2011, than in the previous one, 1991-2001. The differences are striking at ages 25-29 after which the number of additional females and males in 2001-2011 decline steeply and tend to converge with those of 1991-2001. There are

also some gender differences: migrants were more often females than males in the central ages 20 to 34 years in 1991-2001 and in the ages 20 to 29 in 2001-2011, as a consequence, the age profile of female migrants is steeper than that of male migrants in 1991-2001 as well as in 2001-2011 (Testa, 2014a.11).

Figure 2 - Additional contribution to the EU working-age population - 1991-2011 (thousands of people acquired throughout the decade). Age profiles. EU-28



Source: Testa, 2014a; based on Eurostat data

Some further consideration should be given to the contrast that positive net migrations would have towards the aging of population and the correspondent social spending on welfare. Short-term changes in ageing rates and in old-age dependency ratios can be expected to be downwards when immigration prevails, and upwards when emigration prevails, as the majority of migrants are quite young. But over longer period changes will depend on the cumulated effect of immigrants, as some of them will get older in destination countries.

Taking a long-term perspective, if we consider the aging rates and the old-age dependency ratios referred to life-years that the additional (or lost) population will spend in the destination country (or will not spend into the country of origin), we can see that the values of the two indicators are much higher than the current ones.

Table 1 - EU-28: ageing indicators for native and acquired population

Ageing indicators	According to:		
	Age distribution of residents 2001-2011 (A)	Age distribution of additional people acquired in 2001-2011 (B)	Life-years that will be spent by people acquired in 2001-2011 (C)
Ageing rate (*)	16.7	2.4	34.3
Old age dependency ratio (**)	27.4	3.4	55.5

(*) % of people aged 65 or more (col. A and B) & % of life-years spent in age 65 or more (col. C)

(**) People aged 65 or more per 100 aged 20-64 (col. A and B) & years spent in age 65 or more per 100 years spent in age 20-64 (col. C)

Source: Blangiardo's elaboration on Eurostat data

The number of additional life-years to be spent by migrants in retirement ages is quite high for many EU

receiving countries: it is more than half the years spent in work. As a consequence, although migration is mainly a resource for the EU labour force, we should also consider the relevant costs in terms of welfare system that should be paid for migrants in a long term scenario under the assumption of definitive settlement in the country of destination.

- *Migration trends*

This trend is likely to be similar in the next 20 to 40 years, despite rather inconclusive and contradictory research, as Kaczmarczyk (2014) shows. This is because migration, as a complex phenomenon, is difficult to forecast and a lot has to do with the methodology used and/or the stance adopted in undertaking a projection. Migration is complex for several reasons. It is a social process that may be driven by different elements such as dynamics inherent to the phenomenon (presence of migrant networks and transnational social spaces) and the significant impact of migration policies.

Unlike births and deaths, mobility is a multifaceted phenomenon (from circular to settlement migration) which is reflected in the poor quality and low reliability of migration data. Difficulties with forecasting international migration are clearly visible when analysing the migration projections that are available. In most cases the presented outcomes are mainly a product of (sometimes strict) assumptions. On one hand, some projections assume that net migration will converge to zero in the long term. On the other, expected labour market needs are acknowledged as a factor leading to increase in the scale of the inflow in the future.

Considering our knowledge on mobility and migration, future large-scale immigration to the EU countries is inevitable. This is for many reasons including persistent wage and living conditions gaps between North and South countries, differences in the economic growth rates, structural demand for foreign labour, as noted in most EU countries, and presence of strong migrant networks. These factors can be mitigated by migration policies but they cannot change the picture significantly, as shown by most of the empirical evidence. These expectations are in line with forecasts discussed in this paper (Kaczmarczyk, 2014).

Moreover, immigration to Europe seems very important for the future of European economies and societies. Shrinking populations are expected to challenge the economic situation in many EU countries. There are several solutions at hand, including increasing participation rates, changes in retirement age and the utilization of labour market reserves but still immigration remains inescapable (and useful). This is shown by the data pointing to the importance of immigration for current population balances of well developed countries which is likely to gain in importance in the future.

Immigrants are not only expected to influence the age structures of European populations. According to the forecasts presented a significant inflow in the labour market is expected – both in quantitative (life-years contribution in terms of the labour market activity) as well as qualitative terms (filling labour market gaps, providing certain skills). Last but not least, available studies show that even if immigration is not an ultimate solution it can become a serious relief for the sustainability of European welfare states (Kaczmarczyk, 2014).

- *Migration's effect on receiving societies: long-term demographic scenarios per country*

The population usually resident in the EU-28 has been estimated at 507 million on 1st January 2014 (Eurostat, October 2014). However, assuming that the annual number of births remains constant - at the average level recorded from 2002 to 2011 (roughly within the last two population censuses in state members) - and that the current mortality probability by age and gender will be unchanged, the corresponding EU stationary population should be only 416 million, 18% less than the current figure³. This means that the 5.2 million

³ A stationary population holds two issues: a) "zero grow", i.e. inflows (births and immigrations) are fully balanced by outflows (deaths and emigrations); b) age and sex distribution not subject to changing. The stationariness is a final condition that can be achieved

annual births that occurred in the decade 2002-2011 will be unable to maintain, at the present life expectancy levels, the current EU number of residents.

If we take into account the net contribution of 1.3 million people from outside the EU (usually related to international migrations) that have been added annually (on average) during this decade the stationary population rises to 486 million: i.e. only 4% less than the current residents.

Migration could be considered as fundamental to support the EU population, but it should be remembered that even if a high level of net inflows is maintained – i.e. similar to that at the beginning of the new century - **migration alone will not be able to halt the trend towards a reduction of the total number of residents living in EU-28.** In particular, whilst there are inadequate births in EU-15 to ensure the stability of the total residents, for the newer EU members (EU 13) the reductive effects of insufficient births will be aggravated by an overall negative net migration.

A small number of EU member states will increase in population size namely: Ireland, Spain, Cyprus, Luxembourg and, to a lesser extent, Belgium, Sweden and The United Kingdom. In contrast, low births coupled with persistent negative net migrations suggest substantial reductions of the total of residents (more than 50% less) in Lithuania, Romania, Latvia and Bulgaria. Further considerable reductions (over 20%) could also be seen in Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Estonia and, the sole exception among EU 15, for Germany.

If we consider the change in the number of residents without taking into account geographical mobility, it is easy to see this leads to the demographic decline in virtually all members of the EU 28, with the sole exception of Ireland.

Table 2 - Actual EU population and its expected changes towards the model of stationariness according to recent natural and migratory demographic dynamics

	<i>EU 28</i>	<i>EU 15</i>	<i>EU 13</i>
UR- Usually residents on 1 st January 2014 (millions)	507	402	105
Annual births on average 2002-2011 (millions)	5,2	4,1	1,1
SP1- Corresponding stationary population ^a (millions)	416	335	81
Annual Additional/lost population 2002-2011 (millions)	1,3	1,5	-0,2
SP2- Corresponding stationary population ^b (millions)	486	417	69
Change SP1 vs. UR	-18%	-17%	-23%
Change SP2 v. UR	-4%	+4%	-34%


^a According to a constant annual total of births (average 2002-2011) and no change of 2012 mortality probability by age and gender.

^b According to a constant annual total of births (average 2002-2011 level), no change of 2012 mortality rates by age and gender and a constant annual addition (or loss) of population by age and gender equivalent to the average 2002-2011.

Source: Blangiardo's elaboration on Eurostat data

when, for a long number of years, both the frequency of births and the death probabilities are constant (and also constant net migrations by sex and age could be considered). The model of stationariness could give a benchmark scenario to assess what will be the final effects of the current demographic conditions (as to births, deaths and net migrations) if they will be kept constant over time.

Figure 3 – EU 28 members: expected % change in the total residents towards the model of stationariness according to recent natural and migratory demographic dynamics



Source: Blangiardo’s elaboration on Eurostat data

○ **Workforce shortages**

The regressive scenario for the whole EU-28 residents is still valid, with even greater severity, when considering the active age population dynamics. Indeed according to the stationary model without migration, reproducing the current levels of births and mortality rates, the EU-28 population aged 20-64 will fall from 307 million (as recorded on 1st January 2013) to 178 million (-42%) when stationariness is reached. Only by including constant support through migration into the model, is the active age population decline less severe: from the current 307 million to the expected 224 million at reaching of the stationariness (-27%).

Again the presence of migration acts differently in EU-15 countries compared to EU-13. While migratory flows slow down the fall of the working age population in EU-15, they often increase the fall in the new members of EU post enlargements. For some of the latter, the lack of migration would even result in an increase of active age population. This is the case of Lithuania, Romania and Latvia, where currently the active age

population stock is affected by past losses due to out migration.

Table 3 - Actual EU population aged 20-64 and its expected changes towards the model of stationarity according to recent natural and migratory demographic dynamics


	EU 28	EU 15	EU 13
R- Residents on 1 st January 2013 (millions)	307	240	67
SP1- Stationary population without migrations ^a (millions)	178	126	52
SP2- Stationary population with migrations ^b (millions)	224	179	45
Change SP1 vs. R	-42%	-48%	-22%
Change SP2 v. R	-27%	-25%	-33%

^a According to a constant annual total of births (average 2002-2011) and no change of 2012 mortality probability by age and gender.

^b According to a constant annual total of births (average 2002-2011 level), no change of 2012 mortality rates by age and gender and a constant annual addition (or loss) of population by age and gender equivalent to the average 2002-2011.

Source: Blangiardo's elaboration on Eurostat data

Figure 4 - EU 28 members: expected % change in the 20-64 aged residents towards the model of stationariness according to recent natural and migratory demographic dynamics



Source: Blangiardo's elaboration on Eurostat data

1.2 The role of the labour market structure⁴

Migrant integration depends on the labour market opportunities that migrants find at arrival and on the human capital selection which is achieved by migration policies. We refer, for example, to economic migrants from EU countries who may move because of free movement which reduces the migration cost and the disparity in wage levels which acts as an incentive, or to refugees who come because they are fleeing violence, or irregular migrants who do not comply with national policy.

The construction of a common market and a common monetary structure in Europe, has not been followed by the needed harmonisation of the labour market and the employment system. Instead several different trends can be traced and a complex picture emerges.

Despite the complexity, some trends can be identified. Despite integration or migration policies, labour markets follow their own internal rules which strongly impact on the economic assimilation of migrants and, therefore, on their chances to be integrated in the host society. Hence, if it is possible to implement anti-discrimination measures or to introduce changes in the bargaining system, for instance, it is hardly possible to act on the job-opportunities offered by the labour market. The demands in the primary sector cannot be transformed into opportunities for high skilled migrants or into possibilities for occupational growth in the short run. At the same time the domestic service sector continues to adsorb a large part of the female supply without offering many chances of upward mobility.

There are systematic differences across advanced economies in their socio-economic regimes that strongly impact on the integration process. They distinguish between four types of labour market structures: coordinated market economies (CMEs), which prevail in the Nordic countries as well as in **Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium** and to some extent **Germany**; the liberal market economies (LMEs) – which include **United Kingdom** and **Ireland** -; the Southern-statist mixed market economies (MMEs) – **Spain, France, Italy, Greece** and **Portugal** – and last the emerging market economy (EMEs) of the Central European countries.

Linking the types of socio-economic regimes to migration shows a number of insights in migrants' outcomes in terms of economic integration. In broad terms, the quantitative and qualitative differences in immigration in the different European countries can be referred to the socio-economic regime variation. Indeed, opportunities for low-paid and low-skilled employment attract many migrants, while education and training institutions differently shape the domestic supply of labour.

Compared to coordinated market economies (CMEs), in liberal market economies (LMEs) immigrant-native gaps in low-skilled employment are attenuated. On the other hand, mixed (MME) and emerging market economies (EMEs) seem to disadvantage immigrants when it comes to skilled employment, but provide better conditions than coordinated market economies with regard to participation, unemployment, and temporary employment.

Countries with so-called flexible labour markets, limited regulation, lower minimum wages and lower trade union density appear, initially, more favourable destinations for immigrants, enabling them to find their first employment.

The role trade unions play in influencing migrant integration in the economic dimension can be pivotal either through direct actions such as protecting interests of migrants, by raising migrants' awareness of their entitled rights and, more interestingly, they act indirectly through several means such as monitoring compliance with relevant legal regulation or, more importantly, bargaining for an extended coverage of collective agreements.

⁴ Contents taken from Kahanec et al., 2014a/2014b/2014c

In fact, where higher collective agreement coverage rates exist migrants are more integrated in the labour market; obviously the other side of the coin is the preclusion of mass immigration from this system. This is the case in Nordic countries where access to the labour market is strongly protected but once accepted, migrants face less discrimination or insecurity, equal wages and upward mobility. Moreover, in those countries migrants are less employed in sectors linked to personal services, restoration or construction.

Higher union density increases the unemployment gap between immigrants and natives. On the other hand, collective bargaining coverage seems to have no significant effects.

In line with this argument, in contrast to Ireland or the **UK, Sweden**, as a country with a very high trade union density and a relatively rigid labour market, demonstrates one of the lowest immigrant employment rates in Europe.

In contrast, fragmented bargaining systems in liberal market and emerging economies as well as the informal system (in MMEs) permit easy access to more precarious work: as it is a flexible system that is therefore associated with high migration rates. This system allows employers to take advantage of the migrant labour force as it responds easily to the volatile demand of the labour market. In particular, Southern countries have a larger number of new migrants who are employed in households and in the construction sector – at least up until the crisis started-; whereas the health and community service sectors employ the most migrants in the **UK** and Ireland. In **Spain**, migrants have been harshly affected. The cost of informality has weighed both on migrants, in terms of the impossibility to claim benefits and on the receiving society in terms of omitted tax revenue.

Finally, the dual bargaining system present in **Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium and Germany**, that clearly divide insiders from outsiders is not effective for natives or migrants and it is combined with of informality of the outsiders. This is more evident in **Germany**, where immigrants are over-represented in atypical employment while natives are covered by collective bargaining and enjoy of employment security.

The link between the skill formation system and the industrial relation system clearly impacts on the inclusiveness of migrants. Indeed, whereas in CMEs the two systems are strongly interconnected, in the LMEs the situation is reversed; as a result employers in coordinated market economies are interested in migrants with specific skills whereas in liberal market economies migrants with general and transferable skills are preferred.

Accordingly, skill acquisition and the production regime is supported by different education and training systems. Hence, general skills, easily transferable across firms and industries, are supplied by public education. The latter also fully participate in the “dual system” that combines public education with training provided “on-the-job”. Finally, companies provide firm-specific skills that are the least transferable. Employers are mainly involved in the dual-skills formation system through which trust and knowledge are put in place and, as a consequence, migrants can be strongly affected by their exclusion from the process from the outset; accordingly, they have easy access in general skill regimes, as it is the case in **UK**.

This aspect should be taken into account not only with regards to newly arrived migrants, who are excluded by this recruitment system, but also second and third generation migrants. In this case, the drop-out phenomenon affects different levels. In one case, CMEs, it can prevent migrants from the entering the labour market, in the other, in LMEs, it can be the reason for an early start but a consequent lack of upgrading.

Employment protection of regular contracts reduces the gap in the prevalence of low-skilled employment between immigrants and natives; however, it pushes immigrants into temporary employment.

Employment protection of temporary contracts has similar effects on immigrant-native gaps in low-skilled as well as temporary employment. In addition, it disadvantages immigrants vis-à-vis the natives in terms of participation and employment gaps.

However, that higher welfare spending may lock immigrants into their existing positions and make them less fluid. We conclude that migrants generally grease the wheels of their receiving labour markets, but that this potential is not fully realized due to extant barriers to mobility.

Labour market mobility tends to reduce low-skill employment amongst migrants; anti-discrimination measures tend to reduce unemployment gap between migrants and natives.

We find that migrants respond to labour shortages more than natives in EU-15 countries, and thus provide more efficient labour allocation in the EU-15. We also show that the immigrants' responsiveness depends on countries' economic and institutional contexts. In particular, we find that immigrants are especially responsive in countries with high unemployment rates, in economically more developed countries (with high GDP), and in countries that provide immigrants with good access their labour markets, and/or social democratic welfare systems.

→ **Temporary and circular migration are possible, but can only be effectively encouraged by the real portability of social security and pension benefits together with providing real health care access.**

Furthermore, working with sending countries' institutions in order to provide better use of remittances in terms of a safety net in the country of origin can have the result of decreasing inequalities there.

→ **Governments should focus on the role of labour market access as a key to successful integration, rather than thinking about large-scale social engineering projects.**

→ **Bilateral or multilateral frameworks should be put in place in order to match skills and gaps.**

1.3 Receiving societies: between discrimination, misconceptions and xenophobia

Attitudes and behaviour of the majority may impact the discriminated minority group, while this is rarely the case for any similar attitudes and behaviour on the part of minority.

In liberal democracies, legislation is the highest form of institutional regulation of inclusion and exclusion. The existence and substance of legal discrimination is determining laws. In nation states, the political exclusion of alien immigrants is the major source of exclusion. It is a generally accepted and legitimized form of exclusion. The general legislation, regulations, norms and values and structure of receiving society may not be geared to the particular needs, characteristics or circumstances of newcomers, even if such arrangements stipulate equality in the formal sense.

Societies are regulated by laws and rules that are made by and accepted by majorities of national citizens. Immigrants do not influence the creation and implementation of such arrangements. Still more important, many of these arrangements legitimize distinction between citizens and non-citizen residents as reflected in differential social rights (i.e. access to social assistance or state pension), industrial rights (employment benefits) or political and civil rights (right to vote or to organize).

Within institutions and organizations that indirectly exclude certain groups or categories like women, immigrants or disabled persons, the simple application of existing rules, habits and customs can be enough to

cause the unintended, unconscious exclusion of these categories. For instance, staff recruitment procedures, including culture-biased tests, may have serious exclusionary effect.

The reverse may also be the case. Racist and xenophobic ideas about groups may exist, while institutions, organizations and individuals entertaining such ideas may not be in a position to translate the ideas into discriminatory acts, or may refrain from such actions because discrimination would harm their own interest.

Institutional social exclusion, through legislation, regulations and conventions - either formulated and implemented explicitly and purposely, or adopted as an unintentional consequence of the practical functioning of existing institutions - is the most powerful mechanism of social discrimination.

- ➔ **The institutional setting is often mono-cultural at present: cross-cutting strategies of integration must be changed in order to adapt to diversity, so that they can take into account all variables (e.g. age, gender, ethnicity) and be sensitive to differences both between and within different diverse groups.**
- ➔ **Institutions should acknowledge and promote the wide ranging benefits of diversity and should make wide-ranging efforts to change the negative discourse surrounding migrants, by presenting diversity as an opportunity.**

- ***The public opinion***

Much of the public discourse about migrants claims they are simply seeking to access benefits, however small, of established welfare states and thus undermining the solidarity attitudes towards welfare provision which led originally to welfare systems being established. **A growing tendency to blame migrants for a range of social and economic ills, and minorities for poor levels of achievement and social integration**, has often exacerbated tensions which are easily manipulated by nationalist and, more recently, even mainstreams political parties.

Political parties and movements deserve special attention; nationalist-populist right-wing parties and movements with strong xenophobic and anti-immigrant positions have recently gained ground in many European countries and can feed a vicious circle of more obstacles to integration, more cultural and ethnic tensions, more demands for securitisation policies. The perverse effects of misconceptions and discriminatory attitudes strongly hamper both economic and social integration. For example, some aspects related to cultural or religious identity are often easily stigmatized generating prejudice and discrimination by (individuals, organisations or institutions of) the receiving society. That leads – even if access is legally guaranteed - to fewer opportunities and lower outcomes for migrants in domains such as employment, education, health and housing. Evidence shows that national and local media also have an important role in shaping the attitudes of natives.

Over the years, **and according to Eurobarometer data, the perception of immigration as one of the two most important problems facing country has varied over the period 2003-2013.** From 0 to 50% of respondents (all countries considered except Spain that is an outlier with a peak up to 65% in 2006) across Europe range immigration as one of the two most important problems. The **UK** and **Malta** have the two highest trends in this regard as they respectively oscillate between 20 and 40% and 15 to 50% over the period. Overall, the figures hint at a positive correlation between the size of the migrant population and anti-migrant opinion, even if the authors warn against hasty conclusion. Other variables should be considered such as the actual level of integration that may weigh against negative opinion or else the immigrant position of the political offer (Poletti, Regalia, 2014a).

Immigration is perceived by citizens of EU countries more as a cultural problem than an economic one. Policy-scores highlight that anti-immigration attitudes relate more to the perception of a cultural threat than

to the perception of an economic threat. Of course exceptions exist. Indeed, much evidence in the **UK** suggests that, on the contrary, the cultural issue is subsidiary to the economic one: they take “our” jobs is the familiar complaint.

The regression carried out confirms that dissatisfaction with the economy, politically conservative, low education attainment tend to match negative attitude towards immigration. Political positioning and education attainment weigh more than other variables considered, such as satisfaction with the economy; professional situation (employed, unemployed, student, inactive); political ideology (self-placement); education level; and the control for gender, age, satisfaction with life in general, and political interest (Poletti, Regalia, 2014a).

- ➔ **Integration policies should encompass measures concerning the attitudes and behaviours of settled population (natives and migrants previously arrived) towards newcomers, as i.e. through national education curricula.**
- ➔ **Migrants and receiving society should be addressed by policy measures, efforts should be made in providing education about the reality of migration, introducing majorities to minorities, teaching intercultural communication skills, myth-busting.**
- ➔ **Media campaigns should increase awareness about the positive effect migrants have on growth, national income and innovation.**
- ➔ **There is a great need to focus initiatives on receiving communities as they strongly participate in the integration process but are too often neglected in intercultural measures.**

2. THE FRAMING OF MIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICY

When studying integration policies, the first topic to analyse is how different political and social actors perceive and frame immigrant integration. A frame is (a reconstruction of) the problem definition of a policy issue, including the underlying assumptions about its causes and the remedies for it. This means looking at how the problem is actually defined and explained. In terms of problem definition, the first question is how immigration is perceived: is it seen as a problem or as opportunity? Who has the moral and/or legal right to be/become an immigrant? Who are the wanted and unwanted immigrants? For immigrants who are actually present in the host society, the basic question is whether they are seen as “foreigners”, as “temporary guests” or as permanent members of the society for whom the state accepts the same responsibilities as for native citizens, guaranteeing the same rights and providing the same facilities.

Frames cannot always be analysed directly but have to be reconstructed from policy documents and political discourses. When a policy is defined, there is generally an explicit formulation of a perceived problem and of the desired outcome of the specific efforts that are taken by policies. Such verbal, politically debated statements in and about policy documents contain the essential elements of policy frames. The elements analysed here and compared are: general assumptions about, and orientations on, causes of the problem and remedies as well as basic concepts used (or explicitly rejected) in some of the main European documents, general aims of policies at different levels of governance, policy shifts occurring in the way integration is perceived, and definition of the main target groups.

2.1 *General assumptions, orientations and basic concepts used*

Since integration policies are defined politically by (the majorities within) the receiving society, there is an inherent danger of representing the expectations and demands of this society, or dominant parts of it, rather than the possibility that these policies be defined on the basis of participation, negotiation and agreement with immigrant groups.

The development of the concept of integration in policies (i.e. the specific meaning that is given explicitly or implicitly to integration in policy formulation and practice) should be understood against the background of how immigration has been framed in Europe. While the United States and Canada define themselves as countries built by immigration and immigrants, Northwest-European countries in the post-war period did exactly the opposite in their guest worker policies: they started to attract hands for their booming economies but on a temporary basis, ideally without their families and with an explicit expectation of return. From such

a perspective, in the last century there was no need of integration policies in the legal/political and cultural/religious dimensions that later has been recognized as crucial, while integration in the socio-economic dimension was pursued only as far and as long as required by their (temporary) stay.

2.1.1 Immigration: how policy-makers perceive it

At the European level immigration is perceived both as a problem, in term of control, and as an opportunity in term of economic growth and partial and inescapable remedy to the aging society and the skills shortages in certain sectors of the labour market.

In terms of policy, migration has been essentially framed as a security or a legal issue. Security features strongest (60.3 per cent of all measures) in an analysis which included 116 EU policy measures from the introduction of the third pillar in the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 to 2013 (Heidbreder, 2014a). The strong concentration on restrictive measures overall is evident. In contrast, legal measures granting rights account for a maximum of three measures a year in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2007. Notably, from 2005 there is also an increase in measures that deal with both restrictions and rights.

The initial instrument choice in the EU framework had far reaching consequences. Initially framed as a security issue, the policy competences are embedded in this particular area of EU competences, under the DG Home Affairs portfolio, with specific decision making modes and actors.

The first document provided by the European Commission on migration, the *Communication on a Community Immigration Policy* in 2000 proposed a new approach to immigration. According to the Commission,

“there is a growing recognition that, in this new economic and demographic context, the existing “zero” immigration policies which have dominated thinking over the past 30 years are no longer appropriate”⁵.

The same idea has been reaffirmed specifically in relation to an aging society. Indeed, although it is clear that immigration cannot be the solution to the shrinking population, it remains inescapable (Kaczmarczyk, 2014). In the Conclusion of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Members States on the integration of Third Country Nationals (9905/14), the Council recognizes the central role of migration “given the demographic shrinking in Member States and the shortages in certain sectors of the European Labour Market” (page 4).

This vision does not seem to match national perspectives and a difference emerged between countries that quickly recognized themselves as immigration countries and those which struggled to face this reality. Nonetheless the majority of **European countries have developed an explicitly anti-immigration rhetoric**. Immigration has been perceived in particular ways. After labour migration had stopped in the mid-1970s, there was a growing contradiction between the facts of immigration and the denial of defining themselves as immigration countries. While some countries like **Sweden** and **the Netherlands** started integration policies respectively in 1975 and in the early 1980s, most national governments in Europe maintained the illusion of immigrants' temporariness and return till the late 1990s and 2000s. Therefore they confined themselves to *ad hoc* adaptive measures, in practice leaving the integration responsibility to the local level of cities and to parties in civil society such as trade unions, churches and welfare organisations (Penninx *et al.*, 2014a).

Since 2001, international political terrorism, brought migrants into focus from a security perspective. Migration thus became associated first and foremost with problems and threats and as such has risen to the top of the political agenda in many EU-countries. Controlling and fighting irregular migration become one of the main aims of national governments, particularly in some countries.

⁵ European Commission, *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “On a Community Immigration Policy”*, COM(2000)757final, p. 6.

Between 2000 and 2014 the reluctance of Member States to deal with admission rules have had the effect of forcing the Commission to lighten its approach on legal admission and to opt for a selected approach regarding labour migration.

Lately the emphasis has been put specifically on the economic growth, as in the communication “An open and secure Europe: making it happen” (2014), where we read that:

“Demographic changes, in particular the shrinking of the working population in Europe, coupled with significant skill shortages in certain sectors (notably engineering, IT and health care) hinder the EU’s productivity and thus its economic recovery. Increasing global competition for skills and talents affects labour markets in many Member States and will be a decisive factor for Europe’s economic prosperity in the decade ahead. **During the past 15 years, the EU has followed a sector-by-sector approach to legal migration.** This has resulted in a common legal framework, which regulates the admission of certain categories of persons, recognises rights and sanctions violations. It has also fostered a shared commitment of Member States on integration and return. It is time now to consolidate all this within a more coherent EU common migration policy that also takes into account the short and long-term economic needs”.⁶

At national level each state stresses migration in relation to national labour shortages, outlining how far Europe still is from being a single market.

The aspects mentioned above had and still have an impact on the local level. For example, **considering immigration as a temporary phenomenon useful to the national labour market corresponds, at local level, with an integration frame based on early reception policies almost exclusively in order to face primary needs.** Integration policies of cities have often started as early reception policies for refugees and/or migrant workers. In the cases of **Prague, Warsaw and Turku** for example, reception of refugees formed the starting point for policies. In other cases specific groups of immigrants, such as guest workers in Amsterdam and Stuttgart, became target groups of policies because their position in the local society was perceived as problematic and they faced barriers to accessing public facilities. As a consequence, such early policies started as policies in the welfare sector: social benefits, housing, health. **The current picture shows cities still focused on meeting migrants' needs in a pragmatic way, even if they are more aware of their role and of the strategies they can and desire to put in place** (Penninx *et al.*, 2014b).

2.1.1.1 Who is the preferred type of migrant?

The most commonly stated aspiration of the European Union and individual Member States is to attract the “best and brightest” workers.

The *Post Stockholm Strategic Guidelines*, adopted in the Conclusion of the European Council of the 27 June 2014, includes the widely held idea of the need for Europe to remain an attractive destination for talents and skills and to maximize opportunities for legal migration in order to mitigate the effects of the recent economic crisis. An important innovation in this area, is the invitation to have an informed dialogue with the business community.

Again, in the most recent communication from the Commission *An open and secure Europe: making it happen* (COM(2014)154 final), as well as in Juncker’s guidelines *A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change*⁷ and in the *Mission letter to the Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship Avramopoulos*⁸, the need to **attract talents encouraging and enhancing the recognition of**

⁶ COM(2014)154 final http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/basic-documents/docs/an_open_and_secure_europe_-_making_it_happen_en.pdf p. 4

⁷ http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/docs/pg_en.pdf

⁸ http://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/cwt/files/commissioner_mission_letters/avramopoulos_en.pdf

foreign qualifications and professional skills, in particular in putting to good use the skills and qualifications of legally resident migrants is clearly expressed.

This idea can be traced through various documents. The Communication on *Immigration, Integration and Employment* of 2003, mentioned the possibility of extending to Third Country Nationals the scope of the Directive on recognition of qualifications as the European Economic and Social Committee had suggested (ibid, p. 27).

In the *Second Annual Report on Migration and Integration* of 2007, the Commission alludes again to the importance of recognition of academic and professional qualifications and expresses that the procedure is often different from that applying to EU/EEA nationals in a number of countries (ibid: 17).

The Integration Agenda of 2011 emphasizes some of the challenges such as the low employment levels of migrants, high levels of “over-qualification”, increasing risks of social exclusion or gaps in educational achievement.

It should be noted that, the new qualification Directive contains a provision specifically devoted to the recognition of qualification for refugees. Specifically, the recast Directive 2011/95/EU highlights the importance of ensuring an equal treatment between beneficiaries of international protection and nationals in the context of the existing recognition procedures for foreign diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications. In this regard, Member States are also called to give support to those beneficiaries of international protection who are unable to provide documentary evidence of their qualifications.

Although the fact that facilitating **the recognition of qualifications** could be of a great help in order to reduce the existing gap between, for instance employment rates between natives and migrants, we should be aware that this **would not be sufficient**. In the US, the world’s multicultural melting pot, people with a white sounding name have 30% higher chance to obtain a job than a person with a black sounding name, despite the fact that they may both have the same qualifications. This is therefore a question of non-discrimination.

- ➔ **Accompanying the need of the qualifications recognition the fight against discrimination remains a priority.**
- ➔ **Monitoring labour market systems (supply and demand) is necessary for not wasting the benefit of qualification of recognitions.**

Finally, at the national level, Member States’ desires should be addressed to attract the best and brightest workers related to the specific national/local labour market demands. As pointed out by Kaczmarczyk (2014),

the future labour market needs are to be assessed both in quantitative and qualitative terms. European Migration Network (2011) looks at the labour shortages on the sectorial level and attempts to answer the question to which extent they could be addressed by inflowing foreign workers (the study covers the period 2004-2010 and is mostly devoted to analysis of migration policies as useful or not in the context of future needs).

Based on the Labour Force Survey (LFS) data a clearly two-tier structure of the labour market needs has been identified. On the one hand, EU member states experienced shortages both in sectors/occupations such as engineers, health workers, IT specialists (where the quality of labour does matter) and in construction, agriculture, basic services and domestic workers (quantity).

Against this background it is not surprising that in most of the EU countries third-country nationals are concentrated in the highly skilled and low skilled jobs (Kaczmarczyk, 2014).

To sum up, against the declared desire to attract “the best and the brightest” it is quite clear that Europe is still not able to fully use the skills already present. Moreover, the limited possibilities to use intra EU-mobility rights are a great disincentive to migrants who wish to maximize employment upgrading.

- **Migrant brain waste should be avoided or at least reduced by monitoring the match and non-match between supply and demand.**
- **Migrants should, where possible and appropriate, be selected on the basis of their skills, thereby reducing skill waste and facilitating their entry into employment.**
- **Intra EU-mobility rights should be extended to certain migrant categories.**

2.1.2 Integration: how policy makers perceive it

How integration is perceived is a central question in order to understand how policies frame integration. The answer to this question is part of the problem definition and of the eventual solutions envisaged. The same question could be put in a more explicit manner highlighting the exclusion/inclusion dilemma: for immigrants already present in the host society, are they seen as foreigners, as temporary guests or as an established members of the society for whom the state accepts the same responsibilities as for native citizens, guaranteeing the same rights and providing the same facilities? The following paragraphs aim to provide an answer to these questions to draw an idea of how integration policy is framed starting from the European level, and then going through the national and the local contexts.

Different models for framing and managing integration have been firstly defined by the national level and therefore the local level during the last decades. The **British** and **Dutch** multicultural approaches or the **French** tendency to assimilate migrants have been two main approaches taken the XXth century. Other Member States have tried to develop their own mechanisms to face the challenges of migration. The well-known integration models have been feeding the debate for the last ten years undergoing constant scrutiny particularly following terrorist attacks or episodes of rebellion in some working-class districts in **France** and in the **UK** (Penninx *et al.*, 2014b). It could be argued that this has resulted in an acceleration of a process where opposite models of assimilation and multiculturalism revised themselves to a point of convergence.

2.1.2.1 Old files, same aims

In analysing how integration is and has been perceived at the European level, European institutions' statements on integration are usually considered as starting from the year 2000 when, after the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, the Commission started to express itself on the matter. Nonetheless, there are a number of previous documents published by the Commission of the European Communities from the 1980s in which traces of what later become central in the institutional debate about integration policy were already outlined.

In a Consultation on Migration Policy in March 1979, the Commission of the European Communities stated the “equal treatment as regards living and working conditions, social security provisions, vocational training, adult education and especially the education of migrants workers' children, questions concerning health and accommodation” (COM(79)115).

In a European File of 1980, entitled “The European Community and migrant Workers” (COM 9/80), there is a clear invitation to guarantee the free movement of Community migrant workers, stimulating the coordination of national policies on migrants from third countries, promoting the elimination of discrimination over living conditions, and specific measures in the social and educational areas.

In the *Guidelines for a Community policy on migration* (COM(85)48final) the importance to promote the full participation of migrants in local elections is underlined. In June 1989 the Commission published a report on *The social integration of third country migrants residing on a permanent and lawful basis in the Member States* in which there is the first extended commentary on the legal situation of migrants, the importance of nationality acquisition, the unemployment situation, education, housing and living conditions (SEC(89)924final).

A second report called *Policies on immigration and the social integration of migrants in the European Community* (SEC(90)1813final) published in 1990 focused on the Single European Market and the control over immigration. In a paragraph entitled “Integration or what else?”, the general meaning of integration is defined as “be one of us socially, economically and, at least in a rudimentary sense, politically” and integration policy is considered “inescapable” (ibid. 14).

The next available working documents are significantly entitled *Immigration Policies in the Member States: between the need for control and the desire for integration* (V/1020/92), and *Immigration -The situation in the EC Member States in 1992. Attitudes towards controls, labour market requirements and the challenge of integration* (V/166/94).

We conclude this brief overview on old files recalling the Tampere Conclusion, usually taken as a starting point, where the section devoted to fair treatment of Third Country Nationals it is something essential to understand policy developments.

The main elements of a European approach to integration have a long history. Equal treatment, working conditions, employment, education, health and housing have been central elements in the integration debate for decades.

From a semantic point of view it is interesting to compare two different documents by the Commission: one of 1990 and the other from 2014. The first is *Policies on immigration and the social integration of migrants in the European Community* (SEC(90)1813final) under the paragraph “Integration or what else”. The second is the communication “An open and secure Europe: making it happen” (COM(2014)154final).

The first document from 1990 states:

“In theory at least, countries can choose between leaving the immigrants to themselves and integration or assimilating them. Western European countries are densely populated societies crammed into limited living spaces where foreigners are perceived not as newcomers who will somehow find their niche but as unwelcome additions who will compete for scarce jobs and housing. On the other hand, immigrant workers are part of Western economies, to which they make an important contribution. If today’s immigrants were left to fend for themselves they would continue to occupy the bottom rungs of society permanently and without the chance of leaving them or even being replaced by subsequent waves of immigrants. The larger surroundings society turns hostile, develops rejection and stigmatization mechanism and resorts to uncivilized policing, thus reinforcing the vicious circle of exclusion breeding marginality.” (SEC(90)1813final: 14)

The second document from 2014 states:

“Europe is a diverse society where integration remains a challenge. To enhance social cohesion and to reap the full benefits of migration, commitment to effective integration of migrants in the labour market and receiving societies should be strengthened. In these efforts more attention should be paid to gender balance and to address the important employment gap for migrant women. Fair treatment and non-discriminatory access to the labour market should be ensured. Vulnerable migrants, in particular women, young migrants and unaccompanied minors should receive targeted support and a ‘best interest of the child’ approach should be practically applied in accordance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Building on previous work in the field

of integration, successful policies could be identified and best practices disseminated. Further work will be necessary on capacity building and on engaging with local and regional authorities, which are at the forefront of integration policies” (COM(2014)154final:4).

Over time European institutions, besides having developed normative and soft steering instruments supporting Member States in converging towards a common approach to migration and possibly to integration, have evolved in their way of choosing and using words. There are key differences between the first and last text. The invitation to seriously take care of the integration issue, expressed in the first text, is replaced by a prescriptive approach mentioning principles and conventions in the second. Integration remains a challenge but with defined solutions at hand.

Although the language has changed the situation of migrants remains the same. In 1990 migrants are those occupying the bottom rungs of society permanently. In 2014 integration of migrants into the labour market should be strengthened. Exclusion feeding marginality in 1990 becomes vulnerable migrant in 2014. **But the impression is that, despite the clear change in the tone used, the situation has not changed significantly.**

2.1.2.2 EU calls for rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens

Another crucial idea that has been put forward in European documents is the **need to provide migrants rights and obligations comparable to those to EU citizens.**

In 1999 the EU obtained a clear cut competence to legislate on migration with the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, The European Council, as the institution in charge of defining the general political directions and priorities of the EU, was the first to express its views on integration.

In Tampere, the European Council provided the basis for any policy on the subject by emphasizing that a more vigorous integration policy should aim at granting TNCs "rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens" (Tampere European Council, 1999: para 18). The European Council also acknowledged "the need for approximation of national legislations on the conditions of admission and residence of third country nationals" (ibid, para 20) and that "the legal status of third country nationals should be approximated to that of Member States' nationals" (ibid, para 21).

In the *Communication on a Community Immigration Policy* of 2000 (COM(2000)757final) the Commission proposes several actions which have a clear underlying rationale of rights as a facilitator for integration. For example, when presenting its proposal for a Family Reunification Directive, the Commission points out that family reunion "is an essential element in the integration of persons already admitted" (ibid: 11). Also, when discussing Third Country Nationals' rights it is argued that "it is clear that a hard-core of rights should be available to migrants on their arrival, in order to promote their successful integration into society" (ibid: 17). Finally, it is mentioned under the Section entitled integration that the provision of equality with respect to conditions of work and access to services, together with the granting of civic and political rights to longer-term migrant residents brings with it such responsibilities and promotes integration (ibid: 19).

The Long-term Residence Directive 2003/109/EC establishes in Article 5 that, in addition to other conditions, Member States may require third-country nationals wishing to obtain long-term residence status, "to comply with integration conditions, in accordance with national law" (Acosta, 2014).

Therefore it is clear that granting Third Country Nationals rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens is considered crucial for supporting integration. It was a formula launched in Tampere and resumed ten years later in Stockholm. The Programme of 2009 argues that comparable treatment should remain an objective of a common immigration policy and should be implemented as soon as possible, and no later than 2014.

A claim supporting the idea of rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens emerged from the European Parliament in 2003 and 2007. In the European Parliament's Report on the Commission's Communication on *Immigration, Integration and Employment* - the European Parliament, then being a mere consultative body engaging a proactive role, supported the idea of civic citizenship as it would be important for increasing a sense of belonging in Europe, and it even proposed granting Third Country Nationals voting rights for the European Parliament elections.⁹

Also the *Commission Staff working paper*¹⁰ accompanying the Integration Agenda of 2011 goes further and mentions the need to ensure proper social protection under Directive 2003/109 for long term residents who shall enjoy equal treatment with nationals as regards social security, social assistance and social protection as defined by national law (COM(2011)957final).

Despite a constant call to grant migrants comparable rights to those of European citizens are still far from being a reality for Third Country Nationals.

2.1.2.3 Integration as a two way process

At the European level the conceptualization of the integration as a two ways process is something that is commonly recognized and well accepted. Since the Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment (European Commission, 2003), the Commission understood integration as something to be addressed through a holistic approach taking into account "not only the economic and social aspects of integration but also issues related to cultural and religious diversity, citizenship, participation and political rights" (ibid: 18). Integration was defined as a "two way process based on mutual rights and corresponding obligations of legally resident third country nationals and the host society which provides for full participation of the immigrant" (ibid: 17).

And this was formally stated in 2004 within the first CBP stating that **Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States.**

As a result of a previous call by the European Council, the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy, proposed in the first Ministerial Conference on Integration, were adopted in November 2004 by the Justice and Home Affairs Council. During the last ten years, the CBPs have played a crucial role in defining and orienting integration policy and measures all around Europe. The rationale behind the adoption of the principles is "to assist Member States in formulating integration policies by offering them a simple non-binding but thoughtful guide on basic principles" (ibid: 16). CBPs represent a clear and simple summary of all the issues involved in integration policy. In doing so, they are a crucial element in the definition of integration as a multifaceted task. In the Conclusion of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Members States on the integration of Third Country Nationals (9905/14), the CBPs are reaffirmed with the Member State's commitment towards them.

At the time of their adoption they represented an extremely ambitious framework, clearly defining States' duties in ensuring integration of migrants an affirming that integration is a "dynamic two way process of mutual accommodation" which entrusts the responsibility to "accommodate each other" on both natives and migrants.

⁹ European Parliament, Report on the Communication from the Commission on Immigration, Integration and Employment, A5-0445/2003, 1 December 2003, Rapporteur: Claude Moraes. It restated its support in another report in 2006: European Parliament, Report on Strategies and Means for the Integration of Immigrants in the European Union, A6-0190/2006, 17 May 2006, Rapporteur: Stavros Lambrinidis.

¹⁰ Commission Staff Working Paper - EU initiatives supporting the integration of third-country nationals. Accompanying the document European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals (COM(2011)455final) http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/doc_centre/immigration/docs/2011_commission_staff_working_paper_on_integration.pdf

The key elements in this holistic approach to integration were identified as: access to the labour market and recognition of qualifications, education and language skills, housing and urban issues, health and social services, social and cultural environment and nationality and civic citizenship.

Beyond the definition of integration in CBP1, the other CBPs recall each element of integration as: the respect for the basic European values (CBP2), the access to employment (CBP3), adult (CBP4) and child education (CBP5), the access to services (CBP6), the importance of frequent interaction between immigrants and natives (CBP7), the right to profess a religion (CBP8), the political participation (CBP9), the need to mainstream policy (CBP10) and the need to measures and evaluate progress made during the times (CBP11).

Until now their potentiality has been mainly expressed through the EIF - European Integration Fund (2007-2013) which financed countless integration projects conceived and implemented in line with the CBPs framework. The financial resources provided to ensure the concrete application and implementation of the CBPs is pivotal. In this regard, the AMIF - Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (2014-2020) commitment to financing integration national projects guided by CBPs is of utmost importance for the years to come.

In 2008 in a *Communication on a Common Immigration Policy for Europe* (COM(2008)359), the Commission echoes the necessity of increased participation by Third Country Nationals in order to “reflect the multiple and evolving identities of European societies” (ibid: 8). This recognition of Europe as a continent in which **identity is not static** but evolving represents an interesting feature of this Communication which goes beyond the usual calls for social inclusion, integration in the labour market or non-discrimination.

In line with previous documents from the last ten years, in the Conclusion of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States on the integration of Third Country Nationals (9905/14), with an explicit commitment to the CBPs, integration is again defined as a dynamic two-way process (ibid, 4). Moreover, diversity is accepted as an enriching and permanent feature of European societies and it is acknowledged that integration “is a long-term and multi-faceted process” (ibid, 5).

In practice that means that

- ➔ **Integration could/should be better enhanced by a strategy involving both adaptation and learning of immigrants, but also significant changes in access to and the working of institutional structures of society that should be able to cope with more diversity keeping the standard of equality/equity.**

However, there is little acknowledgement in national political discourses or in government’s policy documents that integration is a process and an ongoing negotiation between cultures, that can either move forward when the right conditions are provided, or may not proceed if conditions are weak, or else can be reversed if conditions or opportunities deteriorate (Phillimore, 2014a).

In this regard, some Member States have begun to develop cooperation between governmental stakeholders or have begun to engage the private sector in debates on integration. For example efforts have been made to broker connections between migrant groups and employers, employment services and vocational training organisations to link demand with supply. One successful project operates in **Amsterdam** where *The Platform Arbeidsmarkt en Onderwijs* (PAO) brings together key stakeholders and produces a twice yearly labour market monitor which provides the local administration with up-to-date data concerning the labour status of Amsterdam citizens, including those with a migrant background. However, this information is not shared with civil society organisations (Humphris, 2014).

Another element concerning the two ways process is the participation of migrants in the democratic process of the receiving society. Even if it is increasingly perceived as a significant aspect of successful integration, policies to promote the interaction of immigrants and host society, including the setting up of shared forums,

are still limited (Humphris, 2014). It is even more evident if we consider that only a limited number of Member States provide third-country nationals with voting rights in local elections. As analysed in more depth in the following pages, such evidence is the proof of an unbalanced situation that sees migrants as the main characters in the entire process.

Despite calls to envisage integration as a two way process migrants perceive integration, a one-way process.

Integration is understood by migrants as a period of adaptation and change in order to 'fit in' with the majority society. This emerged as a one-way process in migrant's narratives where they believed they had to make adjustments and changes to the way they conducted their life. No new migrants discussed their understanding of integration as a two way process or in terms of natives people learning and adapting or changes in receiving society culture.

'I think it means that you are able to incorporate yourself into something new. It means being part of something. Being welcoming'.

'It means involvement in the new community. You know in our country we are born and bred in Pakistan. We are grown in old Pakistani styles. In this country, it is totally different, how we adapt the new systems and challenges I think... I am thinking that's integration. Adaptation of new society, new culture, how you adapt.'

This emerged in migrant's narratives as describing how they perceived receiving society and culture as a closed container. As such migrant's descriptions of successful integration were linked to 'getting inside' and learning the system. This also emerged in descriptions of trying to 'mix up' with people.

'It means learning a way of life of your host community. Getting to know how things are done. The way of life. Getting to know people. The activities. Taking part in those activities. Getting involved and 'owning' what goes on in there and contributing in there'.

A key feature of integration was repeatedly described as a disposition to take part in activities of the country and the ability and confidence to change and adapt. This took the form of a positive frame of mind and having an 'open' disposition.

'You just have to try to be social. To talk to others.'

However, for those who had suffered prolonged loneliness and trauma in the migration and integration process, as we will refer later in the case of detention upon arrival, this was described as a barrier to meeting people and forming friendships:

'Being new is difficult. It is not something that is easy. You find difficulties but you get used to it. You just need to relax. That's all.'

2.1.3 The policy shift: integration is a challenge to whom?

As mentioned above, when integration policy began to be discussed it was clear that institutions, both at national and European level, had the main responsibility in regard to migrants' integration into receiving society.

However, framing integration policy at European level changed direction after a few years. Towards the end of the so called first period (from Tampere 1999 to The Hague 2004) some Member States started to shift the burden on who should facilitate access to language civic knowledge from State to Third Country Nationals themselves.

In the *First Annual report of Migration and Integration*, it was mentioned for the first time how language tuition and the provision of civic education to newly arrived migrants was growing and how the focus had moved towards an increased responsibility on the newcomers to pay for these courses and to pass exams, as in the case of the Netherlands (ibid: 19). Thus, the Commission acknowledged for the first time this new trend which has been subsequently replicated in various countries (Acosta 2012; Pascouau 2012).

The new conceptualisation of integration is notable since it represents a paradigm shift from an understanding of integration policies as something positive, given their role in promoting social inclusion, non-discrimination and access to rights, towards a condition in the form of a test, programme or contract within immigration law in order for Third Country Nationals to become socially included, to acquire a regular residence status and to have access to family reunion. The legality of this conceptualisation of integration from the perspective of the current EU migration law framework will be something specifically developed during the second period from The Hague to the Stockholm program (2004-2009) (Acosta, 2014).

When the Commission published its *Second Annual Report on Migration and Integration* on 30 June 2006 (European Commission, 2006) it highlights the “new emphasis on obligatory integration courses, containing both language instruction and civic orientation” (ibid: 5). It also stresses how “in several countries, there is an emphasis on possible sanctions in cases of non-compliance with obligations arising from compulsory integration measures, rather than on incentives in case of compliance” (ibid). Significantly, the Commission refers for the first time to the legal validity of these requirements under the Family and Long-term Residences Directives and states that integration conditions and measures “should not undermine the efficiency (‘effet utile’) of the Directive” (ibid). In addition, the Commission acknowledges that “careful examination of national transposition measures and concrete practices will be necessary” (ibid: 6) in order to ensure that long-term residents are guaranteed equal treatment in a number of areas such as access to education or housing.

The European Council adopted in 2008,¹¹ and under French Presidency, the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum (European Pact Immigration and Asylum, 2008). Whereas the Pact also focuses on migrants’ rights “(in particular to education, work, security, and public and social services” as well as the “need to combat any forms of discrimination to which migrants may be exposed”) (ibid: 6) it shifts its attention towards migrant’s obligations, in particular the need to “promote language learning” and the stress for the respect needed “for the identities of the Member States and the European Union and for their fundamental values, such as human rights, freedom of opinion, democracy, tolerance, equality between men and women, and the compulsory schooling of children” (ibid).

This was the result of the spirit with which the French government of former President Sarkozy approached migration and thus integration, since the idea of imposing integration requirements to limit unwanted (family) migration was derived from the Netherlands’ example. This is even clearer if the negotiations before the Pact was adopted are considered. The original idea in the Pact was to include a reference to the compulsory imposition of integration contracts for Third Country Nationals and only the opposition of the Spanish Government to this measure caused its elimination in the final text adopted. To put it differently, the two-way process called for by the CBPs is endangered by the willingness of some States to link the migrant’s residence status to his/her capacity to prove language or civic knowledge. However, the importance of the Pact cannot be overstated. The Pact is a non-legally binding, political document and its principal interest was to try to influence the Stockholm programme. The main political document which guided the EU’s action in the area is the Stockholm programme until the adoption of a new multi-annual programme (Acosta, 2014). However, the Pact did not disappear after the adoption of the Stockholm programme. The pact was continuously quoted over the years until Sarkozy’s defeat in 2012.

At the national level, in many Member States, relatively liberal “multicultural” regimes have been under attack, with critics arguing that they allowed people from other cultures to enjoy the rights but ignore the responsibilities that living in another country might bring, and effectively to live separate lives. **The political**

¹¹ Brussels European Council, 15-16 October, Presidency Conclusions, 14368/08, p. 8.

and thus policy direction of travel in many countries has been to imply that minorities need to do more to integrate, as in the UK, Germany and France, blaming the disturbances in many cities during the late 2000s on the unwillingness of minorities to integrate. The particular form this policy trend has taken, and the language used to describe it, obviously differs between countries to some degree.

In the **UK** the policy framework has been called social or community cohesion and a very substantial, if at times confusing, literature has developed around this official framework, much of which has challenged the Government's approach and/or argued that it ignores the impacts of discrimination and racism on minorities and migrants which undermines attempts at cohesion. In an increasing number of countries (including **France** and **the Netherlands**), the framework for integration has moved more strongly towards compulsion with migrants required to participate in programmes – which may or may not be free - and to pass certain tests and before they become eligible for citizenship and residence (Craig, 2014).

In the last document produced at European level on the migrant integration policy, the European Council Conclusions from the 27 June 2014, the last sentence of the paragraph is representative of the vague formulation used in these types of documents. It refers to the need to “support Member State's efforts to pursue active integration policies which foster social cohesion and economic dynamism”. It is unclear whether this means more emphasis on compulsory civic and language knowledge integration courses or, whether in line with the reference to economic dynamism, this rather relates to the possibility of facilitating mobility within the internal market for third-country nationals in order to maximize talents and skills matching and to contribute to economic growth. This second interpretation is possibly the correct one and also the only one in line with the current legislative framework on EU Migration Law.

Finally, in this regard, there is a reference to a possible “voluntary cooperation between receiving countries and countries of origin in a pre-departure phase” which could facilitate reception and integration in the destination Member State. The reference to “voluntary” is important in this regard since it seems to slowly become clearer for all actors, even for those Member States who had introduced integration requirements abroad, that compulsory integration abroad impeding family reunification is not in line with EU law (Acosta, 2014).

The number of Member States engaged in such a process must not be underestimated, for several reasons. Firstly, these Member States are established countries of immigration and therefore have considerable weight in the debate on migration policy. Secondly, they are very active in the field and may act as 'pioneers' on aspects of migration policy. They have taken advantage of the Directive to establish schemes under which family members are requested to fulfil integration measures in the country of origin i.e. before access to the European Union. In addition, rules related to integration have not always been adopted in order to boost the integration capacity of migrants, but rather to control or limit family migration. The **Dutch** example is one of the most significant in this regard.

→ **The EU Commission should issue clear implementation guidelines of EU Directives concerning the integration requirements that Third Country Nationals must fulfil (long-term residence and family reunification Directives) and should explore the use of infringement procedures.**

Two notions stem from the idea of co-operation between receiving and sending countries. Firstly, that integration abroad remains an idea to develop. The second is that it should be voluntary. In the latter case, there is an increasing number of Member State using pre departure information schemes. Mandatory schemes are not all contrary to EU law. The French integration abroad scheme is one example. Secondly, these schemes are extremely costly and this is perhaps the reason why they are progressively abandoned.

At national and local level, these assumptions have been translated in very different ways. Indeed, during the increasingly politicised climate of the late 1990s and early 2000s which pushed for the implementation of integration policies, **at national level the term integration started to get a different meaning.**

Where early policy conceptions such as those used in **Sweden** and **the Netherlands** had been rights-based, aimed at structural integration in the socio-economic domains and framed in a liberal cultural atmosphere (later called multicultural), the new approach focused increasingly on the cultural dimension of integration as an obligation for immigrants: cultural and value-based commonalities were thought to be essential for social cohesion. Acquisition of national citizenship - that was promoted in early Swedish and Dutch policies as an instrument that would facilitate structural integration - was increasingly redefined as the crown on a finalised process of cultural adaptation.

This new cultural conception of integration policies went hand in hand with redefining the identity of North-west European countries. The claims and outcomes of such discussions on the 'identity' of receiving societies (as modern, liberal, democratic, secular, equal, enlightened, etc.) were translated into civic integration requirements for immigrants and civic integration courses of an assimilative nature. The latest development - compulsory pre-immigration courses such as developed in **the Netherlands** - extends this logic even further: under the label of integration, such courses actually function as instruments to make immigration more restrictive and selective. Notwithstanding these pressures, quite different immigration and integration policies developed in practice in the 'second generation immigration countries', particularly in Southern Europe.

Most immigration in those countries is legalised ex-post by regularisations. Integration measures and policies have been initiated since the mid-1990s, predominantly on the local and regional levels, based on rights of access to important domains irrespective of immigrant status. Such local policies aimed primarily at insertion in the labour market were embedded in a liberal cultural atmosphere that tends to use interculturality as a strategy (Penninx *et al.*, 2014a).

Likewise, the integration agreement could be monitored for highlighting whether its use overflows from integration policies to migration policies. Integration agreements are the main instruments used by receiving societies for answering the principle of mutual accommodation. Through language tuition and introductory courses, migrants are supposed to receive the necessary support to integrate themselves, while the receiving societies guarantee the correct modalities to achieve the aim. Integration agreements should represent the tool for enabling contact between migrants and natives during the first phase of the integration path. However, there is also a danger that the migrant can be refused residency due to the punitive nature of the policy for those who fail. In Italy for example, the permission to stay in the territory cannot be renewed if the migrant doesn't achieve the score (30 points) predicated by the agreement. As in the case of the family reunification, the integration principle is obfuscated by the main objective of controlling migrants' residency and movement.

Member States are not legally entitled to include wide ranging integration requirements. Nonetheless, despite existing limits imposed by general principles of EU law and by the Directives themselves, Member States have a wide leeway in some situations. National Courts have an important role to play in this regard by correctly interpreting the conditions to the general rule under these Directives. The increasingly harsh debate with regard to migrant's integration in Europe, coupled with the fast emergence of a model based on compulsory integration in order to access rights directly granted by European Law and which has been quickly replicated in various Member States, demands a clear response by the Commission in the form of guidelines or infringement procedures.

Since 2005, the concern regarding the correct enforcement of legislation in this area has repetitively been acknowledged by the Commission, as well as the Parliament, in numerous documents, including the Stockholm programme. Where integration is clearly endangered by impeding de facto Third Country Nationals assessing rights deriving from EU law with the risk to lead people to social exclusion, on a legal basis there is the possibility to launch infringement procedures. The Commission already advanced this eventuality in its *Report on the implementation of Family Reunification Directive* in 2008 and repeated it in its last annual *Report on EU immigration and asylum* where it was mentioned that the Commission should ensure the full implementation of existing rules, open infringement procedure where necessary (COM(2013)422final:16). Despite this intentions, there is no news of any infringement procedure on the Family Reunification Directive

in any Commission's annual reports and only one infringement procedure has reached the Court of Justice of the European Union on the long-term Residence Directive.

The official rhetoric has usually referred to the need to promote integration and make Third Country Nationals self-sufficient while at the same time arguing that these tests would help in the emancipation of women and the prevention and fight against arranged marriages. Hence, there needs to be empirical evaluation on whether these official aims are being attained by these tests and integration contracts. Two studies have evaluated the effects on integration of these tests in several Member States: PROSINT¹² and INTEC¹³. They have both reached similar conclusions that several aspects of these tests and requirements may lead to social exclusion rather than to enhance integration. This makes it even more urgent to have a clear response by the Commission (Acosta, 2014).

2.2 Target groups: Who has the right to be/become an immigrant and to be integrated?

Another question to be addressed is: integration for whom? Migrant integration policies that formulate specific groups of immigrants as target groups are different from policies that focus on all immigrants. And these are substantially different from policies that target all individuals regardless of their origin or that target natives. Policies may also target collectives (organisations, civil society) rather than individuals. They may even target general institutions of society. In practice, these different approaches result in very different policies with regard to the three dimensions of integration:

- political rights can be granted to immigrants as individuals, for instance by granting voting rights, or as members of a group, which often means the creation of representative bodies;
- policies may seek to promote equal opportunities for all citizens, meaning equal access to housing, education, health care and the labour market, or equal share in their actual access to these goods and services;
- finally, cultural diversity can be promoted as an individual or as a group right, the latter often implying the state support to immigrants' organisations and own institutions.

Dealing more specifically with immigration issues, Article 79 of the TFEU indicates “the Union shall develop a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring, at all stages, the efficient management of migration flows, fair treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in Member States, and the prevention of, and enhanced measures to, combat illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings”.

As a matter of principle, at the European level there is a fundamental disjunction between policies applicable to migrants in an irregular situation, who should theoretically be excluded from the territory, and migrants legally residing in the Member States, who should theoretically be included into the receiving society. Beginning in 1999 with the Tampere European Council conclusions, and adopted immediately after the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, the common approach to immigration and asylum policies should “ensure the integration into our societies of those third country nationals who are lawfully resident in the Union”.

Also the Common Basic Principles on Integration, endorsed by the November 2004 Justice and Home Affairs Council emphasised that “a critical aspect of managing migration is the successful integration of legally residing immigrants and their descendants”¹⁴.

¹² <http://research.icmpd.org/1429.html>

¹³ <http://www.ru.nl/law/cmr/projects/intec/>

¹⁴ The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union, OJ C 53, 03.03.2005.

Ten years after the adoption of the Common Basic Principles, the June 2014 Justice and Home Affairs Council agreed to adopt conclusions of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States on the integration. The mere title of the document is self-sufficient to portray the limited scope of the conclusions which address the integration “of third-country nationals legally residing in the EU”¹⁵.

As a matter of fact, policy orientations at EU level are locked into a logic whereby integration policies and measures should only accompany legally residing third country nationals and are never linked with the potential fact that third country nationals in an a priori irregular situation could be granted a right to reside and therefore fall within the ambit of inclusion policies.

The distinction “legal/inclusion” vs. “irregular/exclusion” deeply affects the way policy makers perceive and develop migration policies. The basic idea that migrants in an irregular situation should not remain on the territory, or be expelled, is accompanied with the development of detention practices. Hence, once arrived on the territory or once discovered in the territory migrants in an irregular situation are often, and sometimes systematically¹⁶, subject to detention¹⁷. This derives from the widely shared principle that migrants in an irregular situation should be removed and that detention is an efficient practice to ensure removal.

The situation of migrants apprehended at the border is quasi-systematically managed under “security-driven” procedures. In such circumstances, the necessity to identify people or the belief that migrants would abscond lead national authorities to detain people. The use of detention in such circumstances is a well-established policy which plays as a deterrent measures towards migrants who may be willing to access the territory without authorisation¹⁸. But these practices, whether developed due to time constraints or implemented for political purposes, do not take into account **the effects detention may have on individuals in the immediate, medium or long run and in particular regarding integration.**

The distinction “legal migration = inclusion” and “irregular migration = exclusion” is firmly rooted in EU and Member States policies. It has had the consequence of creating an artificial disconnection between policy fields of migration and integration, with the effect to exclude integration policies from an entire side of immigration and also asylum policy. Hence, **the fight against irregular migration has validated the use of detention as a tool to hamper people to enter as well as to deter people to migrate.** In this context, a large number of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees have been detained and released, bearing the physical and psychological scars of detention sometimes a long time after.

The above mentioned distinction “legal migration = inclusion” and “irregular migration = exclusion” effects the national and the local level in a particular way. Indeed, while this definition matches completely the national philosophy, at local level, regions and cities which are at the forefront of integration policies, have to face also the very concrete problem of irregular migrants’ needs in particular in education and health.

There are cities which adopt the so-called **human right frame** which regards undocumented in general, does no matter the reason of their stay (e.g., for work reasons, to seek asylum etc.), as particularly vulnerable individuals, who have to face more threats to their safety and security than ordinary residents and are at

¹⁵ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/143109.pdf

¹⁶ “Invisible Suffering. Prolonged and systematic detention of migrants and asylum seekers in substandard conditions in Greece”, Médecins sans Frontières, 2014, Report available at the following address: http://www.msf.org/sites/msf.org/files/invisible_suffering.pdf

¹⁷ The number of detention centers has increased over time in the EU, see for instance work undertaken by several NGO’s in this regard like Migreurop <http://en.closesthecamp.org/2014/03/03/europe-of-camps-deploys-its-web/> and the Atlas http://www.migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/Carte_Atlas_Migreurop_19122012_Version_francaise_version_web.pdf

¹⁸ As pointed out by the UNHCR “Putting people in detention has become a routine – rather than exceptional – response to the irregular entry or stay of asylum-seekers and migrants in a number of countries. Some governments view detention as a means to dissuade irregular migration to or applying for asylum in their territories”, in “Beyond Detention. A Global Strategy to support governments to end the detention of asylum-seekers and refugees”, UNHCR 2014. Available online: <http://www.unhcr.org/53aa929f6.pdf>.

greater risk of marginalisation because of their lack of a residence permit. Cities that adopt such an approach show a particularly open stance towards undocumented immigrants' access to fundamental rights, from legal status to health, education, housing etc. and to legal status in particular.

A case in point is the Communist city of **Pierre-Bénite**, in the Lyon area in France, which in the 2000s set up, together with the NGO Cimade, particularly active support for immigrants, an "alert system" aimed at monitoring the difficult situations faced by some illegal immigrants in the city and at finding favourable solutions in collaboration with the Prefecture. A second example is the city of **Ghent** in Belgium, the municipality offers legal advice to all immigrants, irrespectively of their juridical conditions, in order to favour their access to other services and rights. Public officials together with NGOs are crucial in undertaking and carrying out this kind of legal service (Caponio, 2014b).

On the other side, there are local levels which are in line with the national level by following the **security frame** that targets primarily national residents, with the aim of reassuring them about the respect of legality in the city and about the enactment of controls on unwanted immigration. Usually, the political discourse in these cities is openly anti-immigrants and the concrete actions carried out are aimed at sending the message that undocumented migrants are not welcomed. The main strategy is introducing restrictive measures as public order ordinances that make life for them extremely difficult and therefore impede access to legal status (Caponio, 2014b).

Third country nationals are the target defined by the European Union for integration and migration policy. Quite surprisingly, although not having the competence to rule on this policy field, the EU took the chance to define the specific target for the existing policy or those to be implemented. Against the European backdrop, the right to be or become a migrant is granted to those people who respond to conditions stated in the European Directives and in the national laws. Asylum seekers are those having the moral rights to be or become immigrants.

3. THE GOVERNANCE OF MIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICY

Governance can be defined as a method, a set of mechanisms and formal and informal processes for dealing with a broad range of problems and conflicts. Governance operates through groups of actors who arrive at mutually satisfactory and binding decisions by negotiation and cooperation aimed at managing and regulating a given domain of human activity. Governance includes the definition and implementation of rules as well as the establishment of formal and informal institutions and regimes for regulating collective activities and exercising power within a given territorial domain (Martinelli, 2014b).

Here we consider governance from a descriptive point of view, taking a wider range of actors into account (institutional, collective and individual). First, institutions at different administrative levels, such as national, regional and local governments; agencies and practitioners within the state apparatus; second, relevant actors at collective level such as NGOs, migrant organizations and networks; and finally individual actors, such as politicians and migrants themselves. The vertical dimension of integration policymaking, namely, the relationship between the national, regional and local levels, is of particular relevance since both municipalities and the EU level have become increasingly involved in making immigrant policies. We conducted analysis to consider this multiplicity of levels in order to understand how new tensions have come to the fore and also how new alliances and forms of cooperation (e.g. between the local and the EU level) have developed. Key questions are: who has the authority over what? Who is in charge of integration policies? How are the different levels coordinated? Do they respond to different political and social imperatives? Do they complement or contradict each other?

The **multilevel governance** of immigrant integration has been the result of the historical process of immigration in Europe and the evolution of related migration policies. In the XX century, Europe has become a continent of immigration, but European countries are not nations of immigrants in the sense of the US, Canada or Australia and do not perceive themselves as such. A first wave of immigrants came to North-western Europe including refugees after the Second World War, people from former colonies, and workers from less developed European states. In the 1980s a second wave of immigrants reached other European countries, which previously had been labour-exporting, like **Italy** and **Spain**. After the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991, a third wave of immigration took place in the new EU member states, which experienced emigration and transit migration at the same time (Martinelli, 2014b).

The governance of such a process started with regulating policies at the **national level**, which were followed - sometimes with significant delays - by integration policies. **Local policies** have been mostly integration policies and have been developed either as a reaction to the lack, or the sheer absence, of such policies at the national level, or as a complement to them. Except for a few advanced countries like **the Netherlands** and **Sweden**, where, as early as the 1980s, national governments encouraged integration policies at the local level, municipalities usually substituted for the lack of action of national executives and regularly conflicted

with them. The role of cities in integration policy was enhanced by the exchange of knowledge and experience in networks of cities, like Cities for Local Integration Policies, Integrating Cities, Intercultural Cities, the European Coalition of Cities Against Racism, with strong connections with the European Commission after 2003 (Penninx *et al.*, 2014a).

EU governance has been the late comer to the integration debate, with integration measures following the same pattern of regulation and other immigration policies. The sequence of treaties that gave birth first to the European Communities and then to the European Union (1993) have created EU citizenship, guaranteed a complete freedom of movement and removed physical, technical and fiscal barriers (*Single European Act*, 1992). However, the opening of internal borders implied the preservation of their common external border and the coordination of Member States' policies concerning the admission of third-country nationals. Also, as a consequence of the rapid growth of asylum-seekers in the early 1990s, the governance of immigration at the EU level has been predominantly concerned with increasingly restrictive admission rules and securisation policies aiming at fighting illegal immigration.

3.1 Actors

The horizontal dimension of integration policymaking considers whether and how integration policies are implemented by institutional actors as well as other relevant ones such as private institutions, NGOs, immigrant organisations and professionals, and migrants themselves. The central question here is: who is supposed to be a relevant actor in policies? Are individual immigrants seen as primary actors? Are their organisations and other collective and institutional resources regarded as relevant? With regard to the receiving society, the question emerges: who are the main actors involved (again at the individual, organisational and institutional level)?

3.1.1 Who has the authority over what?

When examining the set of actions developed at EU level, it is evident that integration policies are subject to a specific "treatment". More precisely, they are not addressed in the same way as immigration or asylum policies. This difference in treatment is crucial in trying to understand the dynamics taking place at EU level regarding integration policies and their relationships with immigration policies. Notably, **the development of a common EU immigration policy has not been accompanied with the corresponding competences in the field of integration. Where the EU has full competence to harmonise national immigration policies, it does not have the same competence in the field of integration.** While this could be explained by several legal factors, this situation leads to a complex and intricate mix between hard and soft law.

For almost 10 years, from 1999 to 2009, the competence of the EU to harmonise national integration policies was all but clear. Whereas the Treaty of Lisbon finally clarified the issue, a significant set of rules and measures have been adopted in this policy area using either hard law or soft instruments.

Within migration multilevel policymaking, the authority is divided between different actors and territorial units that together make up the EU. In the EU there are exclusive competences, shared competences and supporting competences¹⁹. These competences vary considerably when considering migration or integration, as the division of authority and thus of competences differs depending on the policy field considered.

¹⁹ As stated in the TFEU in art. 2: "1) When the Treaties confer on the Union exclusive competence in a specific area, only the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the Member States being able to do so themselves only if so empowered by the Union or for the implementation of Union acts. 2) When the Treaties confer on the Union a competence shared with the Member States in a specific area, the Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt legally binding acts in that area. The Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence. The Member States shall again exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has decided to cease exercising its competence. [...] 5) In certain areas and under the

Most issues that address migration policy fall under the category of shared competences, especially in the areas in which Treaty reforms have established a formal community competence as in visa and border control, asylum, immigration, and labour migration. In the shared competence regime, where EU legislation exists, Member States have to submit to it. Where no legislation has been established, the Member States can independently legislate as long as EU legislation is adopted. This is the process of harmonisation of national legislations led by European institutions.

The EU plays the strongest role in the visa and border control regime. As it concerns immigration and asylum, formal EU competences exist but legislation is not yet always fully developed and implemented.

As regards integration policy, the EU is only able to adopt measures which aim to coordinate national policies, as foreseen in the area of the **supporting competences**. Integration policies remain within the remit of States' competence. The EU is competent to develop a series of actions which aim at helping MS to coordinate their policies and with the support of EU institutions, mainly the European Commission. This is precisely what Article 79.4 TFEU says and it has been carried out through policy orientation and exchange of information between relevant stakeholders as better detailed below (Heidbreder, 2014a).

Indeed, art. 79.4 TFEU states that

“The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may establish measures to provide incentives and support for the action of Member States with a view to promoting the integration of third-country nationals residing legally in their territories, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States”.

In this provision the distribution of competences shows clear limitations in EU integration policy. While the EU is entrusted with the power to develop migration policy, on integration it can only provide support in orientating national policy and promoting the exchange of information among stakeholders. In the field of integration, the EU is able to intervene insofar as it does not lead to the harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the MS. The EU is thus entrusted with the lowest level of competence as it only has the competence to coordinate national policies, the latter remaining into the competence of the Member States.

The **logic underlying this limited authority** relates mainly to two specific aspects of integration: first, the fact that integration involves a complex variety of policy fields and second, that a comprehensive integration policy requires a wide range of administrations and actors, many of whom are located at the local level. **The first element is due to the multidimensional aspect of integration process**. Indeed, integrating people into the receiving societies implies that the persons concerned should be granted access to a large set of crucial services like health care, housing, education, the labour market, vocational training, culture, etc. In all these policy fields, the EU's competence is minimal, where it exists at all. Second, alongside the significant number of policy fields involved, **integration policies also involve an impressive set of players**. Indeed, while national policies are defined mainly at governmental level, they are implemented at regional, sub-regional, local, district and even sometimes street level. In this context, and according to the principle of subsidiarity, the EU does not seem to be the most appropriate level of intervention (Pascouau, 2014a).

In addition, the **structural imbalance of competences between migration and integration policies have meant that they have been developed separately, despite constant claims towards a holistic approach**. For that reason, a main consequence of the present division of competences is the silos approach while the holistic approach remains mainly desirable.

conditions laid down in the Treaties, the Union shall have competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States, without thereby superseding their competence in these areas. Legally binding acts of the Union adopted on the basis of the provisions of the Treaties relating to these areas shall not entail harmonisation of Member States' laws or regulations”.

The EU level is therefore characterised by a particular situation where the EU has shared competences in the field of immigration and supporting competences regarding integration issues. Such a situation goes against the assumption that immigration and integration policies should be developed together and with the same level of commitment. This discrepancy in terms of competences is no coincidence.

As underlined earlier, the clarification regarding EU's competences in the field of integration only occurred with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009. However, the previous 10 years have shown that, EU action in this field has not always been in a coordination capacity. Far from it, the EU has adopted a series of rules and tools, some of which have enabled the coordination of national policies and some of which have harmonised national rules. The decade running from 1999 has seen an intricate mix of actions between coordination and harmonisation.

3.1.2 National and local competences

The national level has the authority over migration and integration. National experiences of immigration influence how integration is framed. How countries are administratively organized is also relevant. Particularly, the Central states in the European Union have asymmetrical competence on immigration, asylum and naturalisation. The regional level, in these States, deals only with matters of integration and with specific tasks on education, housing and other social affairs. On the contrary, countries of symmetrical federalism (and old traditions of federalism) involve the Länder and cantons in immigration matters. In other words, all levels of government work together in a defined way, and particularly in **German** speaking countries the Länder and cantons administer the laws of the federal level. The underlying idea is that there should be basic equality through federal law, but the administration should be connected to the realities and needs of the individual cantons or Länder, and controlled by elected regional and local representatives.

Another example is given by the **Italian** and **Spanish** administration. These two countries are characterized by a tradition of centralised government. However they have followed in the footsteps of cooperative federalism. The Italian constitution foresees the autonomy of regions but also the idea of a nation that is "one and indivisible". To sum up, both countries have taken up the division between central legislation and regional implementation (Thränhardt, 2014a).

Local integration policies have always existed in the shadow of national integration policies or developed independently in the case that no policies exist at national level. However, if immigration policy is followed by a national integration policy then local integration policies are stimulated and facilitated by these preceding national frameworks. Sweden and the Netherlands are cases in point and this explains why **Dutch** and **Swedish** cities have a longer history of local integration policies. In the absence of national policies, many cities have developed integration policies as is testified by **Birmingham** and **Bradford**, **Berlin** and **Frankfurt**, **Vienna** or the cities of **Zurich**, **Bern** and **Basel**, to give just a few examples.

In the last decade, local integration policies have become much more visible: cities have organised themselves internationally in networks²⁰. These networks are strongly supported and funded by the European Commission and their activities have been studied extensively often on their own request.

Systematic comparison of local policies reveals a significant variation in the framing of policies and the meaning of integration behind these local policies. Some initiatives, such as the Intercultural Cities Network, focus very strongly on the cultural dimension of integration, using diversity as a strength and diversity management as a strategy. Other cities frame integration policies primarily as a socio-economic issue using anti-discrimination and equality as strategies and mainstreaming as governance principle. Still other cities stress the participation dimension of integration, looking at accessibility and opportunity structures, on the one

²⁰ Cities for Local Integration Policies Network (CLIP), Intercultural Cities Network, EUROCITIES.

hand, and 'active citizenship' of immigrants, on the other. Some cities have even developed a local citizenship concept as opposed to national citizenship (Penninx *et al.*, 2014a).

A particularity can be linked to the City of **Barcelona** where the City Council has played a crucial role in implementing several processes related to different aspects of immigration. Although the Spanish Constitution gives the State exclusive competence over matters of "nationality, immigration, emigration, status of aliens, and right of asylum", management of registration in the municipal census and the writing of reports on social integration and housing give the municipal councils a leading role in immigration procedures related with arrival and reception, regularisation and family reunification (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2014b).

3.1.3 Tension between levels of governance

Tensions between the **European and the national levels** have been studied in depth by Dietrich Thränhardt in his analysis (Thränhardt, 2014a) which focused on the governance, at national level, of the two policy silos: migration and integration. He identified elements that cause these strains.

First of all the creation of the single market and concomitant liberalisation implication that States can no longer control the movement and influx of people as they did previously. However, the idea that shifting power to the EU-level would re-establish some different form of authority is, challenged openly by politicians who see the loss of national sovereignty due to EU-harmonisation as not only too high a price to pay but also as an additional element in undermining national action sovereignty.

Following this logic, the **UK and Ireland** have opted out of the whole area of freedom security and justice (justice and home affairs) and the Schengen area.

Second, the EU has no all-encompassing blueprint that would provide a fully-fledged programme for a comprehensive migration policy. The type of competence the EU has in certain policies linked to migration have emerged in an incremental and ad hoc fashion. Third, the constant struggle between the functional pressure for harmonisation and the attempt to retain national powers leads to the de facto result that policies remain highly incomplete in practice. Even where more comprehensive solutions – such as a common asylum policy – have been formally added to the treaties, the actual EU-law creation has been hampered by lack of agreement among the Member States. Interestingly enough, these tensions have not led the national governments to engage in the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) to coordinate national immigration policies and pre-empt EU harmonisation.

The specific division of authority is the outcome of competing interests on two dimensions:

"The EU's involvement in this field of law must not only address these diverse aspects of migration in a coherent way, but also has to manage two distinct but related conflicts: the balance between EU competence in this field and national sovereignty, and the tension between immigration control and the protection of human rights. Indeed, as the growing corpus of legislation indicates, the EU has been gradually harmonizing national law as regards control of irregular migration, and moreover it has continually been increasing the degree of control of irregular entry" (Heidbreder, 2014b).

Tensions between national and local levels have been analysed through eight local case-studies which allow some conclusions to be made regarding the potential role performed by local integration policies in promoting migrants inclusion. Indeed, **even if decisions have been taken at national level it is at local level that the processes of becoming an accepted part of the society are developed.** For this reason the biggest difference between the local and national frameworks of integration is that the local contexts are asked to meet the first needs linked to the settlement of migrants within the territory.

3.1.4 The role of civil society in filling gaps

It has been a recurring theme in the literature on integration: NGOs, Trade-Unions, or more generally non-profit organisations may be important actors for integration policies. In the absence of national policies, they may even have compensated the state's shortcoming in guiding migrants in the maze of receiving societies.

Legal advice and guidance is an area where receiving society organisations may offer pivotal support to migrants. This may take many forms, for example, preparation of documents or providing information on the legal system. In this regard, **Prague** is a case in point.

“Social and legal counselling is the cornerstone of integration projects organized in Prague. [...] Legal counselling is organized to provide knowledge about the legal system, and other legal problems that were encountered by the counselled migrants. The counselling includes preparation of necessary documents and also legal representation in procedural dealing with courts and public administration such as procedure of granting a state citizenship. Moreover, the legal consultations include general issues of life, ranging from Family Law (newly born children, under-age children, weddings or divorces), Civil Law (real estate purchases), Labour Law (extortion) salary, wage refunds, labour contracts consultations, improper severance of the labour relations) to Commercial Law (commercial register) and Criminal Law” (Matusz- Protasiewicz, 2014b).

Another example of free legal advice that can help newly arrived immigrants is **Barcelona**, where social entities support immigrants with the procedures for obtaining legal status (via *arraigo* or “rootedness”), renewal of residence permits, family reunification, deportation, information regarding marriage with Spanish nationals, help with housing and other services. Garcés-Mascreñas found that:

“Legal advice is one the mainstays of reception policies for the newly arrived population. [...] this service is offered by a set of social entities (55 in 2011) and funded by the *Barcelona City Council* through projects. At the end of 2007 the Council's Department for the Immigration and Intercultural Dialogue Programme launched the *Xarxa d'Entitats Socials d'Assessorament Jurídic per Estrangers* (XESAJE – Legal Advice for Foreigners Social Entities Network) with the aim of fostering shared knowledge among people providing legal advice in the city. The publication and circulation of information concerning changes in laws and regulations affecting foreigners is encouraged by this network, and periodical meetings are held with the institutions working in the field to obtain up-to-date information on the most pressing issues for both administration and users” (Garcés-Mascreñas, 2014b).

Until 2002, non-governmental organisations in Germany, particularly trade unions and churches, were crucial for integration processes of guest-workers and their families.

In **Turin**, during the amnesty of 1995, a mobilisation from below took place in order to facilitate the regularisation of immigrant undocumented workers, which led to the emerging of a network between trade unions, NGOs, the municipality and the Police Headquarters (Caponio, 2014a).

A third case in point is **Prague** where the lack of a robust political-bureaucratic body has been compensated by a relatively well-developed network of NGOs dealing with integration governance. Prague-based NGOs have taken part in the realization of national integration strategies and they are also involved in the formation of legislative acts concerning the integration of migrants which then create a broader framework for the evolution of local strategies for integration governance. On the local level, they have constituted the backbone of Prague's integration governance and performed multiple tasks. Firstly, they have helped migrants to access public goods through social/legal counselling and also organized courses in the Czech language. Secondly, they have substituted the weak or even non-existent migrant organizations, in lobbying for migrants' interests and articulating their needs. Thirdly, they represented the main contact places for migrants and functioned as crucial intermediaries between individual migrants and the public administration. Moreover, thanks to their first-hand experience, the NGOs have had the ability to reflect on everyday needs when providing policy advice and through taking part in the evolution of Prague's integration governance (Matusz-Protasiewicz, 2014b).

NGOs may provide migrants temporary accommodation and act as mediators between private owners and tenants. It is worth noting that often, these initiatives receive funding from local authorities (Garcés-Mascerenas, 2014). More generally, civil society may spearhead integration endeavours through practices and initiatives carried out at local level. Due to their experience at the grass roots level these organisations are often able to respond to specific issues faced by particular communities. As Humphris (2014) states,

“reasons for this include flexible action plans, lower administrative costs and the embedded nature of organisations within local areas. They have an important role in creating the right conditions for third-country nationals to access information and services relating to employment, education, healthcare, housing and culture”.

As interventions take place at the local level there is a wide range of approaches, practices and outcomes. Humphris (2014) has identified some emerging trends in civil society’s practices that are aimed to ease the process of integration for new migrants.

First, the use of mediators has had a multiplier effect on integration. Generally based on volunteering from the general public including retired people, students, members of the majority population or long-established migrants, intercultural mediation aims at overcoming language and cultural barriers, mentoring students and pupils, improving employability or language skills on a one-to-one basis (Phillimore, 2014).

→ **Cultural mediators should work alongside personnel such as doctors, teachers, etc.**

Second, effective integration projects are based on effective and relevant partnerships, associating actors from the non-profit sector, local authorities and migrants themselves). Pasini and Coletti (2014a) reach similar conclusions through a network analysis of integration practices throughout the EU. In essence, they find that a practice is more likely to be successful if: it places migrants at the centre; its design implies a dense network of interaction between the different actors involved; the actors involved.

→ **Following the example of the European Migration Forum, dialogue between civil society and policy makers should be increased at other levels of governance.**

Third, the establishment of forums gathering non-governmental organisations, migrant communities and local government officials proved to be an effective way to organise the communication of issues regarding integration and find remedies to address them (this reflects the user-centric approach to practices as expounded in Pasini and Coletti, 2014a). This is similar in inter-faith forums: they gather different religious representatives, local authority officials and so forth. Such forums provide the opportunity for multiple actors from migrant communities to connect with agencies and institutions and discuss key issues of concern to migrant communities. The success of this approach depends on having the right political environment within which to operate so that institutions are open to the information they receive and are prepared to act (Phillimore, 2014a).

Of particular importance is the capacity of trade unions in some cases to weigh on migrant’s labour market outcomes. Depending on their strength, unions may play on institutional arrangements for bargaining for an extended coverage of collective agreements, monitoring compliance with relevant legal regulation, negotiating particular collective agreement provisions for migrant workers, or protecting the interests of migrants and raising their awareness on entitlements related to work and welfare system provisions in the receiving countries (Kahanec *et al.*, 2014c).

As several studies on Southern Europe have shown, in the absence of governmental integration policies, civil society actors (such as trade unions, NGOs, charities and civil movement associations) have become key in providing various services and offering political support for immigrants' rights claims. At the same time, their mobilisation may produce a “crowding out” effect wherein native associations mobilising on behalf of immi-

grants actually become the main recipients of municipal funding and partners in policymaking, thus preventing immigrants from forming their own organizations (Penninx *et al.*, 2014b).

This statement is of particular importance since it points out that in some cases there can be tensions between the organization of immigrants and those for immigrants.

It is worthwhile to refer to a tension that arises regularly between (representatives of) immigrant organisations and NGOs (of natives) that defend the interests of immigrants and provide services to them. In the first phase of immigrants' settlement, such as in the **Prague** and **Warsaw** cases, interests of immigrants are – in the absence of strong immigrant organisations - defended by such native NGO's: the ones that nowadays build up the service provisions for immigrants and pressure for national and local policies and – as in the Prague case – are strongly represented in the *Regional Advisory Platform*. As immigrant organisations develop in the course of time, these may (re-)claim such representing tasks and the resources that governments may make available for both representation and service provision. The outcome of such a struggle is to a great extent dependent on choices that local governments make. For example, in the city of **Milan**, as reported by Caponio, representation (and to a lesser extent also service provision) was moved away from immigrant organisations to Catholic NGOs (Penninx *et al.*, 2014b).

Also in **Turin** (Italy) the situation is quite similar, where there is an established practice of distributing grants every year to NGOs working in the social policy field, as well as Catholic organisations dealing with undocumented migrants (Caponio, 2014c). This is a way to reach a category of migrants (undocumented) who are not targeted by official policies due to their legal status.

→ **Investments should be made to build excellent community and civil society leaders, who should come from a wide range of men and women, nationalities, statuses, and ages.**

3.1.5 Migrant organisations and networks

The role, the power and the nature of migrant associations vary greatly both within a country and among different countries. Associations differ widely amongst themselves firstly with regard to their purposes and nature: some of them pursue sociability amongst their members; others promote cultural ethnic activities; still others are more active in the political field (e.g. claiming rights for migrants).

Also the level of organisation and strength of an association may vary greatly and an example may clarify this point. In **Italy** migrant associations are largely unstructured, characterised by organisational weakness and do not have the power to influence the country's social and political life. In other countries, such as **Sweden**, large institutional support and economic incentives, targeted at ethnic associations have given them more resources and power.

In specific cases migrant associations may play a crucial role in migrant integration. As Kindler states:

“The important role of migrant organisations is presented in the study of refugee community organisations (RCOs) providing pre-arrival assistance, initial reception in the form of translation, interpretation, and support; assistance with building of skills and the provision of cultural knowledge; facilitating access to volunteering opportunities, as well as providing opportunities of social space and social contact” (Kindler, 2014).

Kindler seeks to shed light on the role social networks and social capital play in fostering integration into local neighbourhoods across the EU. Over the past decade, the debate has revolved around whether bonding social capital (i.e. community-based social capital) prevents or hinders the construction of bridging social capital (i.e. transcending community cleavages). Alongside this debate, another major subject of research has been the role of ethnic networks in migrants' economic activity and social integration at local level. Migrants may rely on their community to find a job but, in so doing, they may also restrain their opportunities and be

confined to low paid jobs. Since the majority of the studies reviewed are qualitative and conducted at the micro-level, results given are place-based and vary a great deal. Some trends are however discernible.

A series of findings from a long list of studies leads to a nuanced and sometimes contradictory picture: not all networks are conducive of better integration. The capacity of a network to aid integration differs widely according to collective but also individual characteristics.

There is an important differentiation between the various national/ethnic migrant groups, but also within the same national/ethnic group (among others along the lines of legal status, education and gender)" (p.12). Migrant networks do play a significant role in the initial phases of the settlement process, supporting in finding job and accommodation, which can then become a source of bridging social capital. That said, increase in size and establishment of a given community may cause the networks to be more exclusive than inclusive. Characterised by distrust towards other groups, it would create increasing inner group cohesion and a negative form of bonding capital (Kindler, 2014).

Considering the influence of inter-ethnic contact in mixed-neighbourhoods, the picture once again appears rather complex. Kindler argues:

"studies show that although diversity leads to a decline in mutual contact and trust, under certain circumstances it actually leads to an increase of these aspects of social cohesion" (ibid, 2014)

More importantly, studies seem to pinpoint that this diversity does not undermine cohesion but rather that there is less cohesion in deprived areas. Diversity and deprivation appears to be concomitant. Again, Kindler argues:

"Structural deprivation in neighbourhoods – as poor quality of housing, education and employment possibilities etc. - is the main reason behind the perception of areas as having little social cohesion" (ibid, 2014).

➔ **Social cohesion and inter-ethnic relations would improve locally if the broader framework of economic policy took into account the needs of marginalized communities as they can be further disadvantaged when high levels of immigration are concentrated in deprived areas.**

As sketched in the previous section, networks on one hand, do play a significant role among migrants in the initial settlement process, helping to find a job or accommodation and giving support – especially buffering the negative effects of weak cultural and economic capital, as well as lack of a stable legal status. At this stage ethnic networks do constitute a source of bonding social capital. With time, these can lead to the development of ethnic places, such as shops, business and restaurants, where migrants and native inhabitants meet, and which then can become a source of bridging social capital. The extension of ethnic networks, based on strong ties and mutual trust (which thus constitute bonding capital), via weak ties to wider social networks, seems to lead to place attachment and social integration.

However, on the other hand, establishment of the group (both for migrants and non-migrants) in the country of migration and increase in size of the community can cause networks to be more exclusive rather than inclusive, and divided along lines of residence status and education. Membership in such networks is characterised by distrust towards and stigmatisation of others while increasing inner group cohesion. Such networks may also be characterised by distrust towards one's own national/ethnic group, thus are neither a source of bridging nor of bonding social capital. Ethnic networks, especially when it comes to economic participation of migrants, may become exploitative rather than a source of social and economic improvement. More established migrants may disassociate themselves from newcomers with unstable legal and weak social statuses. Also younger generations may be unwilling to participate in the networks of older generations.

→ Migrant networks need to be supported but monitored to make them really play a crucial role in fostering integration.

→ Support migrants to develop wide-range network.

3.2 Organisation of policy making and implementation

Once we have identified the main policy frames, the policy targets, and the actors involved, the next question we pose is how integration policies are organised and implemented. In terms of organisation, we examine the location of the initiating and coordinating force for migrant integration within the governmental administration: is it centrally located and coordinated, at the national level within a specific ministry (i.e. Home Affairs, Social Affairs or Employment), or is it organised between all areas that are relevant for integration policies? Such questions also apply to regional and local policies.

3.2.1 Europe driving integration: an intricate mix of actions²¹

The division of competences detailed above in Par. 3.1. was clarified with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009. However, in the last decade, EU action in the field of integration was not always been limited to a coordination role. Far from it, the EU adopted a series of rules and tools some of which have enabled the coordination of national policies and have harmonised national rules. Although the Treaty of Amsterdam was silent about the possibility of the EU to act in the integration field, in 1999 the Tampere European Council's conclusion opened the way for a EU action covering racism, xenophobia and non-discrimination and also aimed to grant rights and obligations to third country nationals.

This mix of actions has been well demonstrated by Acosta in a contribution to this project. Rather than replicating what has already been developed, this part of the report will synthesise the EU actions in the field of integration. In doing this, we particularly focus on the dynamics which have taken place in this particular field. Hence, it will address which rules have been adopted with the aim of harmonising national laws and regulations and which tools and mechanisms have been adopted to enable and improve the coordination of Member States integration policies.

3.2.1.1 Harmonisation of national rules

Within the framework set in Tampere, the EU adopted two different types of legislations: rules aimed at integration, such as the **Family Reunification Directive** and the **Long Term Residence Permit Directive**, and rules opening access to certain rights, for example the wide range of EU rules in the field of immigration and asylum which define rights of third country nationals.

○ *Rules pursuing an integration purpose*

The Family Reunification Directive and the Long Term Residence Permit Directive both aim to promote integration. Both Directives also include provisions enabling MS to implement integration requirements vis-à-vis

²¹ Content taken from Pascouau, 2014a

third country nationals. It is thus relevant to note that, even if migrants' integration is still under the full control of the MS only, the EU adopted rules which, in their aim and content, deal with integration issues and lead to the harmonisation of national rules in the field of integration. In addition, the procedural standards established under the Common Asylum Policy might offer an entry point for EU-level intervention.

With regard to family reunification, the Directive is clear: "Family reunification is a necessary way of making family life possible. It helps to create sociocultural stability facilitating the integration of third country nationals in the Member State, which also serves to promote economic and social cohesion, a fundamental Community objective stated in the Treaty" (Preamble point 4).

The Long Term Resident Directive follows a similar line of reasoning. The Preamble states that:

"the integration of third-country nationals who are long-term residents in the Member States is a key element in promoting economic and social cohesion, a fundamental objective of the Community stated in the Treaty" (point 4). It adds further on "in order to constitute a genuine instrument for the integration of long-term residents into society in which they live, long-term residents should enjoy equality of treatment with citizens of the Member State in a wide range of economic and social matters, under the relevant conditions defined by this Directive" (point 12).

More precisely, Member States may require applicants to demonstrate a certain level of integration before granting the right to family reunification or the long term resident status²².

However, it is important to highlight that the EU has adopted rules which, in their aim and content, deal with integration issues and lead to the harmonisation of national rules in the field of integration.

- *Rules opening access to rights enhancing integration*

The second type of EU legislation is less direct and concerns rules which frame Member States' room for maneuver regarding integration. This relates more precisely to a wide range of EU rules in the field of immigration and asylum which define conditions under which Member States shall or may grant access to a series of rights which have a positive impact on the integration of third country nationals. These rights concern:

- access to the labour market;
- access to education;
- access the vocational training;
- access to health care;
- access to housing;
- equal treatment regarding working conditions;
- recognition of diplomas and qualifications;
- branches of social security and tax benefits;
- access to goods and services and the supply of goods and services made available to the public.

It should be underlined that these rights are not awarded in the same manner. The possibility for third country nationals to gain access to these rights is not the same across all of the instruments and is conditioned by the field covered. For example, variations occur depending on whether the instrument deals with international protection or admission of migrants, the status of third country nationals, temporary or permanent, and the conditions to be fulfilled. In particular it is dependent on whether they are exhaustive or indicative,

²² The conditions under which these provisions can be implemented by Member States have been clearly explained by Diego Acosta, 2014.

While there is a wide heterogeneity in this particular field, it is nevertheless worth noticing that the EU intervenes in areas which are closely linked to integration. As already indicated, having access to the labour market, benefiting from equal treatment or being able to receive health care are all elements which promote integration of third country nationals in the receiving society. In including provisions related to these rights in its legislation, the EU creates the conditions that approximate national rules and policies.

Over the last 15 years, the EU has developed rules which have directly or indirectly addressed integration related domains. These rules have, on certain occasions, and contrary to the letter of the Treaty, framed and consequently initiated the harmonisation of Member States rules in this policy field. While existing, it should nevertheless be pointed out that this harmonisation process is not direct. It stems from a process which primarily aims at defining rules regarding admission and sojourn of legally residing third country nationals in the EU.

Alongside harmonisation which remains an exception in EU's policy, institutions have developed and established a wide range of tools and bodies aimed at coordinating national integration policies.

The EU has carried out different actions in order to enhance the coordination of national integration policies over the last 15 years, which can be divided into two main types of action: policy orientation and exchange of information between relevant stakeholders.

- *Policy orientation*

Policy orientations have been defined in the Common Basic Principles of Integration, adopted by the Justice and Home affairs Council in November 2004²³; during the Ministerial conferences held in 2004, 2007, 2008, 2010 and 2014²⁴; and, notably, in the five year programmes in the area of freedom, security and justice adopted by the European Council in 1999, 2004, and 2009.

The Common Basic Principles, informal ministerial conferences and European Council conclusions enable Member States to discuss integration issues and to set future priorities in this domain.

The European Commission has also been quite active. While it has helped Member States to define the orientation of their policies, its main task was to put this into practice. It did this in two different ways. It firstly defined the concrete steps to take following Member States orientations. This mainly took the form of the adoption of Communications and so called "Integration Agendas". The Commission has published two Agendas; one in 2005 to put the Common Basic Principles into concrete action, and the other in 2011, identifying new and further challenges in the field of integration.

Secondly, the European Commission has been tasked to manage the European Integration Fund created by the Council in 2007 which ran from 2007 to 2013. The Fund aims to assist Member States in their effort to support third country nationals' integration and set priorities. In managing the Fund, the European Commission is at the centre of EU policies and is able to attribute the money to Member States, to influence national developments and therefore European convergence.

- *EU's support to exchange of information*

Given the limited competence attributed to the EU in the field of integration, the exchange of information between national stakeholders is a key element of the coordination of national policies. In this regard, the

²³ Council Justice and Home Affairs, 19 November 2004, Doc. 14615/04.

²⁴ The last one was in November 2014 under the Italian presidency in Milan. The background note to the last ministerial conference on integration was developed from KING's results by Ismu Foundation. See more at <http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/Fifth-Ministerial-Conference-on-Integration-Background-Note.pdf>

EU has developed several types of actions which aim to gather and share experiences and practices among Member States representatives and civil society. Notably, this occurs during the meetings of the National Contact Points Integration and the European Integration Forum, and through the European Web Site on Integration which aims to become an EU-wide platform for networking on integration through exchange about policy and practices.

3.2.2 National and local level: an erratic organisation of migration and integration governance

Integration is a challenge and, as such, it is a difficult matter to manage. At national level, governance is made more complex by the multiplicity of institutions in charge of the matter.

Analysing the governance of integration at national (but also local) level means taking account of the different political parties and priorities at any one time. Indeed, whilst some countries show consolidated institutional tradition, other Member States have experimented with changing the responsibility for integration after every election. At the same time, many countries modified portfolios deliberately, looking at the objectives and the nexus with related policy fields. In addition, others followed tactical paths, e.g. coalition arrangements.

The causes of these changes are also linked to how integration is framed. Indeed, how policy makers perceived the problem (integration in our case) influences governance. In earlier decades, immigration was largely considered an economic and social fact and so it became a matter of the ministries of the economy, labour, social affairs and education. The events caused by the end of the Cold War, the Gulf Wars, and terrorist attacks in Europe and America brought the issue of immigration into the purview of security ministers

In this regard, the reassignment of migration and integration to the ministry of the interior in **France** has led to strong links between immigration control and integration programmes. Therefore, **integration is increasingly seen as a security issue, and integration programmes are aimed increasingly at the selection of immigrants rather than their empowerment**. In France, integration activities have also been overtaken by the security agenda under President Sarkozy, e. g. with quantified deportation targets (Thränhardt, 2014a). France, at one stage, indicated a desire to implement the Dutch scheme of pre-departure integration but has not been able to do so due to legal reasons.

At local level, as a consequence of the consolidation of migrants' presence in various areas more policy fields become involved and the need for more coordination of policies comes to the surface. Particularly, when a more comprehensive, mainstreamed and future oriented approach replaced the welfare character of policies, then an additional need is felt to place the coordination of policies at a (hierarchically) higher level within the administration of the city. This process often goes together with higher visibility of these policies in local politics.

Cities, in general, have shown that they adopt inventive manners to deal with top-down policies that rarely seem to understand the necessities coming from the ground. **The strategy adopted by cities is not to implement the national policies as a final rule, but use them as a delineating framework that must be further modified, accommodated or renegotiated in everyday governance practice with the other local stakeholders** (Matusz-Protasiewicz, 2014a).

Cities in Europe seem to follow one of the three different models: *i) the **interventionist model***, visible in **Vienna** or **Bologna**, which attempts to encompass all sectors of cultural, social, economic, religious, ethnic integration; *ii) the **regulatory model***, visible in **Copenhagen** or **Turku**, which is selective and based on the active intervention in the social and economic sectors of integration, but indifferent or neutral in the cultural, ethnic, and religious ones. In this sense, this model promotes the principle of having 'no policy is also policy'; *iii) the **passive model***, visible in **Porto** and **Dublin**, which lacks a proper infrastructure, and is characterised by a general reluctance in investing in social cohesion measures. It presumes that immigrants already speak

local language, do not suffer language barriers and can thus integrate without any additional help (Matusz-Protasiewicz, 2014a). In these three models, the outcomes in terms of integration are different, as cities create their own frame of governance in which their role as mediator or negotiator among different players clearly emerges

With regard to the implementation of migration and integration policies, local authorities can enjoy different margins of responsibility and autonomy/discretion. A distinction can be made between countries that assign cities explicit and formal prerogatives on matters of immigrants' regularisation and countries where these procedures are highly centralised.

Finally, in all levels of governance, evidence shows an increase of the policy/practice's success if *i)* migrants (i.e. end users) are placed at the centre of a policy/practice, so that it can better fulfil their needs; *ii)* the design implies a dense network of interaction between the different actors involved (density); *iii)* the actors involved in the network belong to different policy-making levels and non-profit/civil society (complexity)²⁵ (Pasini, Coletti, 2014a).

²⁵ In addition, the three features, if combined, guarantee that the output addresses its initial target and that the outcome favours integration. All this leads to the activation of social mechanism, such as reciprocity, control, acceptance, certification of actors' claims by public authorities, material and non-material rewards, and positive effect of past experience, that can trigger the two-way process between migrants and the receiving society (Pasini, Coletti, 2014a).

4. LOCAL INTEGRATION POLICIES IN THREE DIFFERENT DIMENSIONS


This chapter will focus on **what has been done** at different levels of governance to integrate migrants into the receiving society.

In some cases, a state or a city may choose to ignore migrants' presence and therefore avoid any special responsibility for them. This non-policy response constitutes a choice, and as such should be understood as a policy in itself. In other cases, new policies may be formulated to cater for certain immigrants' needs but under specific conditions due to the alleged temporary nature of their stay. Under this "guest-worker approach", immigrants' otherness may be "tolerated" and even encouraged though their (residence) rights may be curtailed in the long run. Finally, if migrants are perceived as permanent residents, inclusion may be the main response.

In order to have a comprehensive picture of how integration is supported it would be important to go beyond the mere integration policy and also consider other policies such as those in the field of education, housing, health and employment. Although we acknowledge this here we limit our analysis to integration policies implemented at European, national and local level. Specifically, we analysed these policies by dividing them into the three dimensions proposed by Penninx in his heuristic model: legal and political, socio-economic and cultural and religious (Penninx *et al.*, 2014a).

As shown in Figure 5 below, there are two main actors who interact with one another: migrants and the receiving societies. Then, as depicted in the middle, integration can be divided into three dimensions that are constantly influencing each other: the legal-political dimension, the socio-economic dimension and the cultural and religious dimension. Finally there are three levels of analysis: the *individual level*, which refers directly to migrants and natives, the *collective level*, which refers to organisations of migrants (e.g. migrant associations), organizations of the receiving society (e.g. trade unions, churches) and organizations of both of them; and finally the *institutional level*.

Fig. 5 -Penninx's heuristic model for the study of integration processes



The nature of the interaction between the two constituent populations (**receiving societies and migrants**) determines the direction and the temporal outcomes of the integration process. However, **these two ‘partners’ are fundamentally unequal in terms of power and resources**. Since integration policies are defined politically by (the majorities within) the receiving society, there is an inherent danger of representing the expectations and demands of this society, or dominant parts of it, rather than the possibility that these policies are defined on the basis of participation, negotiation and agreement with immigrant groups.

The study of the **legal-political dimension** of integration has been developed extensively, both the part that focuses on the legal status attributed by admission policies and its consequences for integration (including the absence of an official legal status) and the part on (non) participation of immigrants in politics in the broadest sense, a branch of studies that often goes under the name of citizenship studies.

The analysis of the **socio-economic dimension** regards the (development of the) position of immigrants in key fields of societal stratification: work and income, education, housing and health. If the benchmark is the native/non-immigrant, such studies often go under equality studies; if they are longitudinal within the group, they go under the label of (intergenerational) social mobility studies.

Concerning the **cultural-religious dimension**: while the study of the cultural and religious adaptation of individual newcomers has been central, nowadays the perception and acceptance of newcomers by natives has become increasingly important. Furthermore, immigrants' culture and religion are studied as collective phenomena, as is often dictated by the political and societal organization of cultural and religious diversity and its recognition in the society of settlement (equity studies).

Using these three dimensions to analyse integration is a valuable way for understanding the process and, therefore, for providing recommendations on how to govern the phenomenon. Meanwhile, **recognising the interconnections among the dimensions is crucial in order to implement strategies supporting integration. These three dimensions are different as far as their direct objectives are concerned, but they are interconnected and should always be considered as such.** As a matter of fact, evidence sheds light on the negative, if inadvertent, impacts of one domain on the others due to misplaced policies or attitudes. On the other hand, evidence highlights good practices in promoting efficient migration and integration policies that can have results in more than one dimension at the same time.

The socio-economic dimension of integration may be strongly influenced by the legal-political one, particularly if access to and rights in these critical fields are limited or even denied. Potentially, the outcomes of immigrant integration in the socio-economic dimension may also be influenced by the ethnic/cultural/religious one, for example, where negative perceptions relating to certain groups of migrants lead to prejudice and discrimination by the receiving society (individuals, organisations or institutions). That brings – even if access is legally guaranteed – fewer opportunities and lower scores for immigrants in the so-called hard domains of employment, education, housing and health care.

4.1 Integration policy in the legal-political dimension

The legal-political dimension refers to residence and political rights and statuses of immigrants. The basic question here is whether, and to what degree, immigrants are regarded as fully-fledged members of the political community. The position of an immigrant or the 'degree of integration' has two extreme poles: on the one hand there is the position of the illegal foreign resident who is not a part of society in the legal-political sense (but is part of it in the other two dimensions, i.e. socio-economic and cultural-religious dimension). At the other extreme there is the position of an immigrant who is (or has become) a national citizen. In between there is an enormous variation, which has increased in recent decades due to attempts of European states to 'regulate' international migration and integration, and as a consequence of new statuses and rights of the European Union migration regimes (among others EU-nationals *versus* Third Country Nationals).

The competence over the legal and political dimension of integration lies predominantly at the national level, particularly when it comes to the legal status and formal political participation through voting. This means that in these respects conditions are set for local policies. Local authorities have to deal with these conditions, by using their discretionary power in implementing national policies and/or by promoting specific initiatives to facilitate immigrants' access to secure a legal status.

Although main competence over the legal and political dimension of integration lies at the national level, **local authorities enjoy a considerable margin of manoeuvre in implementing national policies and/or can promote specific initiatives to facilitate migrants' access to secure legal status** (e.g., a dedicated office

providing information on the naturalisation procedure) or **programmes that promote migrants' political participation** (e.g., consultative committees). The analysis also shows how cities can play a relevant role in matters which are primarily of a national competence, i.e. access to legal status and citizenship on the one hand and immigrants' political inclusion on the other. The literature review shows a highly varied picture, with different kinds of policies unfolding within different frames of immigrants' legal and political integration (Caponio, 2014a).

4.1.1 Access to legal status and citizenship: the role of cities

Migration policies are implemented at national level. Governments decide who can enjoy the right to enter the territory and permission to stay. However, **the irregular presence of immigrants is a crucial issue for each level of governance**. Although irregular migrants are not considered a target of policies because they are not supposed to exist, their presence is a fact. Cities cannot pretend that they do not have this category of migrants but their response varies widely depending on existing national laws and local rules.

For instance, on the one hand, in **Spain**, through the institution of the *padron municipal*, which is an administrative register where immigrants who live in a city can register with their foreign passport and therefore without necessarily having a regular residence permit, the local administration can play an active role in favouring (or discouraging) undocumented immigrants' access to legal status. In fact, since 2003, Spanish immigration law assigns municipalities the task of producing the so called "social rooting" (*arraigo social*) report, which is a fundamental requirement for seeking regularisation. On the other hand, in **France** the municipalities have no formal competence on matters of immigrants' legal status. At a local level the Prefect (*Préfet*), as representative of the Ministry of the Interior and therefore of the national government, enjoys a considerable amount of discretion in establishing who cannot be expelled and has to be regularised on the basis of humanitarian considerations (Caponio, 2014a).

- ➔ **Irregular migration should be considered as a reality which should not only be dealt with by the local level, specifically with regard to integration policies.**

Legislative amendments and proposals in several EU Member States have made citizenship harder to obtain. A general shift to more demanding integration conditions has taken place, resulting in the exclusion of large numbers of migrants from obtaining citizenship, notably in Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands. Again cities can play a relevant role by promoting different kind of actions aimed at fostering access to citizenship such as language courses, information to would-be citizens and/or specific preparation to pass citizenship tests or examinations. The naturalisation campaigns carried out in some German cities, such as **Berlin** or **Hamburg** are a case in point. In Hamburg, volunteer facilitators from various different communities have been trained to provide advice about citizenship procedures to those who are hesitant or need guidance because of linguistic barriers, fear of bureaucratic processes or lack of knowledge of the benefits of naturalisation.

To address this:

- ➔ **Citizenship should be regarded as an important integration tool and should therefore be facilitated at the national level.**
- ➔ **States should provide more transparency and clarity in administrative procedures for accessing citizenship.**
- ➔ **Governments should promote actions aimed at fostering access to citizenship at the local level (e.g. advice on citizenship procedures, naturalization campaigns).**

4.1.2 Political participation of migrants: direct or indirect participation

The extent to which migrants participate politically relies upon both the political opportunity structure and several individual variables such as political ideas and values; individual characteristics – level of education, linguistic skills, gender; previous involvement in politics in the country of origin; level of social capital; reasons for presence in the territory (permanent or temporary migration); and sense of belonging to the destination country.

The political participation of migrants may be considered as a collective or as an individual prerogative. The experience of **Turin** highlights that, after the failure of the *Consultative committee* in the mid-2000s, immigrants political participation was redefined as an individual right, implying the inclusion of immigrants and their participation in general elections at the district level, rather than special rights and groups' representation. Such an approach appears to be consistent with the support of the Deputy Mayor on Integration Affairs to the initiatives aimed at leading to a revision of the nationality law and, more generally, with the discourse on second generations as "citizens of tomorrow" (Caponio, 2014c).

Migrant participation in the political arena can be classified as direct or indirect political participation. In order to analyse these two forms of participation, it is important to consider whether or not some rights, i.e. voting rights, and opportunities, i.e. consultative bodies, are offered by national or local administration.

4.1.2.1 The right to vote

With regard to direct political participation, in some countries migrants have the right to vote in local elections after three years of residence (**Sweden**) while in others, such as **Italy**, they enjoy very limited political opportunities and non-EU residents cannot vote in local elections. **The right to vote in national elections is strictly linked to the naturalisation process: this poses some problems for long-term residents who are excluded from representation despite their role in the society and being subject to the laws of the land.**

➔ **The political participation of immigrants through the right to vote deserves specific attention in each context in order to understand its meaning for immigrants themselves and its potentialities.**

From the case studies of cities analysed within KING Project, only two cities, **Turku** and **Amsterdam** grant full active and passive voting rights to immigrants. But interestingly, "respondents in Turku and Amsterdam seem to take this participation for granted". It looks as if such individual participation is not seen as representing the immigrant community and thus as less relevant than other forms of collective representation, such as immigrant organisations. **The Turku case, however, has recently shown that a significant representation of Councillors with immigrant background may lead to specific policy initiatives. In the Amsterdam case, this also happened in the past** (Penninx, 2014).

The right to vote in local elections does not mean that political participation of migrants will automatically follow. Some cities, recognizing this limitation, promote a series of initiatives in order to foster an actual engagement of migrants in the receiving country, for example through training courses in voting education, information sessions on local politics, and information campaigns on electoral rights. A case in point is **Dublin**. Caponio states that:

"in **Ireland**, legally resident non-EU citizens can vote in local elections, yet participation had historically been very low: in the 2007 election, only 8,400 out of a potential of 75,000 migrants registered to vote. Barriers identified included the very young profile age of foreign potential voters and a lack of targeted information on how to register and why they should vote. In view of the 2009 local elections in Dublin, the Migrant Voters Campaign Project was launched with the aim of raising awareness of migrants' voting right. In particular, the city organised one day voting

education training for 74 community leaders who were then involved in delivering voters' information sessions within their respective communities and in other communities across the city. Posters advertising the project were translated into 25 languages as part of the registration campaign. To carry out the project, immigrant communities and their associations were involved since the very beginning: a steering committee of 16 immigrants from 12 countries representing ethnic, religious, cultural groups and business interests was established" (Caponio, 2014a).

- States should encourage the political participation of migrants with voting rights by providing information in appropriate forms and through many platforms on local politics and on voting systems.
- The positive effect of allowing voting rights for third country nationals should be further explored by Member States.

4.1.2.2 Consultative committees: role and limits

With regard to indirect political inclusion, the eight case studies of the King Project found a common tendency among all cities: all of them have invested in consultative committees, platforms or councils that bring together stakeholders in integration policies. Still there is a great variety in their composition and to a certain extent in their function. Indeed, while the access to the right to vote is generally restricted, the access to less formal spheres is more open.

First of all, there are platforms that bring together immigrants (mostly coming from immigrant organisations) when they are the target group of a particular policy. They are asked to function as a communication, mobilisation and evaluation agency between target groups and policymakers. **Milan** once had its *Migrants' Coordination* (Coordinamento Migranti) (1985) and **Turin** had its *Municipal Consultative Committee* (1995). **Stuttgart** used to have an International Council whose members were chosen by Stuttgarters with an immigrant background, but in the present Council, members are appointed on the basis of their expertise in migration and integration issues. **Amsterdam** still has an *Advisory Council*, although its status has declined in the course of recent years. The case studies suggest that overall such forms of representation – as a kind of alternative political representation – is rather vulnerable and does not have a long life.

Secondly, there are platforms that primarily gather direct stakeholders in integration policies and have a primary focus on mobilisation, policy instrumentation and implementation. Immigrant organisations may constitute an important part of the members, but then as stakeholders and participants in policies rather than as representatives of a group. The broad 58-member *Immigration Council* of **Barcelona** and the current *International Council* in **Stuttgart**, are good examples. Membership is based on the expectation that members will contribute to policy making or implementation; or the expectation that members scrutinise the administration's policies and practices" (Penninx *et al.*, 2014b).

Another example of an initiative that may favour an active engagement of migrants in issues of public interest is **participatory planning**, an approach aimed at including migrants in the decision making process. Nonetheless, the relation between participation and empowerment of citizens is not univocal: **in some cases participation has a rhetorical meaning or even has a conservative function in the maintenance of the status quo. Sometimes it is simply an instrumental tool of legitimising decisions previously taken. The following cases show effective and non-effective examples of the participatory planning approach.**

In the participatory planning initiative for the Station Area in **Reggio Emilia**, the vast majority of citizens who got involved turned out to be natives, in an area where the majority of residents are of foreign origin. But there are also successful examples of participatory planning. However, when given time participatory planning has been a success in **Berlin**. *The Quartiermanagement (QM) programme* was set up by the Senate in

1999 in 15 neighbourhoods, most of them with a high migrant population. A dedicated 'resident fund', a form of participative budgeting, led to previously unseen levels of local citizen involvement. With a particular focus on people with a migrant background, this participative policy enabled the city to have a better understanding of the needs and priorities of migrant communities. By involving migrant residents' decisions to shape the use of 'resident funds' the feeling of shared ownership of local policies increased. Also, developing effective structures which allow migrants to input their views on common community activities such as festivals and events encourages wide ranging participation as was the case with the Peoples of the World Festival in **Bilbao** (Humphris, 2014).

Consultative bodies are established by cities in order to give migrants or migrant communities a venue for their representation and to represent them in the political sphere. Nonetheless, their efficacy varies greatly and in some cases, they are merely an attempt to compensate for the lack of access to political rights (Matusz-Protasiewicz, 2014a).

Most of existing studies on immigrant consultative committees do not point to a conclusion that these institutions can effectively compensate for the absence of local voting rights. In other terms, their involvement in policymaking processes should be further investigated.

In general, these committees seem to have a quite limited role in the definition of local policy. In the case of **Lyon** for instance, the *Conseil des Rdes RI d Etrangers Lyonnais (CREL)* is regarded as a place of reflection and proposal. It must gather at least four times a year in plenary assembly, and has a formal right of information about local policies; furthermore it can make proposals, spontaneously or when consulted by the City Council. Yet, the City Council has neither the obligation to consult the CREL each time it examines a special issue related to immigrants' integration, nor to follow its advice.

Similarly the *Consell Municipal d'Immigració* established in 2001 by the City of **Barcelona** is a consultative body aimed at favouring immigrants' participation and at creating the necessary conditions for their access to full citizenship, regardless of their administrative situation. To this end, different actors are taking part in the Consell, not only immigrant associations, but also pro-immigrant autochthonous organisations and 'mixed' organisations, as well as representatives of the local authorities and of employers' associations. Yet, its concrete functioning reveals how the Consell played a limited role in local policymaking, since it met rarely, only once or twice per year, and only on the initiative of the city council, while requests for extraordinary meetings coming from the associations were systematically disregarded (Caponio, 2014a).

Other examples on the role of consultative bodies may clarify this point:

The city of **Amsterdam** established advisory councils for minorities in the early 1980s, mirroring the national Minorities Policy. The goal was to provide venues for the representation of immigrant communities living in the city and promote their involvement in processes of policy formulation. In more concrete terms, five advisory councils were established, i.e. Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese/Antilleans, South Europeans and refugees, Chinese and Pakistanis, each one constituted of representatives of individual minority organisations and were financially and administratively supported by the city administration. In 2003, the advisory councils were discontinued, and a new Diversity Council was set up in 2005. This includes representatives of different immigrant associations and acts as a public inquiry institution, i.e. it airs criticisms and gives voice to the concerns of the ethnic communities. It meets about four times a year with the Advisory Board on Diversity and Integration, which also includes experts (Caponio, 2014).

In **Copenhagen** since 1998, an Integration Council has been established "to 'attend to the interests of ethnic minorities and act as their mouthpiece', as well as to 'guide the politicians, the standing committees and the administration of the city on how to secure an efficient and coherent integration policy'". It used to be composed of nominated representatives of ethnic organisations, in addition to experts and representatives of the social partners, housing corporations and educational institutions. Since 2006 the representatives of immigrant groups are directly elected from the population of residents with (non-western) immigrant origin, and immigrant organisations as such are not involved anymore. A shift from group representation towards individual participation seems to have taken place (Caponio, 2014a).

- **Encourage migrants to use participation opportunities through targeted distribution of information; awareness of rights; exchange best practices and experience; follow-up policy implementation.**
- **Create opportunities to participate:**
 - **ensure participation and inclusion in policy decision-making processes of all (migrant) groups affected by a certain decision;**
 - **create specialized migrant consultative bodies which have a concrete say in policy-making processes (rather than committees with just symbolic functions);**
 - **institutionalize the participation of migrant representation in local consultative bodies/councils**
 - **strive for intercultural openness in all administrative levels, e.g. by increasing the proportion of employees with a migrant background.**

4.1.3 Migrant associations and integration in the legal-political dimension

Migrant organisations, both in terms of membership and services provided by them, play an important role in the settlement process and in integration. Notably, the study of *Refugee Community Organisations* (RCOs) highlight the role of migrant organizations in providing pre-arrival assistance, initial reception in the form of translation, interpretation, and support; assistance with skills development and the provision of cultural knowledge; facilitating access to volunteering opportunities, as well as providing opportunities in social spaces to promote social contact (Kindler, 2014).

On the whole, migrant associations often face several limitations. While in certain cases they do represent an important actor in receiving countries and do favour migrants' mobilisation, in others cases they suffer from a lack of representativeness, and a low capacity to deal with institutions that do not consider them as interlocutors.

Often migrant associations are internally divided. Numerous ethnic organisations in **Flanders (Belgium)**, were fragmented along ethnic lines and often divided politically and religiously. In addition, the electoral impact of ethnic minorities remained limited for demographic reasons (Kindler, 2014).

Two examples make clear how and to what extent migrant associations are limited through lack of organization or resources.

With respect to immigrants' political participation, **Turin** has undergone two main phases: the mid-1990s, which was characterised by the representative frame and the 2000s, when an approach based on mediation started to take place. In the first period immigrants' political participation featured as a particularly prominent issue in the local political agenda, as pointed out by the decision of establishing in 1995 the *Municipal Consultative Committee*. This was directly elected by immigrants who had been living in the city for more than three years on the basis of a complex electoral system aimed at ensuring the representation of the main geographical areas of origin of the immigrants living in the city, i.e. Europe, Eastern Europe, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. However, the *Municipal Consultative Committee* was abandoned in 1997, given the scarce participation of immigrant associations in the meetings. It was revealed to be structurally weak, and often lacked the resources to organize on a permanent basis (Caponio, 2014a).

Nonetheless, in some cases the marginalization of migrant organisations is due to other factors, as the case of Milan shows.

In **Milan**, migrant organisations played a relevant role in the mid-1980s, when the Consultative Committee was put in place with the goal of promoting their participation in policymaking processes. This was abandoned in the early 1990s, after the electoral victory of the Northern League Mayor, Marco Formentini. Since then, immigrant associations have been marginalised vis-à-vis the more reliable and experienced Italian NGOs, which have been running most of the municipality services for immigrants' reception and assistance. [...] However, a change of approach started to take place with Mayor Letizia Moratti, who, while being a prominent figure of centre-right Berlusconi movement, still showed a certain interest in immigrant associations as a resource for the city, in particular with regard to the EXPO 2015 event. In more concrete terms, the Mayor held three meetings with immigrant organisations operating in the city area. However, no consultative institution was established, and relations with immigrant associations appear today to be primarily of an informal kind (Caponio, 2014b).

➔ **Support migrant organisations (however informal) as they have an important role in fostering integration processes.**

4.1.4 The attitude of the receiving society on migrant integration in the legal-political dimension

The attitude of the receiving society is crucial for the integration of migrants, and also in the legal-political dimension: if migrants are perceived as outsiders or as a menace it is less likely they will be granted rights, such as voting rights in the local election. If the perception of migrants is more favourable it is more probable that they will be accepted as full members of the society, with rights and obligations comparable to those of other citizens. Over the last decade, and especially after the terrorist attack in 2001, migration has become an increasingly politicised issue with the widespread diffusion of xenophobic attitudes among natives. This hinders any process of migrant inclusion in the receiving society and specifically in the legal and political dimension of integration.

In some countries, such as Italy, the debate of migrants' political rights is highly politicized and the adverse attitude of a part of the public opinion hinders the effective participation of migrants in the political arena. An interesting example is the city of **Milan** where after the electoral victory of the Northern League Mayor, Marco Formentini [...] the issue of immigrants' political participation was side-lined and became a sort of *taboo* for the centre-right majorities governing the cities since the 1990 (Caponio, 2014b).

Nonetheless, the political discourse on migrant participation does not always correspond to practices and the case of Milan is again a case in point. Indeed today, under the current centre-left city government, the official discourse appears far more open to cultural accommodation and participation, yet policy practices are rather contradictory. The City World Forum has been established, which however is not an institution allowing for the political participation of immigrant associations, and no resources have been allocated to them to develop their projects (Caponio, 2014b).

Another interesting example of initiatives put in place to influence the attitude of the national level toward a specific issue, namely the citizenship of the second generations, comes from **Turin** where the Deputy Mayor on Immigrant Integration has always supported initiatives aimed at putting pressure on the national government for the revision of the current restrictive national law. A case in point was the petition "*L'Italia sono anch'io*" (I'm also part of Italy), undertaken in 2013 by various NGOs and associations of second generations, which aimed at collecting the 50,000 signatures needed in order to register a new bill in Parliament that revised the 1992 nationality law. The initiative was explicitly endorsed by the Deputy Mayor in various public events held in the city (Caponio, 2014c). This initiative is an example of a mobilization from the local level in order to influence the attitude of the receiving society as a whole.

➔ **Policymakers should put migrants at the centre of the action, engaging as many levels of governance and as many stakeholders as possible.**

4.2 Integration policy and migrants' integration in the socio-economic dimension

Integration in what may alternatively be called hard domains, structural domains or socio-economic domains is fundamental. A migrant needs to find a job to meet her/his and her/his family needs, a home, schools for the children, healthcare facilities. But integration in these spheres is not necessarily more important than in the other spheres. Finding a place in society in the social or cultural sense is equally important, as is being protected by the law or politically participating in the receiving society. But socio-economic aspects are both means and markers of integration: means because they generate integration; and markers because they allow to see whether there is equal access or not (Phillimore, 2014).

Exclusion and deprivation have enormous impacts upon the ability of new migrants and existing minorities to integrate, and reach their potential, to develop social connections and social capital. Furthermore, given the economic emphasis associated with migration, down-skilling and, in migrant children, poor education outcomes and economic activity levels, have an economic (as well as social) opportunity cost. Thus introducing national mechanisms for recognising or converting qualifications, enhancing employability, providing work experience and supporting migrant children in school are likely to impact on their integration in other domains (Phillimore, 2014).

The challenges migrants face in their integration process in these domains call for responses on the part of public authorities. These responses come from national, regional and/or local authorities. They lean against a backdrop made up of distribution of competence, immigration history, labour market features and so forth (see Chapter 1). It remains that these challenges are mostly felt at local level since practical difficulties are first encountered there and local institutions are first interlocutors.

As Phillimore states:

“Migrants essentially settle into their country of migration at local level. It is at this level they find housing and employment, their children enter education, they build social connections (in addition to those elsewhere) and utilise services” (Phillimore, 2014).

For some fields, namely healthcare, education and labour market, a national regulatory framework exists in most cases. For housing however, local authorities have greater margin of manoeuvre. Notwithstanding, the capacity of local authorities or political will to act in one way or another in these four fields leads to differences from municipality to municipality throughout the EU (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2014a).

It is important to bear in mind the tension between access to socio-economic facilities and migrants' legal statuses. Legal migrants have, in principle, the right to access facilities that irregular migrants, being undocumented or refused asylum seekers, have not. This is problematic because legal statuses may change over the life-course but the impact of not profiting from integration policies will, most likely, endure. One may become irregular if one fails to satisfy residence permit renewal conditions. One may also be regularized. Deprivation of access to one field of structural integration or another may have dire consequences on the process of integration. For that reason, the following section deals with both regular and irregular migrants. Education is the most relevant example. A child that cannot attend school due to restrictions stemming from legal status may suffer from unequal opportunities if and when his or her stay is regularized.

4.2.1 Labour market

Access to the labour market and employment are fundamental features of the process of integration. Both scholarly literature and governments' attention to the matter underscore the place labour integration takes in the process of integration. Employment is regarded as the best way to foster integration in other domains as it avoids poverty. That is, poor economic conditions may lead to concentration in poor housing areas and

isolation from work and education opportunities, to poor health and problems of disaffection (Craig, 2014). Likewise, empirical studies show that having a job is also perceived as fundamental by migrants themselves. Beyond economic security and professional development, work gives migrants a routine, a sense of worth and the opportunity to meet other people (Phillimore *et al.*, 2014a).

Literature on market integration altogether points to migrant labour market outcomes generally below those of the receiving country.

To conclude, for successful market integration, migrants must have overcome three barriers: participation; unemployment; and employment quality (Kahanec *et al.*, 2014a). These barriers are mediated by discrimination.

- ***Migrants participation to the labour market***

Studies show that migrants' **participation** rate in the labour market remains lower than nationals' participation rate overall, but this gap decreases with the passage of time after migration (Craig, 2014; Kahanec *et al.*, 2014). This statement seems to hold less when we look at migrants' residence purpose: economic migrants display higher participation rates than natives whereas humanitarian and family reunion migrants are less likely to participate. More open economies, i.e. those with a higher export-to-GDP ratio, provide favourable conditions for labour force participation and perhaps also employment of immigrants (Kahanec *et al.*, 2014b).

Nonetheless, **barriers to participation in the labour market are often set in national legislation, as a part of the mechanism of exclusion** mentioned in chapter 1.

In **France**, labour market access and integration are complicated by existing barriers, which often explicitly exclude non-citizens from a number of positions, such as civil servants, lawyers, doctors, dentists, midwives, surgeons, pharmacists, brokers, chartered accountants, bailiffs, notaries, etc.

In the **Netherlands** the native-immigrant gaps remain, aggravated by limited language knowledge and, as a consequence, negative perceptions by natives. The Netherlands decided to leave aside cultural integration and boost economic aspects of integration (Blom, 2014). That said, access to the labour market is not granted without condition. At the same time, at national level, participation in the labour market follows a twofold logic that discriminates undocumented migrants and rejected asylum seekers. With the exception of those migrating through family reunification or asylum seekers with an on-going procedure, regular residence is the condition to access labour market. In addition, employment has increasingly become a condition for gaining a residence permit (regularization and renewal) (Garcés-Masareñas, 2014a).

Until recently, **Germany** did not focus on integration of guest workers and paid insufficient attention to language skills or other skills necessary for successful economic and social integration. This helps to explain the low qualification of migrants, insufficient linguistic skills and limited education, especially of second-generation migrants living in Germany, which have created barriers for successful employment. Consequently, there are significant employment participation and earning gaps between natives and second-generation migrants due to low educational levels and insufficient vocational training of the latter group.

➔ **The set of rights laid down in EU directives providing access to the labour market requires proper implementation and monitoring, with the aim of ensuring equity and equality.**

➔ **Legal access to temporary jobs or occasional employment could be facilitated by reducing legal and administrative barriers (e.g. through easier bureaucratic procedures for hiring people temporarily or occasionally, such as the Italian "voucher system"), subject to regulation conditions.**

➔ **Information on European labour market opportunities and needs (skills shortages) and requirements (bureaucracy, procedures, etc.) should be more efficiently communicated to both migrants already living in the receiving society and potential migrants.**

○ *Employment insecurity and unemployment*

Migrants are over-represented amongst the **unemployed** throughout Europe (Kahanec *et al.*, 2014a), but here again, the gap decreases with time after migration. Indeed, significant differences within and between immigrant groups remain, with women doing generally less well than men (Craig, 2014).

It is interesting to note that migrants from Eastern Partnership countries fare better than other migrants, mostly due to the nature of the agreement between the EU and these countries (Kahanec *et al.*, 2014a). Disadvantage in this respect is accentuated for those coming from poor countries and/or have poor command of the receiving country language, in spite of their young age and education level. Migrants also tend to be distributed in industrial sectors with low professional prospects (Craig, 2014).

Employment policies have mostly been adopted at national level. Cities have provided complementary programmes to promote employment, ethnic entrepreneurship and diversity in the composition of the municipality's workforce, to name a few examples. Cities' ability to act in this direction also depends on exogenous structural factors. The organization of job centres is a good example. Where these fall under local administration (e.g. **Sweden** and **Ireland**), the city may orient their activities towards specific groups. Where these fall outside the scope of municipalities (e.g. in the **UK** or **Belgium**), they do not enjoy of this lever for local employment policies. More generally, it seems that cities somewhat act at the margins, using their own imagination to favour employment and diversity: some (but few) cities seek to promote ethnic entrepreneurship; some others buy private goods and services to providers employing immigrants or promoting diversity amongst their employees (Garcés-Masareñas, 2014a).

The **transformation of industrial relations** pertains to all sectors at almost all levels (e.g. flexible contracts and atypical forms of employment, often resulting in extreme exploitation). Although that presents potential concerns for the entire economically active population in 'developed' economies, it is important to focus particularly on the consequences that such transformations can have on the integration process of migrant populations across European countries (Kahanec *et al.*, 2014a).

The fragmented bargaining systems in the UK and the lack of collective agreements in most enterprises allows management to take advantage of immigrant labour forces and use them, for example, as a buffer against fluctuations in demand.

The **German** economy, whilst formally classified as a coordinated market economy, has developed strong signs of a serious insider-outsider cleavage within the labour market. While insiders are still covered by collective agreements and enjoy a great degree of employment security, those outsiders not covered have to put up with much more flexible and individualized contracts, more wage dispersion and unstable working conditions. Immigrants in Germany are disproportionately concentrated in atypical employment forms, including short-term contracts, mini-jobs and temporary agency work. The changes in the bargaining system were not deliberately aimed at segregating migrants; in effect, however, they impinged mostly on non-nationals.

The collective bargaining system of **Spain** unites certain elements of the dual and the fragmented labour market models, but its distinctive features are informality and state intervention. From the perspective of migrants, the benefits of this system are apparent in the relative ease with which construction, agriculture and personal service jobs could be taken up in the booming Spanish economy during the early 2000s. Similarly, to the **UK**, migrants provided the buffer to meet increased demand in good times, and there was no collective bargaining in the affected sectors that could have prevented massive inflow of foreign-born

labour. Nevertheless, significant social and individual costs stemmed from informality: these included forgone tax revenues on the receiving society's side, and no possibility for claiming benefits on the side of the new inhabitants.

- ➔ **National governments should ensure implementation of existing laws against exploitation, impose a minimum set of standards in those sectors not regulated by collective bargaining, increase controls, make sure that trade unions represent all workers (both natives and migrants), promote laws and regulations for the conciliation of work and family life.**
- ➔ **Local levels of governance and local contact points of national agencies (environmental and health agencies) should increase regulation and inspectorial regimes in sectors where vulnerable migrants concentrate; and introduce stronger transparency measures in supply chains.**
- ➔ **Relevant stakeholders (trade unions, employers' associations, migrant workers' representatives, employment agencies, NGOs) should more widely promote existing regulations and protection for migrant workers, educating migrant workers about their rights on arrival.**
- ➔ **Legally employed migrants should be able to accumulate social benefits (pension, healthcare, etc.) in temporary/occasional jobs.**

- *Employment quality and recognition of qualifications*

Beyond obtaining a job, the role of the labour market is also about **employment quality**, about “the *appropriateness of that job* and the *role of the workplace* itself in promoting integration” (Craig, 2014). Throughout Europe, labour migrants have ended up in the worst labour market conditions, filling the gaps left by nationals. Migrants tend to be employed in jobs for which they have more skills or qualification than appropriate. Besides discrimination and lack of qualification recognition, barriers to fit employment are also lack of language fluency and of social networks.

It is worth noting here that this situation is not encountered by all migrants. Highly skilled migrants, to the contrary, are the object of a competition for talents between states: more rights and more extensive rights are granted to them (Kahanec *et al.*, 2014a).

- ➔ **The huge achievement of a European-wide system of recognition of qualifications, extended to third country nationals, should be put in place.**
- ➔ **The scope of Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications should be extended to all third country nationals.**
- ➔ **In certain high-skilled sectors, regulations that require national language proficiency should be eliminated.**
- ➔ **Priority checks (giving precedence to European citizens) could be eliminated.**

Integration policies in **Turku** go through promoting participation through work and reduce dependency on welfare. In order to favour labour market integration, migrants are given the opportunity to equip themselves with knowledge and skills (including language) to adapt to the market's needs. Structural integration seems to prevail over the two other dimensions: legal-political and cultural-religious. Despite these efforts, there still is a gap between labour market outcomes for migrants and natives. According to most policy-makers, this is due to lack of skills, including language skills. Consequently, the city deploys much of its energy on training and skills provision (Penninx, 2014).

As of today, integration in Turku is guided by a programme for integration for the period 2014-2017. Clinging to the national legal framework, the programme accords special emphasis to labour market integration. Integration is defined as an:

“interactive process of immigrants and the society that aims to provide them with the knowledge and skill to function in the workplace and in society ‘while contributing to the possibility of immigrants to maintain their own language and culture’” (Penninx, 2014).

Education is also a key element. In the Finnish system education and vocational training is free, and is a responsibility borne by the municipalities. Some national funding is transferred to municipalities for special expenses cities may bear for immigrant children. Adult education, particularly Finnish language courses, is also important for migrants and for the city. If national funding is available, 43% of these courses are financed by the city itself (Penninx, 2014).

4.2.2 Education and training

Education is a fundamental stepping stone towards integration, not only for children, but also for adults (see 4.3.1). As touched upon above, migrants tend to down skill into positions requiring skills below their level of formal education. For children, education is a way to break the circle and ensure they enjoy better opportunities. For adults, it is a way to recognise or validate their skills in the receiving society.

- *Access to education*

Education policy is decided at national or regional level. Localities may also intervene to complement or repair (or worsen in some cases) policies adopted above. Education is regarded as a right of all children, at least formally. In practice, some impediments arise when it comes to children of irregular migrants: even though they are guaranteed the right to education by law, they are most often victims of disincentives (fear of parents to be detected if their children go to school; request of proof of residence by schools in some countries; no economic aid for books, transportation etc., due to their legal status). Here again, it is up to local bodies to respond to shortages which may lead to disparities from one municipality to another. Some localities may be supportive (coverage of expenses such as school books or transportation), whilst others may try to discriminate against particular groups (exclusion of irregular children in nursery schools in **Milan**, discrimination against Roma people in some **French** municipalities) (Garcés-Mascreñas, 2014a).

With regard to children of regular migrants, the trend is to bridge the gap in school achievements between minority and majority pupil populations. However this gap is not to be found everywhere. If migrant children perform worse in some countries, they perform the same or even better in some others. At national level, policies aimed at reducing the gap in school achievements consist of increases in resources allocated (financial or in terms of staff) or specific support when a target group is clearly identified (language support classes or setting up of particular reception classes for newly arrived migrants). At local level, policies are generally extra-curricular support, establishment of additional neighbourhood schools or vocational schools (as in **Rotterdam**), programmes to reduce the share of migrants in underperforming schools (Garcés-Mascreñas, 2014a).

In some Member States, Third Country Nationals with a long term residence permit are charged higher fees to access education, which goes against the provisions made by the Long Term Residence directive.

One example of practical barriers can be cited: even if national law prohibit schools from asking for documentation from migrant children, many schools actually do so, in order to avoid having undocumented migrant children amongst pupils. In countries such as **the Netherlands, Poland** and **Hungary**, schools also justify identification document requests by arguing that funding is allocated according to the number of

students enrolled. Other possible barriers include the fact that minors may not live with their parents and some schools deny school registration by other family relatives. Other problems include the fact that, though access to primary education is free, undocumented families are excluded from economic aid for extra expenses such as books, transportation, school meals, etc. Finally, undocumented children tend to have no access to education before and after compulsory schooling (Garces-Mascarenas, 2014a).

The institutional arrangements of the education system, as it is, is entirely inadequate in many European countries because, not only migrants, but also more generally native disadvantaged people are affected by problems such as segregation, poor access to education, and so on. Many research projects illustrate the specific structural factors that may explain differences in (migrant) children's performance. These factors include features of the education system (such as ability tracking, age of selection, transitions between early, primary and secondary education, ethnic majority bias in textbooks and teaching practices); resources allocated; legal framework for enrolment (according to legal status, parental choice or residential catchment area); integration policies; and national discourses on migration and integration.

The set of rights laid down in EU directives requires proper implementation and monitoring, notably equity in treatment. Thus:

- ➔ **States should remove all *legal* barriers (at the legislative level) and all *practical/administrative* barriers, to ensure effective access to education for migrant children.**
- ➔ **The institutional arrangements of the education system should be revised, in order to: a) tackle problems affecting disadvantaged people in general, whether they are migrants or natives (through mainstreaming measures), b) be ready to welcome and treat diversity as a positive characteristic of society.**

- *Equal access, equal use and equal outcomes*

The following experiences are examples of the efforts made in order to ensure equal access, equal use and equal outcomes in the education system, by developing pre-school language tuition, compensatory programmes and access to tertiary education.

In **Italy**, migrant children with a poor grasp of the Italian language are often kept down one year in primary school, and even in the lower levels of secondary school. The impact of this appears to further disadvantage the children throughout their school and subsequent careers and to compromise their possibilities for full integration.

In *Kindergärten* (nurseries) **German** language courses were established: 15,000 children were offered extra training in **German** language every year. For those children who did not succeed, a further year of intensive German teaching was offered. More than 1,000 teachers were teaching within this programme, and nearly all parents accepted it. The measures were effective: between 2002 and 2012 the percentage of children with an immigrant background, who were not ready for school, decreased from 35.7% to 12.4%.

Compensatory programmes have had an impact on closing the attainment gap. These include universal nursery provision, (which has been available in many countries for some time), better managed and fair admission systems so that some schools do not become effectively educational ghettos, and specific help for those migrant children who arrive with no effective prior experience of education at all. Early years programmes such as the **UK Sure Start programme** have had some impact on improving attainment for migrant children but these programmes, as with many other special programmes, have been affected by austerity-driven cuts in public expenditure and Sure Start itself was open to the criticism that it was structurally quite racist in its overall approach and was not *targeted on migrant and minority children* (Craig, 2014).

In the **Netherlands** the example of Turkish migrant young people shows that despite strong pressures to study high status subjects such as law and medicine, they are compromised by the structural barriers to accessing those sorts of courses. As a result many Turkish young people end up in courses such as business studies in professional colleges which satisfy their parents' aspirations and their own desire to gain qualifications and to have a better work-life balance than those of their parents, whilst not meeting their original aspirations.

➔ **Provide additional support to migrant children, in order to ensure that they have equal access, equal use and equal outcomes in education. Such measures should also serve the needs of native children. Such improvements would in turn result in the increase of the number of migrant children and disadvantaged natives accessing tertiary education.**

- *School segregation and dropout*

A large number of young migrants are not in education, or employment, or training schemes, which raises concerns and underlines the need for further research in this domain. This phenomenon is attributed to racism in the education system and the system's questionable appropriateness. Structural obstacles have created a segmentation of education attainments that translates into vocational training and segmentation between migrants and nationals at secondary school level and, discrimination and delusion at tertiary education level.

Although ethnic minority participation rates in tertiary education exceed those of the native population in many countries, this apparent success story does not at present provide adequate data distinguishing between different kinds of migrant career within the broader ethnic minority picture. However, it would be surprising, given what is known about the way in which institutional racism and discrimination operates within education and within higher education in particular, if it were not more difficult for certain kinds of migrants to achieve entry to higher status higher education and higher educational institutions.

The case of **Barcelona**, is relevant. As Garces-Mascreñas (2014b) reports:

“less than half of the schools in Barcelona are public, the rest are private. Children of low-income families are mostly concentrated in public schools. Consequently, we see that foreign pupils account for 12% of all pupils between 3 and 16 years old, and they represent more than 22% of the pupils in public schools” (Garces-Mascreñas, 2014b).

As Craig states:

“If full integration means having the same life choices as host country nationals, then clearly the compromising by institutional barriers of parental aspirations leading to young migrants 'realism' suggests that full integration through enjoying equivalent higher education choices will not be attained until the issue of racism is dealt with” (Craig, 2014).

Significant individual and institutional discrimination leads to lower educational attainments that may in turn damage equal opportunities and further increase labour market gaps between migrants (and people with immigration background) and natives.

With regard to **segregation** in education, in **Germany**, interethnic friendships between minorities and host country national in particular neighbourhoods depends critically on the **level of education** of minorities and are less likely in areas with greater degrees of ethnic segregation. There are many examples of local initiatives taken to reduce school segregation. The analysis of available evidence shows that **very few countries** have **translated local initiatives** and ad hoc projects in this area **into national policies**. One key point which facilitates integration in relation to education is improved **training of teachers** at all levels to ensure they are

sensitive and equipped with the skills to work with a range of cultures and ethnic and national origins (Wilkens *et al.*, 2014b).

In **Sweden** there is an identified and increasing **gap in educational achievement between young people with and without a Swedish background**. An innovative approach was promoted by using systems already in place to improve integration outcomes. The aim consists of promoting immigrant youth participation in Swedish cultural life; intercultural exchange through writing, storytelling and other art forms between Swedish and migrant youth; and to develop the role of libraries in integration processes by developing partnerships and networks. These actions identified the importance of an equal gender balance: (project evaluation disaggregated findings for male and female participants). In **Oslo, Master's students acted as diversity mentors** in secondary schools. There was a 30 percent increase in university admissions from these schools, compared to an average 7 percent increase in Oslo schools more generally. A mentoring scheme for mature students from minority backgrounds helped to lower dropout from university. In 2012, there were 11 percent minority students with the target of 15 percent likely to be reached within the next two years. Encouragingly, Oslo University turned the project into a permanent diversity office (Humphris, 2014).

Drop-out levels seem to be higher for migrant children overall (Wilkens *et al.*, 2014b).

There are concerns about the relatively larger number of migrant children not in education, or employment or training schemes, although the research base in this area is relatively weak. More data are required particularly around the intersection between education, training and employment. In the **Netherlands** and other countries, high rates of early dropout and unemployment amongst young migrant people has been attributed largely to their own action (or inaction). In **Rotterdam**, new types of school have been introduced to stem the high dropout rates. A substantial amount of evidence demonstrates the continuing impact of racism within the education system, which, despite some contradictory trends within certain migrant groups, impedes educational attainment for minority and migrant young people. Additionally the appropriateness of education at the top end of secondary school is often questionable. This has led, in some countries, to an increased focus on vocational education opportunities. Such evidence seems to contradict the recorded motivation and increasing educational attainment of migrant children and points to increasing segmentation between different groups. This differentiation is also apparent in established minorities where children (and particularly girls) of Indian and Chinese origin tend to do much better than most other minority children in terms of educational attainment.

➔ **The education system should:**

- **train teachers at all levels, to ensure that they are equipped with the special skills needed to be sensitive to diversity and to deal with disadvantaged groups;**
- **organise local school-based bridging programmes and gap filling programmes to help students reach the standards they need to succeed alongside their peer group.**

○ *The importance of parental support*

Some cultures are strongly pro-learning and schools need to recognise this by affirming the role of appropriate parental support. It is clear that migrant children (and their parents in general) are at least as keen and frequently more so, to exploit the benefits of education as TCN children and this motivation should be recognised and built on. One of the most critical factors in the education domain is fluency in the receiving country's language (acknowledged by virtually every relevant commentator).

Children's language attainment can be held back by a lack of linguistic continuity between school and home. A study has shown that when migrant women were more socially mobile, their children had better educational attainments. The greater migrants' aspirations regarding their children's educational attainment, the more their children feel encouraged to study up to tertiary education levels and the more they are socially mobile.

A study of parental aspirations in **Spain** for their migrant children shows how these aspirations can be diluted in the context of generally modest expectations of both native and migrant young people; the study notes that if government and school were to make effective use of migrant parental ambitions for their children, focusing particularly on parents who were amongst the poorest and most disadvantaged, it would not only help the integration of migrant children and address racial discrimination but raise educational attainment more generally. There is a more general literature showing how discrimination within educational systems can shape the aspirations of minority and migrant children (Craig, 2014).

The following recommendations specifically address the local level, schools and civil society:

- **Motivate, recognise and build on the pro-learning attitude of immigrant children's parents.**
- **Build relationships between schools, the children's parents and the communities in which the school is situated.**
- **Stress the linguistic continuity between school and home by providing language courses for parents at school and within the workplace, involving trade unions.**

4.2.3 Health care

Health represents the milestone of the migratory experience. Indeed, an individual relies on his or her good health for facing all the challenges that migration entails and it is the basic condition of his/her participation to the labour market. Migrants' health outcomes differ from natives. Migrants may have difficulties in accessing, or making use of their right to health care, for several reasons. Language barriers, communication problems, socio-cultural factors, newness or cultural factors may hamper proper medical treatment. What is more, migrants also have difficulty in accessing care because of confusion about the system itself and the failure of healthcare systems to clear up confusion about its functioning and what people's entitlements are (Craig, 2014). In addition, research shows that newcomers tend to be inhibited when it comes to use healthcare services, all the more so when they have not received any introductory course on the system's functioning (Garcés-Mascreñas, 2014a).

The issue is of the utmost importance since migrants' health may deteriorate in the post migration phase due to the stress caused by the integration process as well as by the acculturation process. Many migrants, especially labour migrants, for the most part arrive in an initial healthy state. It is then that their health condition deteriorates. This is markedly different for asylum seekers that arrive with physical and psychological problems due to persecution in their country of origin (Phillimore, 2014).

Amid the causes of deteriorating health, poor housing, low income, working conditions, poor health practices and knowledge about entitlements, poor language provision by healthcare services, cultural insensitivity of care providers, structural and individual racism, and detention should be acknowledged (Craig, 2014; Bathily, 2014).

Again, for irregular migrants, the issue is twofold. First, a direct barrier exist in the formal right to access healthcare and what kind of care is accessible. Second, indirect barriers exist and may consist of: the exclusion of state-funded health schemes for uninsured persons and therefore migrants have to pay the full cost of care (which acts as a strong deterrent); and a lack of knowledge as to entitlements. These barriers operate

at a national level. At local level, the picture becomes more complex. Healthcare institutions enjoy great autonomy which translated into large disparities across municipalities. For instance, some of the nineteen municipalities in Brussels have eliminated cumbersome procedures to ease irregular migrants' access to healthcare, whereas Munich implemented a medical contact point for uninsured people (Garcés-Mascreñas, 2014a).

As for regular migrants, they enjoy extensive, but not unlimited, access to healthcare services. In addition, difference in health outcomes between migrants and natives are enduring. This is arguably due to disparities in the set of healthcare services, in turn due to barriers of different sorts. Despite such differences, only 11 out of 25 European states (**the UK, Ireland, the Netherland, Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland**) have provided specific national health policies for migrants. For some countries, these are integrated into broader policies (merged with policies concerned with "race" and "black and minority ethnic" groups in the **UK**; falling under the umbrella of "cultural differences" in **the Netherlands**), for some others policies are explicitly addressed to migrants (**France, Austria, Germany, Italy, Spain, *inter alia***). A good deal of these policies aim at tackling what could be called institutional discrimination. They attempt to overcome linguistic, cultural and administrative barriers through interpretation and cultural mediation services, training staff to diversity, or diversifying the workforce, to name some examples. They may be adopted at different levels of policy-making (Garcés-Mascreñas, 2014a).

Specific needs also need to be acknowledged. Jobs occupied by migrants tend to be difficult, dirty and dangerous ones. This implies specific attention to ensuing health needs: psychological, physical and psychosomatic stress.

Another issue is undocumented workers' health. Since they have no legal existence, they are invisible in policy formulation. Remaining in an irregular situation exposes migrants to exploitation and ill-treatment, and thus increase the likelihood of substantial health needs. This may be even more critical for children of undocumented parents. Notwithstanding international law provisions in this domain, some countries provide no specific protection to children of undocumented parents and, in some countries, irregular migrants using healthcare services must be reported to the authorities, which is a huge disincentive. Information about entitlements is here critical but often inappropriate (Craig, 2014).

- *Equal access and equal use of health care*

A **wide range of problems** to accessing health services have been identified. **These include:** not understanding health systems, language barriers, poor interpretation/translation and over-reliance on family members for interpretation, lack of awareness about health prevention and inoculation systems, cultural misunderstandings by medical practitioners in language and terminology used to describe symptoms, bureaucratic barriers to registering for healthcare, high levels of poverty restricting access to fresh or healthy foods, overcrowding and exploitation in housing or employment leading to increased propensity to communicable diseases, unfamiliarity with culture/climate and/or exploitation increasing stress levels, depression associated with lack of social mobility and isolation, poor access to antenatal care associated with higher infant and maternal mortality, lack of trust in health services or fear of being charged, exclusion from health services for undocumented migrants in some countries (e.g. **Sweden**), charging for services in others (e.g. **UK**), racism and discrimination by individual professionals, institutional racism and pathologising of ethnicity.

The difficulty migrants have in accessing care are generally thus caused by **confusion about the system** and the **failure of healthcare providers** to be effective in explaining how health systems are structured and what people's entitlements are. A study of migrants' experience of healthcare in **Ireland** suggested that migrants' perceptions were that the system was poor in adapting to the needs of a rapidly diversifying population and that, where possible (e.g. for economic migrants), they would prefer either to access healthcare in their own countries or at least to confirm diagnoses and medical advice with medical practitioners in their own country. These migrants felt that there was a notable **lack of sensitivity** amongst providers and practitioners to

cultural aspects of health care including views about conditions, ways of accessing healthcare and negotiating care arrangements.

Although some efforts have been made by IOM, on the whole the **monitoring of migrant health is poor**. The lack of appropriate monitoring of outcomes means that in most countries it is not possible to explore health outcomes by migration status, while in others, naturalised migrants become invisible in the data. Alternatively health outcome data is based around ethnicity or even a basic minority/majority binary with scant consideration of other demographic characteristics that may have more extensive impacts upon migrant/minority health (i.e. age and gender).

- ➔ **States should be more aware of migrants' problems in accessing health services and should develop a better monitoring system, taking into account variables such as age, gender, immigration status and ethnicity.**
- ➔ **Materials should be made accessible to migrants on health promotion and how most effectively to access services so that the focus is on prevention.**
- ➔ **The receiving society should be educated about the contribution that migrants make to health services.**
- ➔ **Doctors and healthcare personnel should be equipped with the skill sets needed to deal with the different needs of a highly diversified population. Cultural mediators should work alongside healthcare personnel in hospitals, clinics and health centres.**
- ➔ **Given many budget cuts and constraints in the national funding of healthcare, governments should collaborate with civil society organisations to help support appropriate provision within communities.**

4.2.4 Housing

Housing is another less explored matter on the path towards integration. It is however not devoid of critical issues, at the top rank of which we find housing conditions and location of dwellings. It goes without saying that it is important to have good quality, affordable, secure (in safety terms and in time) housing. Craig (2014) reports the four roles played by housing as identified by Phillimore: "as shelter, status and identity; as a nexus for social relationships; providing safety and freedom; and as the site of the integration process" (Phillimore, 2014).

Migrants with low bargaining power end up at the bottom end of the housing scale. Housing markets are usually fairly competitive and resources are limited. Private housing is relatively flexible and compensates the unavailability of mortgages for low incomes and more rigid social housing (ineligibility or long waiting time). Private housing thus prevails over public housing. In summary, **the difficulties migrants face are: first, being eligible for social housing since the right to social housing is very limited for most groups of migrants and eligibility gives precedence to family over single people; second, accessing accommodation, because of a lack of accurate and timely information and inappropriate locations (isolated areas); third, migrants can hardly maintain these places due to low income; fourth, they may be obliged to live in housing of poor quality, overcrowded and overpriced, and otherwise exploitative** (Craig, 2014).

As in the other aspects of structural domains, the difference between legal statuses is distinct. That said, the governance structure of housing, in contrast with the other three domains, gives much more leeway to municipalities: they do not complement or respond to national policies but they are the primary actors of housing policies. Irregular migrants for instance are most likely to resort to private housing, less regulated and potentially more exploitative.

Irregular migrants are excluded from state-subsidized housing and must rely on alternative strategies such as the private housing market, their own network (relatives, friends or acquaintances), paying rent to a legal resident who acts as the formal tenant, or renting on the unofficial market. Such a situation often results in abuses (overcrowded, overpriced apartments), all the more so in countries where landlords can be sanctioned for renting to irregular migrants (**the Netherlands, Italy** for instance). The issue is often addressed at the local level where NGOs may provide temporary accommodation. These initiatives are mostly funded by local authorities. Garcés-Mascareñas (2014a) reports that:

in comparison to the national government, local authorities tend to feel a higher need to provide a safety net for destitute migrants. This is justified on the basis of three arguments. The first is of a humanitarian nature: moral arguments on the inclusion of those residing in the municipality prevail over national regulations aimed at exclusion. The second argument is in terms of public health, public order and safety. In this case, imperatives to prevent overcrowded housing and urban decay may be of higher priority for local authorities than those related to immigration control. The third argument is in response to national policies: feeling burdened with the practical implications of the shortcomings of national migration policy, local authorities protest and try to persuade the government to reverse certain aspects of its migration policy (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2014a).

In Milan, housing has become a key issue. The city's intervention in immigration matters was first initiated by a need to respond to those emergencies that were beyond the scope and capacity of charities. Thus that the municipality granted migrants access to public housing in the early 1980s. Access was, however, to be limited to municipality-owned public housing until the Region of Lombardy ruled out the restriction in 1983. Political tensions arose at that point due to the high costs of renting in the city. Notwithstanding, the data provided by the city of Milan over the 2000s show that migrants' access to public housing has increased. It passed from 12.3% of migrants of the total beneficiaries in 2000 to more than 30% of the total number of the beneficiaries applying every year (Caponio, 2014b). The municipality also provides temporary accommodation facilities for migrants and especially newcomers which are run by NGOs. Some of these facilities address the needs of specific categories of migrants such as disadvantaged families, trafficked women, and single women with children. The great majority of public housing however targets the disadvantaged in general, not migrants in particular.

As for regular migrants, research finds that discrimination in the housing market is commonplace. With regard to migrants' access to decent and affordable **housing**, the problem is framed in terms of equality. As highlighted in the CLIP final report on housing, ethnic discrimination, as well as discrimination of migrants in the housing market, is a widespread phenomenon. Discrimination and racism can be direct, for instance by excluding non-nationals from city-owned social housing schemes or reducing migrants' chances of accessing particular housing as a result of anti-segregation quotas. Discrimination can also be indirect, mostly resulting from unequal treatment and unequal opportunities in the private housing market on the basis of class, ethnicity or place of origin or as a consequence of migrants' unequal access to information in a highly intransparent housing market (Penninx *et al.*, 2014a).

Either direct (explicitly providing limitations) or indirect (unequal treatment on the private housing market), discrimination have been addressed by local authorities, for example through the setting up of agencies mediating between owners and tenants. In most cases, municipalities do not explicitly target migrants but rather low or middle income households. Measures may be directed at the demand side, by increasing the renting or purchasing capacities of the target households through premiums or subsidies, reductions in mortgage payments, free loans or reductions in borrowing costs. Or they may be directed at the supply side by increasing the offer of affordable housing in the city. Policies may also aim at reducing spatial segregation in specific neighbourhood through the establishment of quotas and resettlement for instance.

Overall, housing opportunities result in concentration of migrants into specific neighbourhoods, usually deprived areas, which do not result from a self-segregating tendency. It is much more a consequence of migrants' lack of bargaining power, which is in turn a consequence of *inter alia* low income (Craig, 2014). This

is for instance the case in **Turku**, Finland, where cheap and available housing is concentrated in few areas (Penninx, 2014). This has dire impacts on integration as a whole. The combination of spatial, social and ethnic segregation has negative consequences on social and cultural integration (improvement of language capacity and reliance onto social capital are made harder); and on their structural integration (by risking to be trapped within their ethnic communities) (Garcés-Mascreñas, 2014a).

4.3 *Integration policy in the cultural-religious dimension*

The *cultural and religious* dimension concerns perceptions and practices of migrants and of the receiving society and their reciprocal reaction to differences and diversity. It is especially on the basis of perceptions *in the cultural and religious domain* that prejudices take form and differences are categorized.

This dimension is ambiguous and more difficult to capture because identities and perceptions change over time, as do stereotypes and discrimination, depending on historical and broader political changes. For instance, while immigrants of Turkish origin in **Germany** were labelled as “gastarbeiter” in the 70s, nowadays they are labelled as “Muslims”.

The debate between different integration models – multiculturalism, assimilationism, and so on – revolves around the assumption that migrants have to be incorporated and have to integrate fundamentally from a cultural point of view. Moreover, culture and religion have a large impact on public opinion, which is crucial for accepting or rejecting different policies.

As said in chapter 2, the burden of integration, and specifically, of cultural integration, has been progressively moved from a state to a migrant responsibility.

Notably, in first-generation immigration countries since the mid-1990s, integration started being conceived in cultural terms, with cultural and value-based commonalities being thought to be essential for social cohesion. In this view, the cultural dimension of integration is seen as an obligation for immigrants. Acquisition of national citizenship was no longer conceived as an instrument that would facilitate structural integration and started being increasingly redefined as the end point in a sequential model of integration and process of cultural adaptation. This new cultural conception of integration policies went hand in hand with redefining the identity of Northwest European countries. The claims and outcomes of such discussions on the ‘identity’ of receiving societies (as modern, liberal, democratic, secular, equal, enlightened, etc.) were translated into civic integration requirements for immigrants and civic integration courses of an assimilative nature. In this sense, *cultural* integration was made a *condition* for civic inclusion, rather than an *outcome* of it (Penninx *et al.*, 2014a).

The fact that migrant integration is conceived pre-eminently in cultural terms is reflected by the analysis conducted within the KING research both of European natives’ perceptions of immigration and of migrants’ understanding of the very concept of integration. Indeed, on the one hand, **European natives demonstrably perceive immigration more as a cultural problem than as economic one** (Poletti, Regalia, 2014a).

Also analysis of migrants’ perceptions of integration in the **UK** demonstrated that **the integration process is framed by migrants in cultural terms.**

With regard to the *analysis of policies* in this domain, a significant part of the KING study was devoted to the analysis of local policies, especially city-level ones. Cities’ policies are particularly interesting because the mere presence of migrant populations in their neighbourhoods compels cities to develop integration policies, and this is all the more the case in the absence of explicit integration policies at the national level. Cities often

show a pragmatic approach for dealing with integration-related issues, often contrasting, “mitigating” or re-shaping national integration policies.

The cultural – religious dimension of immigrant integration seems to be the most flexible area in which cities’ authorities have formulated and implemented their own strategies adapted to specific local needs. When contrasted with practices at the national level, cities seem to be skilfully *spontaneous*, *flexible* and capable to *easily targeting* the most acute issues in integration policy-making, negotiating in the everyday governance practice with the other local stakeholders. This is not to say that local policies do not have ideological elements: but these refer much more to strategic elements (needed in pragmatic approaches), such as the concept of interculturality and the keywords of diversity and participation, which emerge in local policy documents rather than national ones (Matusz-Protasiewicz, 2014a; Penninx *et al.*, 2014b).

Cities’ policies in the cultural-religious dimension can be classified into three main categories (Matusz-Protasiewicz, 2014a):

- *Cultural integration aiming at economic growth* - In local cultural policy documents, diversity may be perceived as a source of attractiveness, innovation and competitiveness. Cultural integration is then developed as a cross-sectorial issue engaging different stakeholders such as public institutions, business organizations, media, NGOs, civil society organizations, immigrant organizations, churches and trade unions by managing diversity in the most effective way. Literature on urban development has connected diversity with the growth of attractiveness for investments and innovations in the city. This long-term systematic diversity-oriented approach assumes that culturally diverse communities may contribute significantly to innovations and economic growth. This way of approaching integration shows that the constantly redefined concept of social cohesion and cultural integration is interdependent with integration in the economic and political domains.
- *Cultural integration aiming at avoiding conflict* - Growing ethnic and cultural diversity can aggravate difficulties in intergroup relations and hinder communication between immigrant groups and the local population. The depiction of specific immigrant groups is easily manipulated, for example by presenting Muslims as a threat to societal peace. In such cases cultural integration or diversity management aims at conflict avoidance and combating negative attitudes towards immigrants, xenophobia and racism. The coexistence of cultural, religious and linguistic diversity might lead to conflicts over values and competition for resources. There has been a whole variety of tools developed by cities in order to promote intercultural dialogue and intergroup relations within community such as educational campaigns, cultural events promoting diversity, information campaigns about equal treatment and non-discrimination. All this has been aimed at strengthening a common sense of belonging but also combating discrimination in both the hard domains (education, labour market, health care) and private life.
- *Cultural integration aiming at recognition of diversity* - In the case of the cities **Wrocław** and **Lublin** in Poland, for example, one may witness a set of promotional practices based on an appeal to their alleged multicultural and multi-religion heritage in order to attract investors and tourists.

In official documents, the key terms are *interculturality* and *diversity*. Both terms do not refer so much to cultural diversity as a right, but to the possible use of (certain forms of) cultural diversity for economic development and social cohesion of the local society. In the concept of interculturality a selectively used concept of diversity (not all cultural diversity is positive) is combined with a strategy that mobilises different stakeholders such as public institutions, business organizations, media, NGOs, civil society organization, immigrant organisations, churches and trade unions in order to manage diversity both for economic purposes and for societal cohesion. In such a definition it is a (normative) strategy – rather than a model to describe and analyse reality. The term inter-cultural policies has replaced multicultural policies as far as that term was used before (Penninx *et al.*, 2014b).

- **Governments at all levels should support policies and strategies which try to impact on relations amongst all ethnic, national, religious groups within the city.**
- **Policies should enhance the role of volunteering in connecting the host population with migrants and improving the efficacy of integration projects.**

What follows is a compilation of examples of policies concerning the cultural-religious domain classified by issue. Most cases are drawn from European cities' policies, but examples of regional and national policies are also included.

4.3.1 Language instruction

Migrants define **language learning** as one of the key challenges for their own integration (Phillimore *et al.*, 2014). It is widely acknowledged in integration literature that language learning is a necessary step towards integration: for children, so they can make the most of their education opportunities; for adults, so they can improve their job position and human capital, and do not place too heavy a burden on their children's shoulders (for example being used as translators) (Craig, 2014). As the case studies on Turku, Finland, shows, despite some observers attributing the employment gap to discrimination and the lack of anti-discrimination policies, most policy-makers in Turku see this as a consequence of the lack of relevant skills (including language) of foreigners.

Excellent examples of targeted language courses and of vocational top-up training are offered by **Swedish** and **Norwegian** policies (especially concerning asylum seekers). All migrants in Sweden (aged 20 – 64 and also for persons between 18 and 19 who came to Sweden without their parents) receive a personalised 'integration plan' and assistance to help find a job and housing. Swedish for Immigrants (SFI) is a free language course which includes mandatory job preparation such as internships, and work experience. The goal is to offer 40 hours of full-time activity per week for a maximum of 24 months.

Some cities recognize language as an element in the educational curriculum of primary schools – be it facultative – as was the case in **Amsterdam** and still is in **Turku**, or when the home language of an important group receives a status of preferred foreign language in secondary education. Another case in point is the project carried out by the **Turin** city administration *In Piazza s'impara (You can learn in the square)*, where voluntary teachers and university students of different nationalities offer informal and free Italian language classes where many immigrants meet in Porta Palazzo, as well as basic courses of Chinese and Arabic for Italian citizens. The project, started in 2008, has been repeated every year (Penninx *et al.*, 2014b).

The Mercator Special Instruction Project in **Germany** is one example of innovation. Mercator approached universities to ask if they would train their students to teach German as a second language. Through a series of negotiations with schools and universities, and with improved grades and positive testimonies from participants to evidence its success, the teacher training model and curriculum has now officially been instituted throughout North Rhine-Westphalia by the state government. A change of law in 2008 now requires every university to implement the programme (Humphris, 2014).

Wuppertal, Germany, is a nation-wide leader for language class attendance and provides classes at different times, different levels, different locations, with crèche facilities and also in sign language.

Despite the many successful experiences carried out all around Europe, the provision of language teaching is still variable in its quality and with regard to the conditions required for accessing courses. In the Netherlands and in the UK (for specific target groups), immigrants have to pay for use of such language support. This is demonstrably a barrier for those on low income.

Civil society organisations are limited and they often provide language training which can result in oversubscribed and basic level language programmes (Humphris, 2014). Many successful initiatives have been implemented in partnership with schools such as Frankfurt's '*Mama learns German – even Papa*' (Cities of Migration). While these are positive developments for some situations, such programmes may not help parents meet the demands of knowledge- and service-related jobs.

- **Migrants' employability can be enhanced through ensuring access to targeted language courses, vocational top-up training and by facilitating access to internships and apprenticeship schemes.**
- **Vocational top-up training is to be considered as lifelong learning and is available to migrants and natives (as a mainstream measure), both for unemployed and employed persons.**
- **Language and vocational training courses should be flexibly scheduled, to make them accessible to all, e.g. persons with different/unsocial working hours, mothers of young children, etc.**
- **Language acquisition needs to be encouraged through appropriately shaped classes to meet the needs of migrants, regardless of age, gender and socio-economic status.**
- **Innovative approaches to language acquisition should be encouraged, for example the use of language mentors or 'buddying' systems.**
- **Language courses and other training should be accessible for those who want to participate.**

The city of **Barcelona** represents an interesting example in their attempt to combine recognition of cultural diversity and also uphold the centrality of the Catalan language and culture, on the basis of a so-called "**principle of interculturality**". Cultural diversity is recognized, "but emphasizing what we have in common and fostering ties and positive interaction among citizens on the basis of the cultural heritage of the host society".

In other words, diversity is acknowledged within a unit which has to be constructed on the basis of interaction. As a result of such theoretical premises, one of the stated goals of the city's integration policy is the promotion of Catalan language learning as the condition for achieving equality of opportunities and as a guarantee of social cohesion and maintaining Catalonia's cultural singularity. For example, the *Catalonia's Pacte Nacional per a la Immigració* (National Immigration Agreement), signed in 2008 by the Catalan Government, including most political parties and the leading social and economic agents, indicated the need to "boost the cohesion dimension offered by the public use of Catalonia's own language".

Similarly, the most recent Plan (2014-2016) presents Catalan as a "language of opportunities which should foster interrelationship among all the people who live in Catalonia". If the centrality of the Catalan language as a factor of integration and social cohesion has been constant throughout all the different plans and integration policies, the way in which it is promoted has been gradually changing. From being a *right* of the immigrant and a condition for equality of opportunity, it has come to be a *duty* of the immigrant and a requirement for legal status. In particular, the 2010 Law on Reception of Immigrants and Returnees to Catalonia conditions the *arraigo* (social inclusion) reports (required in order to regularise) and also those on integration (for renovation of permits) on the "successful completion of cultural, linguistic and work-related courses".

The 2012-2015 Municipal Integration Plan is even more explicit, in that it states that "Barcelona ought to be an aggregate of people who interact with one another against a backdrop of diverse languages, cultures, beliefs and ideologies, but within a common frame of reference based on Catalonia's tradition (developed over time by embracing new contributions) and in which Catalan, as a lingua franca, must aid cohesion" (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2014b).

4.3.2 Civic integration

As a result of the attention paid to cultural integration concurrently with the policy shift that places the responsibility of integration onto migrants, national integration policies in first and second generation-immigration countries in Europe have introduced “integration agreements”. Migrants also are required to attend “civic integration courses” as a condition for stable residence.

Italy introduced the “Integration Agreement”, a sort of contract that migrants have to sign when they obtain their permit of staying in Italy. The agreement includes language command requirements (A2 level of the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages) and a requirement of the basic knowledge of laws and institutions. However, the language tuition system, as it currently stands, does not allow the achievement of the established target. Evidence shows that language tuition courses are increasingly attended by those who wish to learn Italian to improve personal knowledge or to have a better employment position, rather than by those who are supposed to sign the integration agreement.

Compulsory pre-immigration courses, such as those developed in **the Netherlands**, function as instruments that, under the pretext of integration, restrict immigration and select migrants. All actors who have introduced integration requirements abroad should consider that this is not in line with EU law (as evidence from court cases demonstrates). The Conclusions of the latest Council and Representative of Governments and the Member States on integration of TCN (June 2014) stress the need for “voluntary cooperation between receiving countries and countries of origin in a pre-departures phase” which would facilitate reception and integration in destination countries. Besides, the reference to “voluntary cooperation” clearly underlines that the introduced integration requirement, adopted by some Member States, that could impede family reunification is not in line with EU law.

Compared to compulsory courses, the National Integration Plan adopted since 2009 in **Luxembourg**, seems more promising and has shown successful voluntary agreement. A project to improve integration that played a lead role was OLAI (*Luxembourg Reception and Integration Office*). The role of OLAI was to coordinate and implement a national integration strategy. The plan involved four key factors (Ministry of Family and Integration, 2009), firstly, guidance for newcomers; secondly, assistance in social, economic, political and cultural integration; thirdly, to fight discrimination; and finally, to study migration. One key element of the integration plan was the *Welcome and Integration Contract (CAI)*. The CAI is a two-year agreement aimed at any foreigner over the age of 16 year’s old living legally in Luxembourg. The agreement is also seen as holding symbolic value as it is not obligatory. It has therefore been seen as indicative of an individual’s willingness to commit to integration and settlement in Luxembourg (Humphris, 2014).

- ➔ **Integration measures, tests and contracts must promote integration and should not be the condition for accessing rights.**
- ➔ **Social inclusion into society should be incentivized through free and equal access to institutions and public goods and services, and not through compulsory frameworks of civic and language courses, which have been proved not to be successful.**

4.3.3 Religion

At the *national level*, following the 9/11 attacks on the United States, many European states feared that the growing international tensions would have repercussions at home. They tried to encourage or create Islamic institutions on the model of churches, to constitute a dialog partner with whom they would be able to solve any problems emerging, hoping to foster a “moderate” Islam. They wanted to integrate Islam, and thus limit the appeal and the reach of terrorist and fundamentalist networks. The idea was to “domesticate” Islam, and to help a German, French or “European” Islam come into existence, by asking them to create united Islamic organizations on the model of the institutions of other religious communities. However, the lack of representativeness in migrant communities remains evident almost everywhere around Europe. In particular, Muslim associations founded in the last decades cannot compare with churches with respect to tradition, public influence, established networks, broad membership and organization (Thränhardt, 2014b).

In **Germany**, the Federal government decided to give initial funding for Islamic academic centres at universities. They were established in four places: Frankfurt-Gießen, Münster-Osnabrück, Tübingen and Erlangen. Their aim is to institutionalize Islamic theology at German universities, and train Imams and teachers of Islamic religion. The federal ministry expects them to lay the ground for a well-founded denominational religious instruction and at the same time to create a “chance to introduce historic-critical methods dealing with the Quran”. This introduces the classic dilemma between academic freedom of research and teaching on the one hand and denominational attachment on the other that has been fruitful and conflict ridden for the Protestant and particularly the Catholic Theological Faculties in Germany over more than a century (ibid, 2014b).

In **France**, students do not get any faith-based religious instruction in public schools leaving this in the hands of religious communities. Schools offer classes on Wednesday afternoon’s and religious bodies are free to use school buildings in these open hours to offer religious education on their own. Mosques are active in teaching religious education, parallel to the Catholic Church, and Protestant and Jewish communities. Some Muslim web sites even speak of “*catéchisme musulman*”, using a traditional Christian term. The teaching is often practised in Mosques, parallel to other activities, and particularly on Wednesdays’ and Saturdays’. In contrast to Catholic practice using school premises, Islamic teaching is mainly takes place in Mosques, possibly on practical grounds, due to the smaller numbers of Muslim students in school. Religious education in France, for Muslims as for other faiths, is much more a task for parents and civil society, and less state organized (ibid, 2014b).

At the *regional level*, in **Germany**, Länder have prerogatives concerning education. Therefore, each Land can decide if and how to introduce Islamic religious instruction in school curricula. As a result, the picture is extremely varied, and the following examples testify the vast array of solutions that local German authorities have found in order to provide Muslim pupils equal access to religious instruction in public schools.

Bavaria has established a curriculum in cooperation with the Erlangen Islamic religious community, Islamic and Protestant theologians, school teachers of religion, professors of religion, Islamic and Arabic studies and education and the Bavarian ministry of culture.

The **Land of Hamburg** opted for “dialogic religious instruction for all”, which is a cooperative solution including all religious groups – Protestant, Islamic, Alevi, Jewish, Buddhist – under the coordinating responsibility of the Protestant (Lutheran) Church as the traditional church of the city. The intent is to establish religious competence in an open and mutually tolerant setting. This practice has been developed over decades, step by step, in a consensus between the city government, the traditional Lutheran Church and other religious partners, particularly Islamic and Alevi organizations, and is motivated by the wish to create a common religious instruction for all children, to further mutual understanding and to have an integrative approach. The establishment of an interreligious “Academy of World Religions” in 2010, comprising research and teaching of all the related religions, has complemented the comprehensive religious instruction in schools.

The concept stresses interrelated theological and didactic research and practice. It includes Professors for Christian, Jewish, Islamic, Alevi, Hindi and Buddhist religions.

Other *Länder* have introduced interim arrangements, consulting Islamic organisations but not conceding the definition of doctrines and contents of religious instruction. They want to be less dependent on Islamic organizations. **North Rhine Westphalia**, for instance, has established an advisory council (*Beirat*) where Islamic organizations have a voice but not the power of decision. However, the concept does not meet the peculiarities of the German Constitution, and does not position Islamic instruction parallel to Catholic and Protestant instruction, giving the state more say in Islamic religious affairs.

Some *Länder* did not react at all when the German Islam Conference urged them to introduce Islamic religious instruction. The new *Länder* (former East Germany) are not engaged on this issue as they do not have a large Islamic population (ibid, 2014b).

For German *Länder*, one of the main difficulties is the clear identification of interlocutors and partners among the Muslim community, due to the very non-hierarchical and non-institutional structure of this religion. This represents an obstacle, as religious instruction in public schools can only be offered if there is agreement between the public authority and the representatives of the religious community as provided by the German Constitution. So, the provision of Islamic religious instruction is considered troublesome because Islam is not institutionally organized like the Christian religion and, therefore, as long as Muslims are not able to reach an agreement with regard to their representation, Islamic religious education in accordance with the Constitution cannot be offered.

Some have argued that the articles of the German Constitution hide a structural discrimination in this regard: while *de jure* Muslims have the same rights to exercise their religion, *de facto* they cannot not due to the structure of their organization. A deeper analysis of the case of the Land of Hessen can provide us with interesting insights on how to best ensure the non-discrimination and the equal treatment of religious groups with regard to the provision of religious education. After a thorough examination of the issue from the juridical point of view, Hessen established ten baseline requirements that need to be fulfilled in order for a religious community to become partner of the *Land* in the implementation of religious education. According to these requirements, provided that the religious community has a minimum of institutionally organized structure, the community has to set clear rules governing its representation so that authorities can recognize the negotiating partner as a legitimated spokesman of the religious community (ibid, 2014b).

However, the State cannot interfere with such rules, as the community has the right to organize itself in accordance with the doctrines of the religion. The invocation that Muslim organizations be organized on a “democratic basis”, represents an undue interference of the State with religious affairs (additionally, the lack of such democratic representation is often used as a pretext in order not to recognize them as legitimate partners).

→ **The practice of diverse culture and religions should be guaranteed in applying the principle of equity in treatment.**

→ **Specific attention should be given to the issue of equal treatment the implementation of decisions.**

A clear example of the application of the principle of equity occurred in the land of Hessen. According to the requirements established by the State, a religious community does not have to be organized on a democratic basis: the Land just requires that it abide by the law and the Constitution. Furthermore, Hessen acknowledges that complete homogeneity of the religious community is not necessary. This allows it to overcome another apparent obstacle, i.e. the existence of many different Muslim communities (Sunnis, Shiites, Alevis, Ahmadiyya, etc.). Just as the different Christian communities (Protestant, Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Adventist, etc.) do not have to agree on common religious education, this also applies to the different Muslim communities. Hence, Hessen has followed the traditional state-church relations, concluding a separate treaty

with two Muslim organizations (DİTİB Sunni and Ahmadiyya), which fulfilled the above-listed requirements for being recognized as a religious community and thus as a partner of the State, giving them responsibility for the content of religious instruction, taught by state-trained teachers. This enabled different Islamic religious education for different confessions. While the religious contents of religious instruction are decided by recognized religious communities, the state is allowed to determine the pedagogical and scientific standards for the qualification of teachers, approves the curricula and controls that they are in line with the general educational goals and the German Constitution. This is one of the reasons why Islamic religious education has to be taught in German (Kindermann, 2014a).

Wisely applying the principle of equity, the Ministry of Hessen gained success in overcoming the hot debate on Islamic classes within the public education system.

At the *local administration level*, cities may engage in having ‘new religions’ taught in the educational curriculum in the same way as ‘native religions’ are part of such a curriculum. **Stuttgart** has made some attempt to do this. Such policies may have the important practical consequence of bringing immigrants into the educational system – as teachers. But above all, they have an important symbolic function: the message of recognition of ‘culture’ as heritage and home language and religion as an important element of immigrants’ identity. They are, however, not present yet in all cities (Penninx *et al.*, 2014b).

The following series of examples provides a picture of the varied relationships between cities’ administrations and religions in domains other than religious instruction.

In the case of the city of **Turku**, Finland, the Finnish principle of separation of Church and State forbids explicit relations between the city’s institutions and religions. At the same time, there was early recognition and institutionalisation of Islam by the city that has certainly eased the difficult position that this ‘new religion’ had to face in many other European countries and cities. The result of Finland’s specific legacy and history has resulted in a more general acceptance of the religious factor in civil society, but also that the state and the city of Turku handle religious aspects by formally keeping at a distance. This is particularly the case, when it comes to religious activities in the strict sense, but also when it comes to activities of religious organisations in general. Inter-religious dialogue and activities is left to the initiative of civil society and the stakeholders themselves. And actually, there are indications that such dialogue exists, be it out of sight of the city itself (Penninx, 2014).

Barcelona was the first Catalan (and Spanish) city council to promote a proactive approach to religious minorities, setting up the *Oficina d’Afers Religiosos* (Office for Religious Affairs) in the 90s. While it always came under the auspices of the *Regidoria de Drets Civils* (Department of Civil Rights) of the Barcelona City Council, the management of the Centre was taken over by the *Catalan UNESCO Interfaith Association* in 2004 and the Bayt-al-Thaqafa Foundation in 2013. (2012). The Office is in charge for creating a regularly updated database with basic information concerning the main religious groups established in the city, with defending the right to religious freedom, acting as a ‘defender’ of religious minority rights, by mediating between communities and urban planning specialists, or helping them gain access to municipal facilities for support in festivities and special events. Furthermore, in 2009 the Catalan Law on Centres of Religious Worship (16/2009), which had the threefold aim of making it easier to practice the right of freedom of worship, to support municipal councils in their guaranteeing of this right, and to ensure the proper conditions of security and hygiene in places of worship, gave local governments a leading role in the management of religious diversity. For example, the law made it obligatory for municipal councils to set aside urban land for uses of a religious nature, and also gave them powers to issue municipal licenses for opening and the use of centres of religious worship. This led many town and city councils to draft policy for managing religious diversity for the first time (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2014b).

In recent years, **Milan**’s administration has been positively appreciating and promoting cultural diversity in the context of the city’ branding international strategy. However, this does not seem to take religious diver-

sity into account. More generally, no policies of inter-religious dialogue have been promoted by the municipality. Relations with religious groups, and in particular with the Muslim community, have been not always easy. The request of an area on which to build a mosque has remained unanswered for a long time. The centre-left majority elected in 2011 abandoned such a hostile attitude, and at the beginning of its mandate promised to take the Muslim community request into account. Yet, the mosque issue has been highly politicised by the right-wing opposition parties, and only recently the municipality came to a decision. In the context of the EXPO internationalisation initiatives, three lots of public land are going to be allocated to religious communities for the building of their places of worship, and one of these is going to be assigned to the Muslim community. The mosque will be built only with private funding. Yet, the Milan mosque is not going to be opened in time for the 2015 EXPO (Caponio, 2014b).

In any case, that administrations – at each governance level – should more proficiently engage with the religious dimension of migrant integration as is demonstrated by the role played by religious networks and associations in the facilitation of migrants' settlement. As shown by research carried out within the KING project on migrants' access to integration resources through social networks, religious networks are extremely significant in helping new migrants make meaning in their new lives (Phillimore *et al.*, 2014).

- ➔ **The promotion of inter-faith dialogue is crucial in order to prevent the isolation of certain groups and to promote mutual understanding between faiths.**
- ➔ **All actors must differentiate better between acceptable cultural norms and those that are not within a European framework (for example, wearing a hijab is generally acceptable, but female genital mutilation is not).**

5. INTEGRATION STRATEGIES

The final chapter of this report concerns integration strategies implemented in different contexts and/or at different levels of governance. In particular, the strategies addressed: i) the **implementation of mainstreamed policies** which target the entire population and support other policy areas (tenth CBPs) ii) the choice to use **monitoring as a tool for guiding policies** (eleventh Common Basic Principle (CBP)); iii). the implementation of policies aimed at **supporting non-discrimination behaviours and practices** at individual and institutional level. The interconnection between migration and integration is a case in point.

5.1 Mainstreaming

Mainstreaming represents a form of governance that can be a crucial strategy for integration management.

Whereas it did not represent the main focus of the KING project, as attention was reserved for analysis of integration governance. Despite this, the project could not but consider the strategic role of mainstreaming. For more specific analysis we draw attention to other projects, such as UPSTREAM²⁶, that were specifically dedicated to conceptualization and analysis of mainstreaming.

As far as the KING project's is concerned, there are two noteworthy elements of policy mainstreaming. The first, concerns the evident **limit of following the silos approach** when addressing migration and integration issues. In this regard, the negative effect of detention upon arrival on the subsequent integration process is a case in point. The second aspect concerns the ongoing **dilemma between policies addressed to specific targets instead of the entire population**.

- *Limits of the silos approach*

The tenth CBP states:

Mainstreaming integration policies and measures in all relevant policy portfolios and levels of government and public services is an important consideration in public policy formation and implementation.

It is evident that integration and migration are two faces of the same coin. Individuals enter Member States through specific migration policies/channels and then require integration policies in order to live within society.

²⁶ <https://projectupstream.wordpress.com/>

As said above, integration processes start when migrants arrive, even before in some cases, because they need a home, a job, schools for them and their children, medical care and so forth. This reality implicates different activities in different fields and involves different levels of governance.

For years, the customary political strategy has been to keep actions divided. Firstly, this choice results in the competence division at vertical and horizontal levels, but it also effects the capability to face the challenges brought by changes.

The silos approach has produced **the existing disconnection between migration and integration policy**. Hence, designing and implementing an EU policy that combines these two policy fields may be difficult, due to competences constraints.

From a legal point of view, the EU has a competence to act in the field of migration which may lead to the full transfer of national competence to the EU. Regarding integration, the situation is different since the competence remains the remit of the Member States and EU action is limited to the coordination of national rules and practices.

Additionally, the link between immigration and integration only exists with respect to legal migration. In this regard, the KING project highlighted the impact of specific migration policies on integration policies and processes, notably **the effect of detention on integration** (Pascouau, 2014a; Bathily, 2014). Indeed, the case of detention upon arrivals of migrants and asylum seekers represents quite an extreme example that reveals the extent to which immigration and integration policies can be implemented independently one from the other. There is a conflict both conceptually and in practical terms between detention of migrants and their integration in the receiving society. Undoubtedly, such a disconnection has a financial and social price.

The development of detention practices stems from the notion that migrants in an irregular situation should not remain on the territory, or be expelled. Therefore, once arrived or discovered in the territory migrants in an irregular situation are often²⁷, and sometimes systematically²⁸, subject to detention. This derives from the widely shared principle that irregular migrants should be removed and that detention is an efficient practice to ensure removal.

This approach propagates a misleading logic as numerous migrants cannot be automatically expelled. Many third country nationals, entering the territory without authorisation or apprehended in the territory in an irregular situation (because they never had any authorisation or overstayed their residence rights), cannot be returned to their country of origin or residence due for instance to their health conditions.

In addition, many third country nationals arriving at the border or in the territory without authorisation claim asylum in the EU Member States. Under EU law, asylum seekers must be admitted and allowed to reside in the State until the final decision on their asylum application is taken²⁹.

In such cases, the legal status of these persons may turn from irregular to regular. However, this regularization process may take a variable amount of time – hours, days, weeks, months – and this is sometimes spent

²⁷ The number of detention centres has increased over time in the EU, see for instance work undertaken by several NGO's in this regard like Migreurop <http://en.closesthecamp.org/2014/03/03/europe-of-camps-deploys-its-web/> and the Atlas http://www.migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/Carte_Atlas_Migreurop_19122012_Version_francaise_version_web.pdf

²⁸ "Invisible Suffering. Prolonged and systematic detention of migrants and asylum seekers in substandard conditions in Greece", Médecins sans Frontières, 2014, Report available at the following address: http://www.msf.org/sites/msf.org/files/invisible_suffering.pdf

²⁹ Article 3, par. 1, of Directive 2003/9/EC states "This Directive shall apply to all third country nationals and stateless persons who make an application for asylum at the border or in the territory of a Member State as long as they are allowed to remain on the territory as asylum seekers, as well as to family members, if they are covered by such application for asylum according to the national law".

in detention. This is increasingly the case at EU's external borders, where detention is used, often in a systematic fashion, for a considerable number of asylum seekers.

In these circumstances, the existing link between detention practices and the fact that detained people may receive a legal status and fall therefore within the scope of integration policies is completely neglected. In other words, the use of detention – at the border or later in the process – has never been questioned and its effects on the capacity a person deprived of his/her freedom in pursuing successful integration has never been comprehensively explored. The absence of this linkage or connection, in designing policies is particularly worrying where detention is systematically applied to asylum seekers arriving at EU's external borders with the reasonable prospect, due to their nationality or country of origin³⁰, to receive protection.

Assessing the cost of detention is a difficult task, since it includes not only detention itself, but also detention places and human resources. In addition, , **the cost is not only financial, but it is also medical and social.** Third country nationals may easily suffer from diseases and even post-traumatic disorders linked or created by detention conditions. **Detention may also have a broader impact on individuals, conditioning their attitude towards the receiving State and the receiving society. The way nationals perceive detained people should also be taken into account.**

All in all, the detention aspect of immigration policy may have a very high price not only in financial terms but more broadly in terms of social integration (Bathily, 2014).

Taking into account the aftereffects of detention on social inclusion should lead either to reconsideration of the use of such a practice or a review of the design and implementation integration policies bearing these effects in mind. The sixth Common Basic Principle which recalls the prohibition of non-discrimination and calls for public institutions to be open to immigrants may not be applied to migrants who have been detained and restrict them from making full use of support and policies provided.

The relationship between immigration and integration is in the end all but easy. Friends when it comes to legal migration, foes when it comes to irregular migration and in particular detention.

With that in mind, we think that at every level of governance.

- **Adopting and implementing immigration rules having an integration focus/perspective should be seen as a possible solution.**
- **Migration and integration policies should be implemented by taking into account the impact each has on the other.**

As said about governance (see chapter 3), the power distribution between the European, the national and the local levels is different as far as integration policy implementation is concerned. This distinction occurs in a vertical and horizontal way.

On the one side, institutions at European level are not competent to act in several fields related to integration - such as labour market, education, health, culture, etc. – because those are governed by the national level with spin-offs at the local level.

On the other side, each institution at each level of governance tends to frame the topic by **looking exclusively at what is contained within its own field of interest.** Interconnections and collaboration to reach a common objective are often missing.

³⁰ Eurostat pointed out for instance that 90% of asylum applicants from Syria received a positive first instance decision in 2013 in the EU28: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-QA-14-003/EN/KS-QA-14-003-EN.PDF.

The European Union started to move toward mainstreamed policies years ago firstly by supporting Member States, cities, civil society in sharing policies, practices, and experiences. This process has been guided through the main tool at EU's disposal: **the funds**.

The now concluded **European Integration Fund (EIF 2007-2013)** financed many projects aimed to support the idea that migration and integration should be faced in a shared manner, particularly during the latter stages of its implementation. Hence, the new fund **Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF 2014-2020)** stressed this strategy by bringing two different categories of migrants, Third Country National and refugees, under the same umbrella. The change in the Fund's name provides an indication of the possible future direction towards mainstreaming already taken at the European level.

Other important considerations concern the changes proposed in November 2014, when during Dimitri Avramopoulos' audit to the Parliament, he referred to the opportunity of European Delegations in order to deal with migration. Again, another sign came in February 2015 from the statement of the High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini who highlights:

“We cannot allow other tragedies at sea in the coming weeks and months; we need to be able to give a strong political and operational response. As I have announced today during the College in Strasbourg, I will convene an extraordinary meeting of the Commissioners' Group on External Action in the coming days in order to discuss with the Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris Avramopoulos, a review of our policies. I've also decided to put a discussion on migration on the agenda of the Foreign Affairs Council soon. The fight against smuggling and trafficking, the rescue of migrants at sea, the protection of asylum seekers are shared challenges; they require a stronger exercise of shared responsibility³¹”.

Therefore,

- ➔ **More Directorate-Generals (DGs) should be involved in the design of integration policies, with DG Immigration, Home Affairs and Citizenship acting as coordinator**
- ➔ **Eventual development of coordination between the DG Immigration, Home Affairs and Citizenship of the Commission and the European External Action Service could be of help in tackling with the Mediterranean tragedies.**

At national level, the **Land of Hessen in Germany** is a case in point. The Hessen Government founded an integration unit at the Ministry for Social Affairs, declared integration to be a **cross-cutting issue**, developed a catalogue of integration measures for all State Ministries and passed an integration concept which covered all areas of society by the beginning of the year 2000. An *Integrationsbeirat* (advisory council on integration) which consisted of representatives of various civil society groups was appointed. The meetings were led by the Minister or the State Secretary. In 2001, a state wide public relations campaign (“Hessen grenzen-los”, *alias* “Hessen without borders”) was started. The goal was to inform the public about the importance of integration.

In **Hessen** each Ministry was obliged to fulfil the integration policy tasks that fell within its general responsibilities. The Ministry of Economic Affairs was in charge of the labour market programs, the Ministry of Social Affairs for early language tuition and measures in the health and care sector. The Ministry of Education was responsible for integration measures in schools, the Ministry of Science and Art for integration projects at Hessian universities. The State Chancellery had to act in media policy issues and the Ministry of the Interior was in charge of sports, prevention and safety.

³¹ http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150210_03_en.htm

Then, a second step was implemented which included actions aimed at **increasing the awareness for integration in all cities and municipalities**. Therefore, Hessen's program *Modellregionen Integration* (Model Regions, 2009 to 2013) was established. In the cities and municipalities the active participants developed a grass root movement on integration and found support through a fully responsible leadership. From 2014, all Hessian counties have benefited from these experiences. Through a **new program called WIR ("WE")**, with an annual budget of EUR 3.1 million in 2014, the State of Hessen aims to further facilitate intercultural awareness. The 33 cities and municipalities in Hessen can employ full-time coordinators to implement strategies. Furthermore, the programme emphasizes these **six main focus areas of integration policy: the establishment of a welcoming and open culture; intercultural awareness and acceptance in administrations, associations, and organisations; active integration partnerships in the regions; reliable and accessible language assistance; training and implementation of integration volunteers and innovative projects. The State of Hessen organises platforms for sharing local experiences on current issues. These platforms showcase good ideas and promote successful integration policies.**

In addition, another level of integration mainstreaming affected the private economy and particularly the non-profit sector: **Intercultural awareness in sport clubs, the voluntary fire brigades, the many non-profit organisations and big charities** had to be facilitated. In modern society and particularly in Central Europe personal and organized volunteer work plays an important role not only for the realization of citizens' interests but also to fulfil tasks public budgets cannot afford any more. The argument is that non-profit organisations need to be more accessible to migrants who are not used to the structure and culture of the German non-profit sector – to engage them in the organisations or/and in to benefit from their activities (Kindermann, Wilkens, 2014a).

- ➔ **Integration should be considered as a cross-cutting issue.**
- ➔ **Sustainable integration would need long-term commitment from all government levels, in order to ensure coordination.**
- ➔ **Mainstreaming should affect all levels of policy: the government (national and regional), the cities and municipalities, private and economic sectors.**
- ➔ **The most effective and innovative projects and policies should not be based specifically around integration but more generally on wider issues**

- *The dilemma between targeted policies and mainstreaming*

The other aspect of mainstreaming concerns the targets of integration policies. In particular the dilemma regards the following two questions. Should policies exclusively address and act on the common interests of individual, natives and immigrants, and thus treat them all the same within the given institutional structures? Or should they cater for the specific interests and needs of immigrants and devise specific policies in order to attain equality for everybody?

In other words, the choice is between direct or indirect integration policies.

As established through the analysis of policy targets (§ 2.2), migrant integration policies that formulate specific groups of immigrants as target groups are different from policies that focus on all immigrants. And these are different from policies that target all individuals regardless of their origin. Policies may also target collectives (organisations, civil society) rather than individuals. They may even target general institutions of society: political rights can be granted to immigrants as individuals, for instance by granting voting rights, or as members of a group, which often means the creation of representative bodies; policies promote equal

opportunities for all citizens by guaranteeing equal access to housing, education, health care and the labour market, or equal share in their actual access to these goods and services; finally, cultural diversity can be promoted as an individual or as a group right. The latter often implying the state support to immigrants' organisations and own institutions (Penninx *et al.*, 2014b).

Evidence is numerous throughout Europe, specifically if we consider local level practices.

The EU institutions have promoted a set of clear indications aimed at supporting specific interests and needs of migrants, notably, of those legally residing in the EU territory as already mentioned. **The frame the European plan follows is the “us & them” logic.**

However, this logic gives room to another crucial question: who is “us” and who are “them”?

Societies (“us”) are currently super-diverse. They are formed by autochthones, people with a migrant background and migrants having already started their integration process. But societies are also different in terms of structural characteristics.

Migrants (“them”) are super-diverse too. Demographic variables (age, gender, nationality, etc.) but also factors that pushed migrants to leave their countries (asking for protection or simply trying to have a better life) and the objective linked to migration (aspiring and feeling like temporary migrants or being aware that they would like to permanently settle in the receiving society).

Finally, there are those who cannot be considered as a target of integration policies because of their legal status: irregular migrants on one side and EU-citizens on the opposite side.

Both these groups are in need of integration support but are in, different ways, excluded by policies. Irregular migrants don't belong neither to the “us” category nor to the “them”. However, as we highlighted in different parts of this report, cities are called to face the challenges brought by their presence. In fact, cities cannot pretend they do not exist, but at the same time, municipalities have to deal with the needs of this group whilst also avoiding negative attitudes of others.

EU-migrants enter into the categories of “us” because their status opens (or should open) the full range of opportunities and services on an equal footing with natives. However, it is the fact that the presence of these newcomers cannot always be incorporated immediately by institutions, collectives and individuals of the receiving city and newcomers have to acquire the knowledge and skills to find their position. However, cities cannot use some of the European funds, and often also not national funds, to finance basic integration support for these EU internal immigrants (Penninx *et al.*, 2014b).

Evidence show that often cities make different choices. The case of **Amsterdam** is a case in point. The recent Amsterdam policy discourse rejects the concept of integration, because that term would allude to the gap between natives and immigrants and would reinforce that gap. Obviously, integration has become a “spoiled” term in the politicised policy discourse, similarly to the terms guest workers (*gastarbeiders*), ethnic minorities (*etnische minderheden*) and multiculturalism in the Netherlands. Key words in the new Amsterdam policy discourse are diversity and participation (*ibid.*, 2014b).

In the KING project two different positions emerged both recalling advantages and disadvantages. On the one side public administrators promote the mainstreaming of integration policy which can thus be more effective, inclusive and prospective. On the other side, experts in law highlight mainstreaming should be tackled with wariness, recalling the unavoidable necessity of laws promoting rights, and the enjoyment of them, for third country nationals and other specific groups.

Mainstreaming seems to be the most favourable strategy. However, both choices have **advantages and disadvantages which should be evaluated.**

A clear **advantage** of mainstreaming policies is that political opposition by anti-immigration parties and right-wing movements could be stemmed (Martinelli, 2014b). On the opposite, a **disadvantage** is the so called “shadow effect” where migrants disappear in reference to the entire population.

With regard to targeted policies, an **advantage** is that migrants’ needs can be highlighted and directly addressed, while a **disadvantage** is that this approach makes the development of policies more problematic due to the creation of policy silos.

To sum up, both positions can be considered as valid. Perhaps a mix of both perspectives would be the most favourable approach.

It should be considered that mainstreaming of integration policy is a luxury that can only be afforded when the local level is pivotal in providing the conditions for successful integration, as in the case of the land of Hessen or the City of Amsterdam. But mainstreaming can also be used for the opposite aim, to promote the absence of integration policies as in the case of Lombardy when specific political parties were in charge.

5.2 Monitoring

Monitoring is a cross-cutting aspect of policy evaluation that should run alongside and support the policy-making process at all times and at all levels. It is a tool that fuels both the effectiveness of multilevel governance and the mainstreaming of integration.

As in CBP 11,

Developing clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms are necessary to adjust policy, evaluate progress on integration and to make the exchange of information more effective.

A complete European harmonisation of integration monitors is difficult, as each country has its own specificities and peculiarities (i.e. particular demographic circumstances, different integration policies, different migration histories, etc.). **Great variation also persists** in the ways countries monitor integration. Thus, comparison and evaluation of policies across the EU can still be extremely difficult.

One of the most controversial aspects is the target group chosen by each national monitor, as some countries differentiate between “nationals” and “**non-nationals**” or “**non-EU citizens**”, whilst others also include “persons with a migrant background”. Solely using the categories “non-nationals” and “non-EU citizens” as monitoring categories can be only partially justified in recent immigration countries (e.g. East European countries).

However, this criterion is also **problematic** as:

- **even recent immigration countries will experience migrants' settlement;**
- **many integration issues concern second and third generation (i.e. education) but these issues are not detected by a monitor that only uses the categories of “national” and “non-national”;**
- **recording only “non-EU citizens” hides the difficulties experienced by migrants coming from countries that have acceded to the EU only recently (i.e. Romania, Bulgaria or Croatia).**

In general, key indicators point to large, aggregate differences in monitoring procedures, categories and numbers (Wilkens *et al.*, 2014). Nevertheless, more accurate analysis requires more specific data to enable measurement of demographic characteristics and their changes over time.

Therefore, **monitoring provides policy-makers with an understanding of integration processes and their variety, according to different profiles (e.g. gender, age, education). It renders possible the mapping of migrants' needs so that appropriate political responses are brought about, whether through integration policies or through more general social and economic policies.**

On the other hand, **monitoring allows policy-makers to watch over changes in the target groups' situation and to adjust policies accordingly, provided of course that monitoring is conducted regularly and comprises a set of relatively consistent and stable indicators.**

UK integration policy, for instance, has been a more or less total failure because it neglects in many policy documents to identify migrants at all or identify specific indicators for migrants, and places emphasis (ever more emphatically) on **managing immigration** (although this, in the UK context, seems simply to be about controlling numbers arbitrarily in response to populist pressure and right-wing groups) **rather than settlement**, and leaves serious data gaps regarding a range of possible measures such as use of services, attitudes of nationals, and the impact of service use on inclusion.

Another clear example comes from the healthcare sector where a **lack of appropriate data** or analysis impedes the development of appropriate interventions. In this field more effort should be done not only in tracing the right origin of the persons, in terms of migrant background, but also in linking demographic characteristic with social data in order to provide a clear frame of disadvantages and inequalities that strongly affect health outcomes.

A further example is France where official statistics do not consider the "race" element, as evident in the UK, within their databases and this makes targeted interventions difficult.

Finally, **monitoring is the fundamental tool for highlighting changes in context and characteristics of migration and integration**³².

Nowadays, migration can be understood as **superdiverse** because new **migrants are diverse across a wide range of variables** including ethnicity, immigration status, rights and entitlements, labour market experiences, gender and age profiles, and patterns of spatial distribution. Whilst there are clear signs that we have entered an era of superdiversity, policy, practice and academia have largely failed adequately to adapt. Policy and practice activities and monitoring, as said above, continue to focus narrowly on ethnicity or on particular immigration statuses and give scant consideration to the wider range of variables that may combine to impact upon outcomes and integration (Phillimore, 2014a).

In general, **different groups of migrants have different trajectories and outcomes**, whether it be voting behaviours, settlement patterns or types of employment; thus measures of integration need to be sensitive to these differences both between and within distinct ethnic groups and across genders as well as across time. For instance, in the **UK** Somalis tend to have high unemployment rates, Iranians relatively high self-employment rates, but African-Caribbean men lower employment rates than co-ethnic women (Humphris, 2014).

To sum up, it is of the outmost importance to highlight again that the type of monitoring instrument needed varies depending on whether non-nationals or people with a migration background are included as target groups. In the former case, second and third generations are de facto excluded from the scope of the monitoring whilst in the latter case, needs may be better mapped and policies better designed if appropriate instruments are devised. Needs can also be pinpointed through the use of regional and local monitoring, using tools that focus down onto specific situations in specific locations.

³² At this regard, the ISMU Foundation had carried out a project in order to analyse integration practices and their contexts of reference. The EMILL project (acronym of European Modules and Integration at Local Level) permits to highlight the role of the context (in terms of administrative and legal dimensions) in supporting or hampering the integration practices implementation. For more information regarding the project we remind you at the project website: www.emill.ismu.org

- Research and evaluation studies should identify a set of indicators useful for shedding light on the qualitative aspects of integration processes, and not just on quantitative aspects.
- Monitoring should be the stepping stone to political responses that, in turn, should be monitored so as to evaluate the extent to which those responses actually address identified needs. Where this virtuous circle between monitoring and policy is in place, policies can significantly move forward in terms of results achieved.
- Integration needs to be monitored in its entirety; i.e. it should be longitudinal as integration is a long process, it should mirror the reality of migrants' lives, and should encompass many different dimensions, instead of focusing on economic one.
- Monitoring should report also racism and discrimination, as it is fundamental to their eradication.
- The agreement of national integration monitors to the standards set by EU Core Indicators would be extremely important. In particular, identifying up to 30-40 basic indicators and an agreed selection of "key indicators" seems sensible.
- The quantity, the quality and the periodicity of the data gathered should be improved, especially in some countries, in order to make it possible to compare across countries on a regular basis.
- Monitors' target groups must include second generation migrants, not just "non-nationals" or "non-EU citizens" (by using an agreed definition of the target group that refers to "people with a migrant background").
- Incisive analysis of immigrant integration needs to disaggregate migrants according to factors which may influence their integration outcomes – in particular their country of origin, length of residency and skill level.
- Monitors should also differentiate between different target groups (by age, sex, level of education, and immigration status etc.) as they might have different integration needs. Multivariate analysis may thus be necessary.
- Regional and local monitoring could uncover particular issues linked to a specific local setting and provide a more precise "snapshot" of the situation.
- Monitoring should be embedded in a wider policy context. This would increase politicians' liability, especially if monitoring is used to conduct ex-post policy evaluations and ex-ante impact assessments.
- Monitoring bodies' activity should be funded by States, as this would ensure the appropriate periodicity of data gathering and analysis, provided that the independence of the monitoring body from government is guaranteed.

The above recommendations are directed to all levels of governance. Indeed, it is important to underline that responsibilities should be shared across the multiple hierarchical governmental and administrative levels.

- *Establishment of local observatories on migration and integration*

Five observatories on migration have been identified as emblematic examples. Four of them - The Hessens's Observatory, The Migration Observatory (United Kingdom), The Immigration Observatory (Portugal), and The Permanent Migration Observatory of Andalusia (Spain) – provide analysis on available statistical data. The

Regional Observatory for the Integration and the Multiethnicity of Lombardy ORIM (Italy) has carried out since 2001 an *ad hoc* yearly survey of about 9.000 units where the sample is composed both by regular and irregular migrants (Di Cesare, 2014).

The **finer geographical level** seems to be the best target for implementing policies aimed at migrant integration and consequently the best unit for identifying accountability mechanisms. In 2010, the Hessian Monitoring Report on Integration (*Integrationsmonitoring*) was published for the first time. A second edition was released in 2013, showing integration trends since 2005. The Hessen Government publishes studies on integration topics which go into more detail, e.g. on school education of migrant students, early childhood education, labour market participation of foreigners, migrant organisations or religious beliefs in Hessen. If possible, the Ministry conducts public opinion polls. Thus, the Hessen population was surveyed on immigration twice. To serve local policy actors, a **study on the state of integration policies in cities and municipalities** has been conducted where most municipalities have been involved (Wilkens *et Al.*, 2014).

- ➔ **Foster the establishment of Observatories on migration and integration; and strengthen the interaction between the observatories, the national statistics agencies, parliament, and national-regional governments in general to translate the work of monitoring into real actions and policies.**
- ➔ **The Observatories should also analyse and understand public opinion on immigration. This is essential for the implementation of more efficient and effective policies.**
- ➔ **Guarantee independence to both local Observatories and national entities, to ensure unbiased, objective, and neutral evidence.**

- *Mutual learning exchange of good practices and policy transfer*

Exchange of good practices has long since been one of the main issues of the European integration programme. However, it has been widely used at various levels and many examples are now available. Given the focus the KING project had on the Land of Hessen, it is worthwhile to mention the bundle of measures the Hessen government has used for fostering integration, ranging from large scale programmes to symbolic acts. Yet, the underlying principles of Hessian Integration Policy are information, building networks and providing incentives for local authorities.

All the measures mentioned are, however, not specially tailored for a German *Land*. In every region across Europe every single tool could be used. Moreover, measures can be picked out to be used in combination. The Hessen government also continually works to improve the tools. **In order not to reinvent the wheel** and to make integration policies more effective and efficient, it continuously monitors how other *Bundesländer* and other countries organize their integration policies (Kindermann, Wilkens, 2014).

- ➔ **A systematic and centralised method (including a website) for sharing the outcomes of the evaluations of projects across the EU should be created, in order to disseminate good practice.**
- ➔ **All parties should encourage mutual learning and exchange of information between municipalities, regions and civil society organisations.**
- ➔ **Even if a one-size-fits-all policy cannot exist, it is important to identify the key lessons learnt from successful policies across Europe.**

Matching emerging initiatives to longstanding ones is an effective way of building capacity. It may make sense to look at pairing approaches connecting organisations or even municipalities so they can learn from each other in an organisational version of mentoring initiatives. In the past, there has been much duplication

of effort as a result of the **failure to disseminate good practice** or knowledge about how to overcome challenges and problems. Whilst websites like Cities of Migration do an effective job highlighting practice, there is currently no systematic method for sharing the outcomes of evaluations and research studies (Phillimore, 2014a). This is key: wide-ranging reviews of evidence show that there is a wealth of evidence and few gaps in knowledge but that this is very poorly disseminated and shared except through narrow networks (such as academics, NGOs etc.) (Craig, 2014).

Starting from practices that tend to be regarded as good practices, it is advisable to look at their degree of innovativeness; for example, to look at the extent to which migrants are placed at the centre of the policy/practice design. Since the range of involved actors varies from one place to another as much as challenges do, there is no straightforward manner to transfer policies/practices: each form of policy transfer has to be specific to the two contexts involved.

Policy transfer in a 'smart policy process' means selecting the sample of practices that seem to work better according to precise criteria, **identifying 'what works'** in the source case, **comparing** the similarities between the source case and the target case, and assessing the potential for replication in different contexts and for different target groups, so to **transfer key innovative elements rather than fully-fledged policies** (Pasini, Poletti, 2014a).

→ **In particular, actor-centred policies (putting end-users, that is, migrants at the centre of the policy design) should be taken as sources of inspiration.**

A number of networks have already been established focusing on transferability of good integration practices. *The LeCim project* developed evaluation grids with a specific set of local indicators to consider the possibility of a successful transfer of integration practice. The results concluded successful transfer did not necessarily rely on close comparability of two places (in terms of economy, social situation, education and training policies, organisational or informal structures) but more on matching the concept (and basic values) of the programme and on the willingness to adapt new models by those responsible in the target institution to their own context. In addition, certain processes behind successful integration policies may be transferable from case studies in different locations.

Attention should also be paid to significant and more frequent types of conflict that may arise in the implementation of a given policy, as well as participants' perception of who benefits and who loses. In this respect, **a repertoire of worst policies/practices** and of policy failures could be constructed, in order to apply a trial and error method.

→ **Emerging initiatives could be matched to long-standing, experienced ones in order to build capacity.**

→ **Key innovative elements are often easier to transfer than fully-fledged policies.**

→ **'Worst practices' and policy failures should also be studied, in order to avoid repeating mistakes.**

The Swedish Inheritance Fund Commission has been identified as unique as it requires its funded projects to test out new ideas, or to develop innovative methods and come up with solutions to social issues. It recognises that innovation may be accompanied by **failure** but considers this as **part of a learning process**. **Evaluations** often happen at the end of projects rather than being formative i.e. undertaken throughout the life of a project, and thereby helping to shape project development through a process of feedback. Guidance around the evaluation of integration funds might be changed so that they are encouraged to be **more formative**.

- **Goals should be set by funders and project managers on the basis of learning as well as outcomes, because when funding is dependent on good outcomes this can also act as a strong disincentive to admitting failures.**
- **Evaluation of integration initiatives should be set in order to serve as a guide for the implementation of the initiatives themselves.**

5.3 Non-discrimination

Within virtually every EU Member State, there appears to be a growing and almost inexorable tendency towards racism and discrimination at institutional (policy) and individual levels. This is manifest in the increasing numbers of incidents of racist violence and abuse and by growing disregard by institutions to the differing cultural and religious needs of migrants and minorities more generally. This tendency undermines the process of integration.

Discrimination is a powerful device generally used to regulate the distribution of resources and opportunities and to limit the erosion of the satisfaction related to consumption of goods and services. It exists in facts and in discourses and operates both at a concrete and a symbolic level. Discrimination is a tool for holding the reins of the structure of power in term of resources and opportunities. Given its role and its function it is conceivable that it will endure in the future.

Direct forms of discrimination are, for instance, the exclusion of non-nationals from city-owned social housing schemes or the reduction of migrants' chances to access particular housing as a result of anti-segregation quotas. Discrimination can also be indirect. A clear example comes from the housing sector. Indeed, discriminative behaviours mostly result from unequal treatment and unequal opportunities, in the private housing market on the basis of class, ethnicity or place of origin or as a consequence of migrants' unequal access to information in a highly opaque housing market.

Discrimination can be easily traced at three levels. The first level is the **institutional level**, where the law defines who is entitled to enjoy rights and who is not. Indeed, institutional social exclusion is, through legislation, regulations and conventions the most powerful mechanism of social discrimination.

In the political and legal sense, distinctions between who is entitled and who is not cannot be called discriminatory (i.e. legally unjustified), since they are embedded in the nation state's legislation. However, this is a clear form of social exclusion, and it has severe consequences for the position of migrants, particularly in the long term.

The alleviation of this legalized political exclusion should be at the core of European integration policies, through provisions like partial voting rights in local elections, diminished distinctions between inhabitants based on national citizenship, and the facilitation and promotion of naturalization.

Evidence shows that when certain openness occurs, significant results are achieved without an explicit policy addressing them.

- **Institutional social exclusion should be diminished by facilitating access to rights.**

Secondly, discrimination is present at a **collective level** in many different vicious forms. In this domain, there are norms aimed at fighting against discrimination and institutions are more attentive and active. As mentioned in the analysis of the socio-economic dimension, discrimination prevents access to education and work opportunities.

Thirdly, discrimination can be recognised at **individual level** where it represents a serious obstacle to social trust and well-being. Acts of racism and harassment targeting migrants and people belonging to minorities demonstrably reduce social confidence, affecting the whole process of integration.


When discrimination occurs at individual levels, laws and norms, if properly applied, can act in defence of those who are discriminated. Thereby, the lack of visibility of individual discrimination is one of the most crucial aspects.

To sum up, if contact between individuals are coloured by prejudice, this may be uncomfortable, but also have a limited impact. If organisations, for example work organisations, base their recruitment of workers on stereotyped or prejudiced perceptions and procedures, the consequences for individual immigrants may be quite disastrous. The workings of institutions (and policies) may also be influenced systematically by categorisations - inadvertently or on purpose – possibly with systemic consequences for migrants (indirect and direct institutional discrimination in terms of anti-discrimination policies).

Structural discrimination can be found in each dimension of integration, in all areas of society. Some laws or regulations privilege particular groups, others disadvantage certain groups. Some barriers are set up deliberately, some emerged and developed unintentionally (Kindermann, 2014a).

Usually, there is unity concerning the design of approaches to immigrant integration which include the principle of equal rights. However, many factors contribute to the fact that access to public facilities and services is sometimes very limited for immigrants, e.g. because of detailed regulations governing the use of public services (Kindermann, 2014a).

Figure 6 - Cartoon



Source: found on the internet without any indication of copyright, (Kindermann, 2014a).

Non-discrimination is the strategy aimed at fighting direct and explicit as well as unintended or indirect discrimination and racism at institutional, collective and individual level. Almost every CBP refers in some way to discrimination, given its role in preventing integration, and also undermining social cohesion. In particular, CBP 2 - stating that *Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union* - implicitly refers to non-discrimination, which is one of the European basic values (The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 22).

The **principle of equality** is here advocated and apparently, no clear or manifest tensions arise in these policy fields: **every person recognised as member of the community should enjoy the same rights and therefore services and provisions**. Obviously, there is a difference between having formal access to a right and being able to realise it in practice, and it is in this regard that anti-discrimination policies have their responsibility. The starting point is reducing and overcoming the practical barriers, linked either to immigrants' linguistic and cultural difference or to their more disadvantaged socio-economic position. These policies often represent the ways in which cities focus on very specific problems, contrasting non-pragmatic or feeble national policies, or opposing policies that have been defined at higher administrative levels without an effective appreciation of the situation on the ground. Frequently restrictive policies are unfavourable to social cohesion as they are moved from different and more "political interest".

Finally, the **concept of equity completes the principle of equality**; in fact, **while equality is based on results, equity applies to procedures**. In other words, **equity is to be used in a context where differences are perceived as large and it is difficult to reach equality**. One salient example to illustrate this concept is building a Mosque. The principle of equality would simply say "yes" (in a multiculturalist vein) or "no" (in an assimilationist vein), inevitably leaving one party discontented. On the contrary, following rules and procedures on the basis of equity, avoids focusing on results, and builds a consensus on the fairness of the processes rather than on equality of the results.

Using the principle of equity is a procedural way to overcome discrimination and to find an alternative to the "us vs them" logic. Eventually, the point is that the principles of equity and equality should be considered at the same time making them useful in reducing discrimination.

Moreover, and according to the economic-oriented political vision of migration, because discrimination is clearly limiting the potential of competitiveness in the global arena, efforts should be made to implement the principle of equity. It could be challenging but it is concrete and useful, and, overall, feasible.

Hessen is a case in point where the equal treatment of religious groups became reality through Islamic religious education teaching in public school through the application of the principle of equity (see paragraph 4.3.3).

Another concrete example comes from the city of **Barcelona**, which has been widely studied among the KING project analysis. From the late 1990s, the city of Barcelona has implemented plans for interculturality. Since 2008, the principle of equity has gained importance and become central to the city's approach of interculturality, with the insistence on the need to advance towards equality of rights and duties in the formal sense but also with attention to the practical ability to exercise them. In other words, it is necessary to guarantee both formal rights and duties, and equality of opportunity in having access to them. This entails *inter alia* combatting discrimination, promoting upward social mobility, and an education system that provides opportunities for all.

In order to favour equal opportunities and equity, the city developed a range of policies (full details are available in Garcés-Mascareñas, 2014b).

Labour market policies give central importance to training so that migrants can join the workforce similarly to any other citizen. They aim at bettering migrants' employability, for newcomers as much as for longer-term migrants, for women that came under family reunion programmes, for youngsters that dropped out from school, for migrants that lost their jobs, etc. In this regard, the service provides information about how to access the labour market, legal help for recognition of qualifications and short training courses.

As for access to healthcare, the system is rather complex, intertwining national provisions and regional management. Pursuing its goal of equity, the city of Barcelona provides information on how to access healthcare

and especially about the legal intricacies of the system. This seems to be the most salient need for users: healthcare information.

Regarding education, the city of Barcelona deploys efforts to recognise foreign qualifications. The city trains young migrants with good school results in their country of origin so that they may pass University entry exams. More than specific actions, it seems the most salient aspect of Barcelona's approach is the municipalities' activism. As Garcés-Mascreñas states,

“there are innumerable initiatives, ranging from training and employability programmes in some neighbourhoods, to projects promoting intercultural interaction through sport, to educational endeavours on cultural diversity, or projects aiming to foster knowledge of the languages of the immigrants' countries of origin” (2014b).

In its 'Conclusions on integration of third country nationals legally residing in the EU', adopted in June 2014, the JHA Council of the European Union and the representatives of the Governments of the Members States agreed on the need to further non-discrimination policies (9905/14). An enhancement of non-discrimination measures, specifically concerning discrimination in the workplace is called for, through close cooperation with social partners and civil society.

Following this, some issues seem to be extremely important in the fight against discrimination:

- **The immigration debate should de-politicized through the acknowledgement that Europe is innately and irreversibly diverse.**
- **Anti-racist strategies should be based in part on knowledge of the psychological dimensions and mechanisms that underlie racist and anti-immigration attitudes.**
- **Anti-racist campaigns should be properly resourced in order to be long-lasting, multi-level and tailored to concrete contexts, involving different actors in civil society.**
- **Since processes of perception and attitude formation are complex and multi-level, campaigns to influence perceptions, attitudes and ideas should also be multi-level, tailored to concrete contexts, and longer in duration.**
- **The respect for equal treatment as provided for by EU law requires the implementation of active anti-discrimination and anti-racism policies.**
- **Racism and discrimination should be systematically addressed through different actions, for instance pro-diversity measures aimed at facilitating inter group relations and inter-ethnic contact.**

Conclusion

Migrant integration policies are implemented in contexts shaped by demographic, economic, social and cultural elements.

As shown in **chapter 1**, the **demographic situation** in Europe is hardly sustainable. The causes of this challenge are manifold: declining fertility, advances in old-age care, and the legacy of the baby-boom generation. This situation will have a very serious impact on European societies and, even if migration may help to mitigate these challenges, it cannot be seen as a definitive solution.

With regard to economic concerns, one first element is that the structure of labour market is more powerful than any integration policy. The **different structures of the labour markets** in Europe have varying impacts on the way in which integration process take place. Since cultural barriers exist between European nations, a number of obstacles prevent the labour mobility which had been hoped for Eurozone supporters. While the Schengen area allows free movement of European citizens between European countries, **migrants are still blocked by some national borders**. Obstacles to free movement around Europe is a limit to European economic growth, because it *de facto* impedes the effective match between labour shortages and migrant workers.

In addition, considering the cultural context in which migrants are received, the effect of **misconceptions and xenophobia has been heightened**. As previously seen throughout history, economic difficulties often lead to political radicalism. Among the most troubling concerns on the European horizon is the rise of Eurosceptic extremist parties. Stagnation and insecurity breed resentment. When hard times hit, public opinion looks for someone to blame. Foreigners are often the first scapegoat and this is one of the many issues that extremist parties have seized upon to attempt to lend themselves legitimacy within their own countries. The spread of these ideas may help to explain why European citizens perceive immigration more of a cultural rather than an economic threat. In any case, the results that emerged from an analysis of Eurobarometer data deserves more and continuous attention in order to find an answer to the open question: **Why in a period of economic difficulties people perceive immigration as a cultural threat instead of an economic one?**

The framing of migrants' integration policy, analysed in **chapter 2**, has been deeply influenced by how migration policy has been perceived by policy makers: namely as a security issue.

At the European level, migration and integration policies, embedded in this particular area of EU competences – under the DG Immigration, Home Affairs and Citizenship portfolio – are, and will be, driven by this initial security aim. At national and, consequently, at local level, the inclusion of migrants has been subordinated to the will of establishing who could be considered worthy to enter the territory. In this regard, the interconnection between migration and integration policies and their consequences are crucial elements that require deeper analysis.

Although laws defining who has the right over what are justified and inalienable, the situation of migrants not legally residing in European countries deserves more attention and realistic solutions. The presence of people without rights potentially fosters poverty and social exclusion thus damaging the entire society. Some cities' good examples have been mentioned, but solutions cannot be left entirely in the hand of the local governance.

Since 2007 there has been a policy shift towards migrants taking responsibility for integration. This trend is increasing despite the different meanings and justifications. Specific attention should be paid to those changes occurring mainly at national level. In particular this report has highlighted the **pre-departure requirements that have turned integration agreements into measures to control migration**. Born out of the aim to foster integration by providing migrants with basic knowledge, these courses have been translated in assimilative, mandatory courses, with an underlying security rather than integration aim, despite differences across contexts.

Additionally, despite the constant claim to attract the best and the brightest migrants to foster economic growth, the report asserts that there is a **high level of brain wasting mainly due to discrimination and a persistent need of low skilled**. Through historical document analysis it can be seen this situation had been identified and expressed since the '80s. To this day, migrants are still far from enjoying rights comparable to those of European citizens. While integration is conceived as a two way process, migrants still live it as one way process and evidence seems to confirm this situation.

Chapter 3 relates to integration policies. They involve an impressive number of actors and, due to the multidimensional aspect of integration process, they are also related to a large variety of policy fields. This makes integration governance a complex issue to define. In Europe, there is a deluge of examples and solutions involving different levels of governance (European, national, and local).

As in the TFEU, European institutions have shared competences in the field of migration and supporting competencies on integration. **Despite constant claims towards a holistic approach, there is a structural imbalance of competence that developed *de facto* separating migration and integration policies**. The EU is not responsible for integration, but it supports national and local integration policies with policy coordination, funding and fostering exchanges of knowledge, ideas and experiences. In this regard, evidence shows that efforts should be made in order to let Europe become a more welcoming place for everyone.

The differences in States' organizations among Member States imply significant dissimilarities in the way integration is fostered and enhanced at the national level and, then, at the local level, an even bigger plurality of solutions emerges. Systematic comparison of local policies reveals a significant variation in the framing of policies and in the meaning of integration.

The tensions between the different levels of governance become explicit specifically between the national and the local level. Even if decisions are taken at the national level it is at the local level that processes of becoming an accepted part of the society, are developed.

The intricate mix of actions put in place at the European level have attempted to harmonize national rules set against an erratic organization of migration and integration governance at the national level. Then, the strategy adopted by cities is not to implement the national policies as a final rule, but use them as a delineating framework that can be further modified, accommodated or renegotiated in everyday governance practices with the other local stakeholders.

Eventually, the **role of the civil society is of crucial importance in filling the gaps left by institutions** at every level of governance. **At the same time, their mobilisation may produce a "crowding out"** effect wherein native associations mobilising on behalf of immigrants actually become the main recipients of municipal funding and partners in policymaking, thus preventing immigrants from forming their own organizations.

In this regard, **migrants' networks need proper supporting measures as well as the correct understanding of their functioning and structures.** Indeed, as networks act at different levels, particular attention should be given to the transnational networks that scarcely are considered in the policy making process, but strongly impact migrants' life both in terms of integration opportunities and in shaping feelings of belonging.

Opportunities should be created for migrants to mix with a wide range of individuals, in particular, members of the receiving societies. This might include measures which encourage religious organizations to work together or might connect colleges, workplaces and other integrative agencies with migrant organizations.

The three integration dimensions considered in **chapter 4** - the legal-political, socio-economic, and cultural-religious - have been used to analyse what has been done at different levels of governance to integrate migrants into the receiving society. Each dimension is different as far as their direct objectives are concerned, but they are interconnected and should always be considered as such. As a matter of fact, evidence sheds light on the **negative, even if inadvertent, impacts of one dimension on the others due to misguided policies or attitudes.** On the other hand, evidence also highlights that good practices, in promoting efficient migration and integration policies, can produce good results in more than one dimension at the same time. The socio-economic dimension of integration may be strongly influenced by the legal-political one, particularly if access to rights in these critical fields are limited or even denied.

Potentially, the outcomes of immigrant integration in the socio-economic dimension may also be influenced by the ethnic/cultural/religious one, for example, where negative perceptions relating to certain groups of migrants lead to prejudice and discrimination by individuals, organisations or institutions of the receiving society. This results in – even if access is legally guaranteed – fewer opportunities and lower scores for immigrants in the so-called hard domains of employment, education, housing and health care.

In general, there is little acknowledgement that integration is a process, even an ongoing negotiating between cultures, that can move forward in the right conditions, may not proceed in poor conditions or can be reversed if conditions or opportunities deteriorate.

As regard the **legal-political dimension**, there are several forms of migrant participation in the democratic process, such as voting, activism in a political party, participation in consultative bodies *etc.* Notably, direct political inclusion of migrant groups and ethnic minorities takes place through access to voting rights. When voting rights are granted migrants represent a potentially relevant political electorate able to influence politicians in their choices. With regard to difficulties concerning the representativeness of migrants or ethnic groups, some localities show a wise vision in training migrants in order to have good and credible actors to deal with in the near future.

In the **socio-economic** dimension European countries are far from ensuring equal access and equal outcomes to migrants and natives. There is still a significant gap between the two groups and, despite the numerous interesting initiatives carried out across Europe, migrants demonstrably face more difficulties than natives in enjoying rights and accessing opportunities. The European experience illustrates how labour migration policies and selection of migrants lack long term planning and are disjointed from the real needs of the market. We are far from the full inclusion of pupils with a migrant background in the **education** system ensuring equal access, equal use and equal outcomes, compared to native pupils. In Many European countries, the institutional arrangements are still inadequate as not only migrants, but also more generally native disadvantaged people are affected by problems.

The **cultural and religious domain** pertains to perceptions and practices that regard both migrants and natives, but that do not affect the two groups in the same way. As indicated by Kindermann, both tasks – European integration and immigrant integration – need to be done simultaneously. Since they are closely related, they form two sides of the same coin, they are not separable. Success in one task furthers success in the other.

We posit that cultural diversity should be viewed as a key asset when formulating policies aimed at the economic growth, and for policies aimed at avoiding conflicts or those that make diversity a special brand for city promotion. In any case, it seems that at local level diversity is increasingly perceived as a *positive element in society*, pivotal to economic growth but also to the progression towards a globalised world.

- **Which Europe in 2030?**

As proposed by Kindermann (2014b), there are **several characteristics that shape a good policy**. Firstly, it should be evidence based. Secondly, it should set ambitious goals that are also realistic. And thirdly, it should use instruments and measures that ensure that these goals can be achieved. These instruments have to be checked for suitability and, when necessary, they have to be adapted. Besides, policy makers should put migrants at the centre of the action, engaging as many levels of governance and as many stakeholders possible.

Most European countries show interest in highly-skilled migrants, even if this is not always a reasonable economic need. Nevertheless, due to the existing immigration laws no real migrant selection can take place. As a consequence western European countries still attract many migrants who cannot keep up with demands of modern knowledge society. This has also resulting in the unavoidable consequence that the majority of integration policies are concentrated on engaging migrants in the labour market.

Therefore, within Europe, integration policy governance not only has to focus on diversity but also has to set targets at breaking the following *circulus vitiosus*: poverty, exclusion, poor language skills and therefore lower educational attainment complicates access to the labour market which leads to lower employment rates and increased poverty.


Kindermann found an analogy between states and clubs in professional football. Clubs such as Real Madrid are able to attract the world's best players. But clubs with fewer financial resources only have a chance to be successful in the competitive world of football if they support the young generation. This is the current situation in EU Member States. **To harness the special potentials migrants have to offer, considerable investments are necessary particularly in developing human capital through education and combating against discrimination.** These investments could be profitable within twenty to thirty years.

Moreover, for attaining integration, the entire population of the EU Member States has to develop a positive attitude towards immigration and remain favourably disposed to diversity. So far, wise and broad policies have been planned and implemented, involving individuals, groups, and institutions.

Since the adoption of the CBPs for Immigrant Integration Policy in 2004, migration and integration have changed significantly.

Today we face a wide and increased variety of immigrants in terms of demographic characteristics, expertise, legal statuses, etc. Therefore, the **"two way process" has become more complex**. As immigration has been a fact in Europe for a long time, it is no more a two way process involving migrants and natives. People who immigrated in the '70s, '80s and in the '90s have become part of today's receiving society. Their ideas, values and customs have blended with those of the native-born population. Thus policy makers have to consider a more complex situation than the so called two way process.

Figure 7 - Relationship Between Receiving Society and Newcomers



Source: Kindermann (2014b)

The mutual accommodation process proposed that people with different characteristics meet each other along the way to integration. The main question here is: **Who meets whom?** We can simply answer that new migrants are one of the two parts quoted in CBP 1. The second one is represented by the receiving societies that are made by autochthonous individuals as well as by individuals with a migration background (see fig. 7).

This frame needs also to take into account other individual variables when discussing the accommodation process. Firstly, those linked to the legal status: we can have regular and/or irregular migrants, EU-citizens, Third Country Nationals with a temporary rather than a long permission to stay, asylum seekers, beneficiaries of international protection, etc. Secondly, there are demographic characteristics that play a crucial role, because needs are different along different axes of difference. Hence, variables such as age, gender, education, marital status etc. relate to both autochthonous and migrants but have a strong impact in the way the integration process can be shaped or perceived. This could lead to add new typologies of migrants, as for instance elderly migrants (Stuckenberg, Fuhr-Becker, 2014), to those already considered (women, minors, new comers, etc.).

- **Integration strategies**

Given the complexity of the phenomenon and the number of spheres of action involved at several levels, it is crucial to focus on some shared strategies that can be implemented in different contexts. These strategies have been individuated by considering the evidence collected through the desk research phase of the KING project and the analysis of the CBPs. Indeed, evidence has highlighted a common denominator linked to each dimensions of integration: discriminatory behaviours. As a matter of fact, discrimination is the main threat to a successful integration processes

Besides, mainstreaming and monitoring, the other two strategies analysed, consider policy implementation.

In our analysis, mainstreaming concerns firstly the way to face integration by overcoming the two-silos (migration vs integration) approach, and secondly the choice to address a specific target (migrants) rather than needs (entire population).

Monitoring has been regarded as the fundamental tool for guiding policies since it allows focus on both the characteristics of the target group and its needs. At the same time, monitoring can shed light on the context's characteristics.

Mainstreaming integration and migration policies, specifically at European levels, should be considered as the crucial site of cross-cutting the two silos approach. In this regard, the KING project outlined the negative impact of specific migration policies - such as implementing detention upon arrival - on the forthcoming integration processes. These kinds of political choices, based on the idea of protecting and safeguarding the receiving societies' benefits, finally result in not only being ineffective, but also harmful. For instance, referring to such political visions, evidence highlights that being imprisoned upon arrival has a huge impact on the health conditions of migrants and the integration chances leading to future expenses for the receiving country.

Mainstreaming also concerns the dilemma between direct and indirect integration policies. This remains an open debate even within the KING project where scholars and representatives of public administrations hold contrasting opinions. What emerged was a caveat between two choices. **The risk of following the mainstreaming strategy is that measures address the entire population** (without distinguishing between migrants and autochthonous) **places migrants in the shadows**. Indeed, these kinds of practices could jeopardise the possibility for migrants to enjoy rights.

On the opposite side, foreseeing targeted policies could keep migrants in a sort of *limbo* and even worse shift negative attitudes onto those who do not fall into the target.

Monitoring represents a cross-cutting strategy that should run alongside and support the policy-making process at all time and at all levels. It is a tool that fuels both the effectiveness of multilevel governance and the mainstreaming of integration. On the one hand, **monitoring allows policy-makers to understand integration processes and their variety, according to different profiles** (gender, age, education, *etc.*). It renders possible the mapping of migrants' needs so that appropriate political responses are brought about, whether through integration policies or more general social and economic ones. On the other hand, **monitoring allows policy-makers to watch over changes in the target groups' situation and to adjust policies accordingly**, provided that monitoring is conducted regularly and comprises a set of relatively consistent and stable indicators. Finally, monitoring can be used also for highlighting the contexts' characteristics and changes³³.

If monitoring is to be a tool serving better integration policies, the definition of the target population is of the utmost importance. The type of monitoring instrument needed will vary depending on whether non-nationals or people with a migration background are included as target groups. In the former case, second and third generations are *de facto* excluded from the scope of the monitoring whilst in the latter case, needs may be better mapped and policies better designed if appropriate instruments are devised. Needs can also be pinpointed through the use of regional and local monitoring, using tools that focus on specific situations in specific locations. Integration needs also to be monitored in its entirety; i.e. it should be longitudinal as

³³ At this regard, Ismu Foundation had carried out a project in order to analyse integration practices and their contexts of reference. The EMILL project (acronym of European Modules and Integration at Local Level) permits to highlight the role of the context (in terms of administrative and legal dimensions) in supporting or hampering the integration practices implementation. For more info regarding the project we remind you at the project website: www.ismu.org/emill

integration is a long process, it should mirror reality of migrants' lives, and should encompass all the different dimensions, and not just the economic one. Monitoring should be the stepping stone to political responses that, in turn, should be monitored so as to evaluate the extent to which those responses actually address identified needs.

Non-discrimination is the third cross-cutting strategy analysed and is aimed at fighting direct and explicit as well as unintended or indirect discrimination and racism at institutional, collective and individual level. As mentioned above, evidence shows that institutional social exclusion is, through legislation, regulations and conventions the most powerful mechanism of social discrimination. In fact, given that legislation is the highest form of regulation of inclusion and exclusion, it determines legal discrimination. In this sense, anti-discriminatory policies, following the rules that establish who belongs to the community and who does not, can only declare discriminatory acts against such rules. There are domains, on the contrary, where norms are settled to fight discrimination and where institutions are more attentive and active. This is the case in education, health, housing and, to a less extent, employment (where it is easier to skip from institutional controls).

To a wider extent, in the context of changing societies due to the growing presence of migrants, Europe has to face a choice between two available options.

It may continue considering migration as an exogenous phenomenon and looking at the changes occurring in the shape of its constituent societies as a problematic cultural threat. It also may favour the community of nationals to the detriment of migrants, discriminating the latter through sophisticated institutional devices.

In this case, and under this wanted or unwanted choice, the risks Europe runs are high. Indeed,

- Europe may go down the road of an ageing continent with fewer workers and therefore fewer tax payers or economic contributors, or, in a nutshell, fewer active citizens.
- Europe may fill some of its labour market gaps with low-skilled workers, but it may consequently deprive itself of sources of innovation and human capital, in an ever-more competitive world, by opting for a suboptimal position.
- Relationships between natives and 'foreigners' does not improve and young migrants, skilled or otherwise, are deterred from remaining.
- For those migrants who do remain, the climate of distrust between the receiving society and 'foreigners' will steadily undermine future generations' trust in each other. Intended or unintended discrimination against 'foreigners' may disenchant first generations and subsequently generate negative perceptions amongst second and third generations towards the receiving society, fostering potential social conflict.

Alternatively, Europe may change its current vision on integration and support the idea of societies made by both natives and migrants. Thus, not "us" and "them", but "we".

This attitude would help to combat discrimination, to give open access to resources, to facilitate migrants' empowerment and enable their full economic, social and political contribution to building societies across Europe. The challenge is burdensome but the long-term benefits are immensurable. Indeed,

- Europe would reverse its current demographic trend of decline, ensuring at least in the short term, the sustainability of its economy and welfare state models. This could provide time for doing the structural changes that the new demographic trends indicate are required in the long term.

- Europe would increase the likelihood that migrants can realize their full potential, facilitating horizontal and vertical mobility and increasing its competitiveness. That will also act to attract highly skilled people
- It would provide a climate of mutual understanding for newcomers that could be integrated into settled societies developing a true sense of belonging.
- European societies would then produce fully-fledged citizens, committed to the development of their own societies.

REFERENCES

- Acosta Arcarazo, D. (2014), "EU Integration Policy: between Soft Law and Hard Law" *KING Desk Research Paper & In-Depth Study n.1/July – October 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/AcostaArcarazo_DeskResearchInDepthStudy.pdf
- Bathily, A. (2014) "Immigration detention and its impact on integration – A European approach", *KING Desk Research Paper n.2/July 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/Bathily_DeskResearch.pdf
- Blangiardo, G.C. (2014a) "The Contribution of Migration to European Demographic Changes", *KING Overview Paper n.9/July 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/Blangiardo_OverviewPaper9.pdf
- Blangiardo, G.C. (2014b) "Migration into the EU: long-term demographic scenarios", *KING Overview Paper n.10/October 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/Blangiardo_OverviewPaper10.pdf
- Blangiardo, G.C. (2014c) "Scenarios of migration inflows to the EU-28 Members according to push factors related to the labor market in the countries of origin", *KING Overview Paper n.11/October 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/Blangiardo_OverviewPaper11.pdf
- Blom, S. (2014) "Local Migration and Integration Policies in Amsterdam", *KING In-depth Study n.16/October 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/Blom_InDepthStudy.pdf
- Caponio, T. (2014a) "The legal and political dimension of local integration policy", *KING Desk Research Paper n.9 /July 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/Caponio_DeskResearch.pdf
- Caponio, T. (2014b) "Integration Policies for Immigrants of the City of Milan, Italy", *KING In-depth Study n.10/October 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/Caponio_InDepthStudy10.pdf
- Caponio, T. (2014c) "Integration Policies for Immigrants of the City of Turin, Italy", *KING In-depth Study n.11/October 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/Caponio_InDepthStudy11.pdf
- Craig, G (2014) "Migration and Integration: Local and Experiential Perspective", *KING Desk Research Paper n.13/July 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/Craig_DeskResearch.pdf
- Di Cesare, M. (2014a) "Laboratories of integration at local level", *KING Desk Research Paper n.21/July 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/DiCesare_DeskResearch.pdf
- Di Cesare, M. (2014b) "Monitoring integration at local level: examples from multiple European countries", *KING In-depth*

- Study n.19/October 2014, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/DiCesare_InDepthStudy.pdf
- Garcés –Mascareñas, B. (2014a), “Immigrant s' equal access and equal use: a review of local policies in the domains of health care, housing, education and the labour market”, *KING Desk Research Paper n.10/July 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/GarcesMascarenas_DeskResearch.pdf
- Garcés –Mascareñas, B. (2014b), “Local Integration Policies in Barcelona”, *KING In-depth Study n.12/July 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/GarcesMascarenas_InDepthStudy.pdf
- Heidbreder, E. (2014a) “When Multiple Levels Meet Migration: the Specific Challenges of a Common EU Immigration Regime”, *KING Desk Research Paper n.3/July 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/Heidbreder_DeskResearch.pdf
- Heidbreder, E. (2014b) “Multilevel Elements of EU Migration Policy - A Research Note”, *KING In-depth Study n.2/October 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/Heidbreder_InDepthStudy.pdf
- Humphris, R. (2014) “Integration Practice: Initiatives and Innovations by Institutions and Civil Society”, *KING Desk Research Paper n.15/July 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/Humphris_DeskResearch.pdf
- Kahanec, M. at al. (2014a) – “The Impact of Migration and Integration Policies on Native-Migrant Labor Market Gaps”, *KING Desk Research & In-Depth Study n.16/July – October 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/GuziKahanecMytnaKurekovaLevandovska_DeskResearchInDepthStudy16.pdf
- Kahanec, M. at al. (2014b) “The Impact of Demand and Supply Structural Factors on Native-Migrant Labour Market Gaps”, *KING Desk Research & In-Depth Study n.17/July – October 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/GuziKahanecMytnaKurekovaLevandovska_DeskResearchInDepthStudy17.pdf
- Kahanec, M. at al. (2014c) “Does Immigration Grease the Wheels of European Labor Markets?”, *KING Desk Research & In-Depth Study n.18/July – October 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/GuziKahanecMytnaKurekovaLevandovska_DeskResearchInDepthStudy18.pdf
- Kahanec, M. (2014) “Economics of migration in EU labor markets”, *KING Overview Paper n.8/October 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/Kahanec_OverviewPaper.pdf
- Kaczmarczyk, P. (2014) “The expected contribution of migrations to the future European economic and socio-demographic system”, *KING Desk Research Paper n.20/July 214*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/Kaczmarczyk_DeskResearch.pdf
- Kindermann, W., Wilkens, I. (2014) “Integration Policy in the State of Hessen, Germany: a Regional Case Study in a Federal System”, *KING Desk Research Paper n.6/July 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wpcontent/uploads/KindermannWilkens_DeskResearch.pdf
- Kindermann, W. (2014a) “Islamic Religious Instruction in the Schools in Hessen, Germany”, *KING In-depth Study n.8/October 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/Kindermann_InDepthStudy.pdf
- Kindermann, W. (2014b) “Targets for Integration Policy in Europe. Which Europe do we want for 2030?”, *KING Overview Paper n.4/October 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/Kindermann_OverviewPaper.pdf
- Kindler, M. (2014) “Social networks, social capital and migrant integration at local level - European literature review”, *KING Desk Research Paper n.14/July 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wpcontent/uploads/Kindler_DeskResearch.pdf

- Martinelli, A. (2014) "The multilevel governance of immigrants' integration in the European Union", *KING Overview Paper n.3/October 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/Martinelli_OverviewPaper.pdf
- Matusz-Protasiewicz, P. (2014a) "Local policies as cultural integration and social cohesion policies", *KING Desk Research Paper n.11/July 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wpcontent/uploads/MatuszProtasiewicz_DeskResearch.pdf
- Matusz-Protasiewicz, P. (2014b) "Prague: Evolution of Integration Governance", *KING In-depth Study n.13/October 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wpcontent/uploads/MatuszProtasiewicz_InDepthStudy13.pdf
- Matusz-Protasiewicz, P. (2014c) "Warsaw: Evolution of Integration Governance", *KING In-depth Study n.14/October 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wpcontent/uploads/MatuszProtasiewicz_InDepthStudy14.pdf
- Pascouau, Y. (2014a) "EU Immigration and Integration Policies: Connecting the Dots", *KING Overview Paper n.1/July 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/Pascouau_OverviewPaper1.pdf
- Pascouau, Y. (2014b) "EU Immigration and Integration Policies: Friends or Foes?", *KING Overview Paper n.2/October 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/Pascouau_OverviewPaper2.pdf
- Pasini, N., Coletti, P. (2014a) "Immigration policies in EU MSs: how to learn from successful examples", *KING Desk Research Paper n.4/July 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wpcontent/uploads/PasiniColetti_DeskResearch.pdf
- Pasini, N., Coletti, P. (2014b) "Integration Policies in European Member States: How to Learn from Best Practices. Case – study: Lombardy Region", *KING In-depth Study n.3/October 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wpcontent/uploads/PasiniColetti_InDepthStudy.pdf
- Penninx, R. et al. (2014a) "European Cities and their Migrant Integration Policies. A State-of-the-Art study for the Knowledge for Integration Governance (KING) project", *KING Overview Paper n.5/July 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wpcontent/uploads/Penninx_OverviewPaper5.pdf
- Penninx, R. et al. (2014b) "European Cities and their Migrant Integration Policies. Case-studies from Eight Cities", *KING Overview Paper n.6/July 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/Penninx_OverviewPaper6.pdf
- Penninx, R. (2014) "Integration Policies for Immigrants of the City of Turku / Åbo, Finland", *KING In-depth Study n.9/October 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/Penninx_OverviewPaper6.pdf
- Phillimore, J. (2014) "Local and experiential aspects of migrant integration", *KING Overview Paper n.7/July 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/Phillimore_OverviewPaper.pdf
- Phillimore, J., Humphris, R. Khan, K. (2014) "Migration, networks and resources: the relationship between migrants' social networks and their access to integration resources", *KING In-depth Study n.17/October 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wpcontent/uploads/PhillimoreHumphrisKhan_InDepthStudy.pdf
- Poletti, M., Regalia, M. (2014a) "Economic or Cultural Threat? Orientations towards immigration and European integration among EU citizens and national parties over time", *KING Desk Research Paper n.5/July 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wpcontent/uploads/PolettiRegalia_DeskResearch.pdf
- Poletti, M., Regalia, M. (2014b) "Party Positioning on Immigration and EU at the 2014 European Parliamentary elections", *KING In-depth Study n.4/October 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wpcontent/uploads/PolettiRegalia_InDepthStudy.pdf

Schwarz, H. (2014a) "A Bibliography of Scientific Literature on Integration Policies of European Cities", *KING Desk Research Paper n.12/July 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wpcontent/uploads/Schwarz_DeskResearch.pdf

Schwarz, H. (2014b) "Local Integration Policies in Stuttgart, Germany", *KING In-depth Study n.15/October 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wpcontent/uploads/Schwarz_InDepthStudy.pdf

Stukenberg, L., Fuhr-Becker, G. (2014) "Elderly Migrants in Hessen, Germany: New Challenges for Public Administration", *KING In-depth Study n.7/October 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wpcontent/uploads/StukenbergFuhrBecker_InDepthStudy.pdf

Testa, M.R. (2014a) "The contribution of migration to the European economic and socio-demographic system (looking at the past)", *KING Desk Research Paper n.19/July 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wpcontent/uploads/Testa_DeskResearch.pdf

Testa, M.R. (2014b) "The contribution of migration to population change in Europe: 1991–2011", *KING In-depth Study n.18/October 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wpcontent/uploads/Testa_InDepthStudy.pdf

Thränhardt, D. (2014a) "The State of European Integration Governance: a Comparative Evaluation", *KING Desk Research Paper n.7/July 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wpcontent/uploads/Thranhardt_DeskResearch.pdf

Thränhardt, D. (2014b) "Islamic Religious Instruction in France and Germany: Implementation Processes in Different State-Religion Regimes", *KING In-depth Study n.5/October 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wpcontent/uploads/Thranhardt_InDepthStudy.pdf

Wilkens, I., Fuhr-Becker, G., Götsche, F., (2014a) "Monitoring as a basic instrument for integration governance", *KING Desk Research Paper n. 8/July 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/FuhrBeckerGottscheWilkens_DeskResearch.pdf

Wilkens, I., Fuhr-Becker, G., Götsche, F., (2014b) "How Can Public Administration Support Adolescents With a Migration Background to Successfully Get Into Vocational Education and Labour After School? - A Practical Approach", *KING In-depth Study n.6/October 2014*, available at http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/FuhrBeckerGottscheWilkens_InDepthStudy.pdf

The **ISMU Foundation** is an independent research centre funded in 1992 promoting research and training activities on migration, integration and the ever-growing ethnic and cultural diversity of contemporary societies.

As an independent scientific body, it proposes itself as a service provider open to the collaboration with national and European institutions, local administrations, welfare and health-care agencies, non-profit organisations, schooling institutions, Italian and foreign research centres, libraries and documentation centres, international agencies, diplomatic and consular representations.

www.ismu.org