COMMENTARY

Calm after the storm? A Trump-imposed ceasefire means doing much more to protect Ukraine and EUrope

Security & defence / COMMENTARY
Fabian Zuleeg

Date: 13/12/2024

If President-elect Trump imposes an unjust and unstable ceasefire on Ukraine, Europe cannot sit back and enjoy the illusion of peace. Instead, it will have to prepare for future conflict, by supporting Ukraine, guaranteeing the deal, protecting other states in Russia’s firing line, and substantially increasing its own military capabilities and spending. In this scenario, Europe will have to do more, not less, to contain Russia and protect not only Ukraine but also EUrope.

Peace at last?

US President-elect Donald Trump has publicly stated that he wants to bring the war in Ukraine to an end, and quickly, aiming also potentially to absolve the US from its responsibility to continue to support Ukraine militarily, financially and politically. By doing so he would ignore that this war was started illegally by Russian aggression, that Russia committed crimes against humanity, as well as various war crimes, or that significant parts of sovereign Ukrainian territory are not only occupied by Russia but have been illegally annexed by Moscow. Ending current hostilities is Trump’s only aim, echoing many around the world who believe that the most important goal is to stop the killing.

Of course, we do not know whether Trump is really going to do what he says nor how successful he will be. He is notoriously unpredictable and might be swayed by several factors, including his exchanges with Russian President Putin and Ukrainian President Zelensky, and the voices close to him in the new administration. A threatened ceasefire might also be a bargaining chip with Europeans rather than the real aim. More strategic thinkers advising Trump might show him how supporting Ukraine is in Washington’s, or more importantly, in his own interest. Even if he tries to enforce a ceasefire, Ukrainians might not acquiesce, given the existential nature of the threat, although it is hard to see how they could maintain their defences without US support. It is also not clear whether Putin will accept such a ceasefire; this will depend partly on the attached conditions and partly on how the war is going on the ground.

Potential implications for Ukrainian and European security

The challenge for the EU and its member states will be to prepare for a working mode of managing the unpredictability of Europe’s key security provider. This requires thorough “what if” preparations in Brussels and in European capitals. If Trump does keep his word, what will this mean for Ukrainian and wider European security?

In part, this will depend on the conditions attached to the ceasefire. Who will be at the negotiating table, and who will be the guarantors of any deal? Who will enforce the deal when Russia starts to disregard its provisions, as it has done in the past? Will Kyiv be given the ability to continue to build up its capabilities to resist Russian aggression? Will Ukraine become a part of the EU (now or with a credible path towards membership) and/or NATO? What happens to occupied territories and to sanctions on Russia?

While many in Europe and especially in Ukraine will not believe in such a ceasefire, they must try to set at least some guardrails for the conditions under which it could be agreed and regarding the role of the EU and its members in any settlement touching the very core of European security for years to come.

A ceasefire is not a lasting peace

It is important to emphasise that this is a discussion around ceasefire, not peace. Whatever is achieved now will most likely be an interlude before the next act of Russian aggression – we have been here before. Putin is unlikely to resist the temptation to pick off an already weakened Ukraine if he is not deterred from doing so. It will not be so much a frozen conflict as a temporarily paused one. Even more worryingly, Russia will, sooner or later, turn its eye to other victims. Moldova and Georgia are already clearly in the firing line of Russian covert warfare and might be next in Putin’s expansionist path, in addition to continued Russian meddling in Africa and the Middle East, and his close alliance with North Korea, which might also expand the conflict into the Asia-Pacific region.

In addition, a Russian victory would signal to the world that the only guarantor for independence and territorial integrity are nuclear weapons, leading to nuclear proliferation across the board. It would also bury any idea of upholding the UN Charter in future, creating greater insecurity by casting doubt on the independence and borders of all countries with a strong neighbour.

Putin will also not stop pursuing his stated aim to reverse some of the repercussions of the end of the Soviet Union, continuing to threaten the Baltic States, as well as the whole of NATO’s Eastern flank. With a perceived weakening of the commitment of the US to European security, the temptation to crank up the covert warfare that is already impinging on Western sovereignty will increase. While it is unlikely that he would seek a military confrontation in the short term, a continual testing of the West’s defences strongly increases the risk of a potentially catastrophic accident. In the medium term, it should not be forgotten that Putin’s Russia is expansionist by nature, seeking domination over its neighbourhood. In a few years’ time, Russia will have recovered militarily and might well surpass its pre-war capabilities in a number of areas. Eventually, the next confrontation will become inevitable.

A conditional deal

A ceasefire at this moment in time is bad for Ukrainian and European security, as well as for global stability. Rather than resolving the situation and reducing human suffering, it vastly increases the risk of a future confrontation, with even more catastrophic outcomes. But, given the US president-elect’s plans and objectives, it is the most likely next stage in Russia’s long-running war against free Europe.

So, what can the EU and its member states do?

While we could, and should, have done more to support Ukraine to win the war, this is now beyond reach. In the near future, it is about damage limitation. This means ensuring that any ceasefire deal contains as many favourable conditions for Ukraine as possible, including credible security guarantees. Zelensky’s current argument that the hot phase of the war could be ended if the territories still under Ukraine’s control receive NATO protection should be seen within this context.

However, it is unclear how far NATO countries are willing to commit to membership at this moment in time, given fears around what this level of commitment might entail. Trump might push Europeans to safeguard his deal by putting boots on the ground and even obliging Europe to protect Ukraine within NATO. He may enforce this by making Europe’s security contingent on acquiescence to these demands while, of course, implicitly not extending the US’s security guarantee. Whatever Ukraine’s NATO status, at the very least, there should be no limitations enshrined in the deal for Ukraine to arm itself or to be armed, or on any technology Ukraine needs. And Europe should be willing to put boots on the ground in case of a ceasefire; it is the only way to ensure such a ceasefire would hold.

EU membership, or a credible path and timeline to membership, should also be part of the deal, at the very least ensuring that Russia does not exercise a veto on Ukraine’s European future. However, it remains to be seen whether this is a Trumpian priority, given his disdain for multilateral institutions in general and the EU in particular. The Union should nevertheless put this on the table, although it is unclear whether the political will within exists.

A demand that might find some traction with Trump would be making any easing of sanctions contingent on the return of illegally occupied territory, as well as mandating the use of Russian funds for reconstruction, which many in the US also advocate, although there is likely to be strong pushback from Russia. Other conditions, linked to Ukraine’s Peace Formula, such as returning prisoners of war, as well as the Ukrainian children abducted by Russia, guaranteeing free passage through the Black Sea and provisions to guarantee nuclear safety all need to be part of the deal. The complete withdrawal of all North Korean troops must also be part of any ceasefire.

Europe will have to do more, not less, in case of a ceasefire

Putin might not be willing to accept these conditions, but if this leads to a breakdown in negotiations between Trump and Putin, so much the better. However, chances are that in return for a favourable ceasefire, Putin will accept many conditions, even if he intends to break them later on. The challenge will be to ensure that Trump includes these conditions in his dealings with Putin. Appealing to his vanity might help: Trump needs to win, so if the “best deal ever” is presented as being dependent on these conditions, it might induce him to push for them, i.e. his deal is “great” if, and only if, these conditions are included.

Much of what will need to be delivered under such a ceasefire will have to come from Europe, including a commitment to a further continuous strengthening of Ukrainian armed forces and significant funding and risk guarantees for Ukrainian reconstruction. Europe must be ready to further strengthen its defence industry, so that it is able to produce the weapons required to defend itself against an expansionist Russia, as well as buying more US weapons. Defence spending among NATO countries will have to reach 3% of GDP, which will also entail borrowing more both at national and EU level, potentially also outside the current Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) given the time pressure to strengthen EU capabilities in the immediate future. In many instances, Europe will be expected to sacrifice its economic interest in return for a continuation of the US security guarantee, albeit this guarantee will be more tentative than in the past with Trump back in the Oval Office.

As a result, should a Trump-imposed ceasefire become a reality, Europe will have to do – and commit – more rather than less. Europe must listen to the countries bordering Russia, and to Ukraine in particular, to apprehend the nature of Putin’s Russia and the continuous and increasing threat it poses, given the border countries’ correct assessment in the past. While conflict with Putin’s Russia is inevitable, if Europe acts it can at least hope to prevent the worst: a full-scale war with Russia.

An unjust and unstable ceasefire must clarify Europe’s responsibility. Rather than sitting back and enjoying the illusion of peace, Europe will have to prepare for further conflict to come, by supporting Ukraine, guaranteeing the deal, protecting other states in Russia’s firing line, and by substantially increasing its own military capabilities and spending. Only by recognising Putin’s threat to European security and by being ready for war, can Europe hope to draw a line in the sand that Putin might not dare to cross when this ceasefire inevitably breaks down.

Fabian Zuleeg is Chief Executive and Chief Economist at the European Policy Centre.

The support the European Policy Centre receives for its ongoing operations, or specifically for its publications, does not constitute an endorsement of their contents, which reflect the views of the authors only. Supporters and partners cannot be held responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained therein.

Photo credits:
Ludovic Marin/ Pool /AFP

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Calm after the storm? A Trump-imposed ceasefire means doing much more to protect Ukraine and EUrope

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Calm after the storm? A Trump-imposed ceasefire means doing much more to protect Ukraine and EUrope

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