Donald Trump and the Republicans have experienced a tremendous victory. The elected 47th President of the United States of America did not only surpass the 270 electoral votes required; he also won the popular vote, can rely on an increased majority in the Senate, and will be able to count on the support of the Supreme Court.
Given his substantial political and legal power, coupled with the fact that he is now much more experienced and prepared than when he entered office in 2017, one should assume that President Trump will be determined to fulfil the multiple promises he made during his election campaign. In doing so, EUrope must prepare for a President Trump who will be erratic in his decisions, opportunistic at times, and changing course – a style of governing that will make it much more difficult to predict what comes next. As a result of all this, the coming years will have an enormous impact not only on the political, economic, and democratic future of the US, but also at the international level, including in Europe, where the consequences of his victory will be tremendous.
In this context, pro-European forces must fundamentally change their mindset and hedge against what is likely to be a profoundly anti-EU President in the White House. Pro-Europeans need to become much more ambitious, even if the willing member states might have to cooperate outside the EU framework, instead of sacrificing that ambition for a hollow and illusory unity among the EU27.
Another watershed moment
Trump’s victory will have an enormous impact on US foreign policy. One can assume that he will forcefully call on NATO allies to take more responsibility for defending Europe’s security while threatening a de facto withdrawal from the Alliance if this demand is not met. When it comes to the war in Ukraine, Trump has already indicated that he will push Kyiv to agree to a ‘peace agreement’ with Russia, one that he wants to negotiate directly with Vladimir Putin. This could result in Ukraine losing substantial parts of its territory and allow Moscow to claim victory – an outcome that would allow the Russian president to continue his aggressive foreign policy across the continent. As for China, one can expect intensified confrontation against Beijing and Trump playing all cards in his hands to push Europeans even more than in the past to align themselves with Washington.
On matters of economic policy, Trump has already indicated that he plans to force foreign companies to manufacture their products in the US, and that he wants to impose universal tariffs on products entering the country. This will likely lead to a damaging tit-for-tat trade war across the Atlantic. In addition, anti-EU leaders led by Victor Orbán will try their best to use the election of Trump to undermine liberal democracy and divide Europeans as part of an overall longer-term strategy to (further) hollow out the EU from within. We should assume that the new US president will support him in these efforts, given that Trump despises the multilateral EU.
In sum, the policies of Trump 2.0 will pose a direct threat to EUrope’s prosperity, security, sustainability, and democracy, and to its overall DNA focused on multilateralism and diplomacy. One decisive question now, therefore, is whether pro-European forces will be united in their response to the new transatlantic realities, and counter those who want to destroy the Union as we know it. From a normative perspective, the creation of a united front to defend EUrope against its adversaries should be a core strategic objective in the months and years to come.
The need for a ‘supra-governmental avantgarde’
To do so, national capitals ready to defend the European project will have to understand that they have no other option than to fundamentally intensify their level of cooperation inside or, if need be, outside the EU framework. In other words, they will have to fundamentally change their political mindset and become much more ambitious, given that the election of Trump will further intensify the geopolitical and geo-economic consequences deriving from the ‘global Zeitenwende’ that we are already confronted with.
EUrope requires a brutally honest assessment of where it stands, a compass directing it to where it wants to be, and a realistic but ambitious plan for how to achieve its goals, even if not all EU governments are ready to take a significant qualitative leap. If pro-European forces are not ready to do so, the political fringes will continue to grow, thereby increasing the real risk that the Union as we know it will unravel.
As one cannot expect the EU27 to collectively agree to be more ambitious, alternative routes need to be explored. Those countries ready to deepen their level of cooperation should move on their own, even if it means pursuing parallel avenues outside the EU framework. This process should follow the notion of a ‘supra-governmental avantgarde’, allowing willing member states to progress while adhering to a set of predefined principles that ensure respect for the Union’s institutional set-up and the community method.
In more concrete terms, there is an immediate need to progress in the area of defence. Willing EU countries should be ready to jointly and significantly invest in EUrope’s security, with financial support from targeted joint and common borrowing mechanisms. This will be necessary to defend the continent and ensure continuous long-term support to Ukraine, if Trump 2.0 will pursue a substantially different path than the Biden administration.
To be frank, moving towards a fundamentally more differentiated EUrope will not only be extremely difficult politically, given the widespread leadership deficit in many national capitals (further exacerbated by the collapse of the German coalition government), but will also entail legal and institutional risks. However, these risks are massively outweighed by the urgent need to overcome internal blockades and enhance EUrope’s capacity to act. If pro-Europeans sacrifice ambition for a hollow and illusory unity among all member states, they risk continued failure with severe consequences, especially with Donald Trump returning to the White House.
Almut Möller is Director for European and Global Affairs and Head of the Europe in the World programme at the European Policy Centre.
Fabian Zuleeg is Chief Executive and Chief Economist at the European Policy Centre.
Janis A. Emmanouilidis is Director of Studies at the European Policy Centre.
The support the European Policy Centre receives for its ongoing operations, or specifically for its publications, does not constitute an endorsement of their contents, which reflect the views of the authors only. Supporters and partners cannot be held responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained therein.