President Trump's recent overtures to Russian President, Vladimir Putin, signal a profound shift in US support away from Ukraine and towards Russia. This deepens Europe's existential crisis. To ensure its security and future geopolitical relevance, Europe must step up now.
A dark chapter in US history is unfolding. Rather than doubling down on support for Ukraine amid Russia’s second invasion in a decade, and preparing a collective strategy to end the war in concert with Ukraine and its European allies, US President Donald Trump has prioritised improving relations with the aggressor.
This is a major—and possibly unexpected—diplomatic victory for Russian President Vladimir Putin. Washington has changed course at an unprecedented pace and scope. It started with the phone call between Trump and Putin, and Trump's eagerness to improve US-Russia relations. At the Munich Security Conference, the US informed the Europeans that they would be excluded from talks with Russia over Ukraine and that they could no longer count on the US for their security.
During a meeting in Saudi Arabia between US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov (currently under US sanctions), Rubio announced efforts to normalise relations and strengthen economic ties and suggested that a meeting between Trump and Putin could happen before the end of February. Furthermore, after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, rejected an offer from Trump to buy half of Ukraine's mineral resources in exchange for US support, Trump began to parrot Putin's talking points. In a press conference on 18 February, Trump blamed Zelenskiy for starting the war and flagged the necessity of elections before a peace deal could be agreed upon, insinuating that Zelenskiy rather than Putin was the obstacle to ending the war. A day later Trump labelled Zelenskiy a dictator.
While Trump's team has yet to officially present a peace plan, what is unfolding certainly does not equate to the “peace through strength” slogan that Trump has touted. Rather than turning up the heat on Putin, the US is compromising itself. Talking about things that the US will not do for Ukraine or Europe, or about what Ukraine should give up are concessions that the US has as chips at the negotiating table in exchange for Russian concessions. So far, Trump is rewarding Putin for his war of aggression. He has never looked weaker. The statesman that he is, Zelenskiy has been quite clear: He will only meet with Putin once Ukraine has a common plan with the US and Europe. There was no way to decide European security over the heads of Europeans.
Trump seems to have forgotten that Russia invaded a peaceful, sovereign state, annexed large swathes of territory, and subsequently integrated them into its constitution. Russia has carried out large-scale war crimes and crimes against humanity, including kidnapping tens of thousands of Ukrainian children and executing prisoners of war. At this point, it seems doubtful that Trump will take seriously the insights and recommendations from Keith Kellogg, his special advisor to Ukraine when he returns to Washington following meetings in Kyiv this weekend.
What is clear is that Putin’s objectives remain unchanged. He wants to end the war on his own terms and Trump is facilitating this. That means, first, to extinguish Ukrainian statehood and identity (since the start of the war, Russia has attempted to remove all traces of Ukrainian identity in the regions of the country that it occupies), and second, to revise the European security architecture. US plans to reduce its troop presence in Europe is music to Putin’s ears. He has always believed that his adversaries want and need peace more urgently than he does; that they are currently weak and divided. He has been proved right. While Putin continues to believe that the Western alliance is weak and declining, he will not make compromises. The rupture in transatlantic relations only reinforces this thinking. If Trump, or anybody else in his circle, believes that Washington can conduct successful diplomacy from the standpoint of military weakness, then they are badly mistaken.
A now or never moment for Europe
Despite facing the biggest shift in its security calculus in decades, and possibly the most challenging period in transatlantic ties since the 1956 Suez crisis, Europe’s response up till now has been profoundly inadequate, and reinforced by the political uncertainty in Germany ahead of crucial elections. If Europe is to remain relevant it must take fast and decisive action to devise a concrete strategy to end the war in Ukraine. It should be built on four pillars: prepare Ukraine for negotiations for a just and sustainable peace by putting maximum pressure on Russia; commit to deploying troops to monitor the ceasefire line; beefing up Europe’s defence spending; and progress Ukraine’s EU accession. There are some signs that Europe is finally shifting up a gear. French President Emmanuel Macron’s emergency summit in Paris on 17 February and his subsequent discussions with numerous European leaders and other partners led to the announcement of a potential French-UK “Reassurance Force’. Both Macron and British Prime Minister, Kier Starmer will travel (separately) to Washington next week for talks with Trump in a new effort to convince him that Europe, along with Ukraine, should be at the negotiating table and what they will bring.
This is a now-or-never moment for Europeans to get their act together, and come up with a concrete strategy with or without the US. In concrete terms, this means:
1. Double down on Ukraine now. To compensate for a reduction in US military aid, Europe must immediately beef up its support for Ukraine, including for crucial air defences. Strapped for cash, the EU should
use the almost $300 billion in frozen Russian hard currency reserves that are in Western banks, the bulk of which is held by European financial institutions. Presently they have only used the interest generated by these funds as collateral for $50 billion in loans to Ukraine. This should be done rapidly to put Ukraine in a strong position in future negotiations. Investing in Ukraine’s defence industrial production should also be a priority.
2. Appoint a Special Envoy as a contact point for Washington.3. Boost spending on European security and defence. In 2014, Trump was right when he said Europe needed to take more care of its security and increase defence spending. Then, only three countries had met the 2% of GDP target for spending; now there are 23. Yet this figure needs to rapidly increase. Whether Trump is planning a major drawdown of US forces or pursuing a more transactional approach to European defence is not clear yet. But using the threat of abandonment as leverage, Europeans must overcome their divisions, which are inhibiting collective action, and step up. This means making unpopular decisions such as defence bonds to create mutual debt on defence, allowing the European Investment Bank to lend money for the defence industry, or increasing European defence expenditure in the EU in the next multifinancial framework.4. Increase Russia’s economic pain. Russia must be further deprived of the resources to wage war. Former US President Biden’s decision to implement a sweeping salvo of sanctions against the Russian energy sector before his departure, including sanctioning 180 vessels in Russia’s shadow fleet, as well as insurers, oil companies, and traders, was a crucial and well-overdue step. The EU’s new 16th sanctions package goes in the right direction, including targeting Russia's shadow fleet along with its aluminium industry and tightening restrictions on oil exports. A further 13 Russian banks are also sanctioned. Still, more can be done, including speeding up the implementation of secondary sanctions on countries evading existing sanctions, and stopping buying Russian LNG. Regardless of what Trump does, the EU must not lift sanctions.5.
Establish security guarantees and a deterrence force. Ukraine needs extensive and bold security commitments to protect Ukraine after a ceasefire deal with Russia. A robust deterrence mission should be a priority. While, the recent French-UK proposal to create a so-called European ‘Reassurance Force’, is welcome, it may not be sufficient. Made up of fewer than 30,000 troops and would mainly focus on air and maritime defence, with minimal ground forces and none near the eastern frontline. It is very questionable whether this would deter future Russian aggression. A much larger ground deployment would seem necessary to effectively deter Russia. For either, Europeans must rapidly accelerate efforts to develop a clear commitment for deployment. Whatever is decided, it will require a robust command structure along with the US continuing to be an enabler, to sustain the deployment including intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance capabilities, etc. This could happen far from Ukraine and is something that Washington has signalled it could do.While the US claims that NATO membership is unlikely, all other NATO allies should commit to this goal. Taking it off the table is a win for Moscow. In addition, Kyiv needs an independent deterrent in the form of a strong military. NATO allies have already gone some way to prepare the groundwork for providing Ukraine with the necessary training, arms transfers and intelligence cooperation to create this deterrent in the bilateral security agreements signed earlier this year.
6. Making the return of Ukrainian children that Russia has kidnapped, and Ukrainian Prisoners of War, a precondition for a final peace deal.
7. Accelerate Ukraine’s EU accession. While there should be no shortcuts in terms of Ukraine’s compliance with the fundamentals, the EU could accelerate its integration in other areas, given Ukraine’s situation and its strategic importance to European security. This could include the single market and deeper security and defence cooperation.
Amanda Paul is Deputy Head of the Europe in the World Programme and Senir Policy Analyst with the Europe in the World Programme at the European Policy Centre
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