Three years after its inception in the wake of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the European Political Community (EPoC) remains a pertinent format to foster political dialogue, cooperation and strategic convergence between countries of the entire European continent. But the lack of coordination and concrete follow-up threatens to make it redundant, as participating countries find other ways to address current challenges. While keeping the flexible nature of EPoC, minimal mechanisms should be set up to incentivise ownership by participants and cooperation.
The sixth EPoC summit taking place on 16 May in Tirana, Albania, will focus on security issues. Roundtables will also be organised on competitiveness and economic security, as well as on migration, mobility and youth empowerment. These topics were discussed at previous summits without any major outcome in terms of initiatives or long-term projects, and expectations for the Tirana gathering are again low, calling into question the purpose and future of EPoC.
The European Political Community was initiated by French President Emmanuel Macron in May 2022 to foster cooperation on issues including security, energy, and mobility. With the full-scale invasion of Ukraine destroying the post-Cold War European order and threatening to further destabilise the EU’s neighbourhood, the immediate objective was to demonstrate the unity of the continent and preserve its geopolitical stability. The use of the word Community, inspired by the early days of European integration, also suggested an ambition to create a continent-wide sense of belonging and shared values or interests.
EPoC brings together the heads of state and government of 47 countries, including all 27 EU member states and 20 non-EU countries. All EU candidate countries (Georgia, Moldova, Turkey, Ukraine and the Western Balkans) participate, as do members of the European Economic Area (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) along with Andorra, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Monaco, San Marino, Switzerland and the UK. Twenty-nine participant countries are also members of NATO.
Most EPoC participants therefore already share common policies through other political or institutional structures, yet the Community’s unique value proposition lies in its inclusivity and geopolitical reach. The five summits held so far – in Prague (October 2022), Chișinău (June 2023), Granada (October 2023), the UK (July 2024) and Budapest (November 2024) alternating between EU and non-EU countries – have demonstrated that EPoC's biggest asset lies in serving as a platform for dialogue between leaders of the participating countries on an equal basis. The absence of formal conclusions to discuss and agree upon allows room for open dialogue and helps defuse potential tensions.
One of the most consistent themes across all summits has been support for Ukraine. President Zelenskyy participated in all gatherings and had the opportunity to hold side meetings with European leaders. This helped him obtain commitments on the delivery of weapons, and sign bilateral agreements for long-term military and humanitarian support at the UK summit.
Beyond support for Ukraine, EPoC summits have also been opportunities to conclude agreements on a number of issues. On migration, a UK-led initiative at the third and fourth summit resulted in an eight-point plan adopted by several European countries to combat irregular migration and organised crime, as well as a £84-million package to fund projects across Africa and the Middle East. The UK summit in July 2024 also resulted in the creation of a collaborative network of nine countries, plus the EU and NATO, to counter Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), as well as a joint call to action to tackle the shadow fleet of Russian oil tankers that was endorsed by all participating states except for Azerbaijan and Turkey.
Limitations and structural weaknesses
All the initiatives and projects announced during EPoC summits involved only small groups of participants. Summit discussions, usually organised in plenary and thematic roundtables, have failed to produce a collective dynamic leading to larger-scale political outcomes.
Despite its early momentum, EPoC’s limitations are increasingly evident. Over time, its summits have seen a decline in concrete outcomes, with the fifth and last summit in Budapest marking a low point, as leaders failed to produce new initiatives or agreements.
The Tirana summit is unlikely to reverse this trend. With general elections taking place just five days before the summit, preparing the event may not have been a priority of Albania’s Prime Minister Edi Rama. And although the European Council supports the host countries in preparing the summits by providing policy and organisational expertise, the EU has been clear from the outset that the invitation letter sent by Rama and European Council President António Costa does not indicate much political steering of the gathering and provides no indication of potential outcomes.
As opposed to other rotating fora like the G7 and G20, where formal conclusions serve as a measure for success or failure of the host countries, the informal nature of EPoC summits does not encourage hosts to take full ownership of the Community. From one summit to the other, this lack of consistent ownership by an identified actor reduces EPoC’s capacity to deliver political initiatives.
This lack of clarity has contributed to uneven engagement among members. Some see it as a diplomatic convenience, while others perceive it as an unnecessary duplication of existing frameworks. Türkiye, for instance, has been absent from three out of five summits and continued to pursue its own geopolitical agenda.
Competition from other forms of cooperation
EPoC is also facing growing competition from other bodies and structures of cooperation, at a time when strategic uncertainties are an incentive to strengthen ties between European countries. Several participating countries have increased their ties with the EU, which decreases their interest in what the EPoC has to offer.
This is primarily the case for candidate countries, which since 2022 have obtained either candidate status (Ukraine, Moldova, Bosnia), the opening of accession negotiations (Albania, North Macedonia) or the conclusion of negotiations chapters (Montenegro) and have thus less incentive to engage in the EPoC.
Non-candidate European countries have also taken steps to deepen their relations with the EU, against a backdrop of Russian threats and US challenges to economic and strategic relations with Europe. In December 2024, after a decade of negotiations, Switzerland signed a framework agreement with the EU, which renews the country’s access to the single market and covers trade, energy, food safety, health and education programmes. Norway is deepening its involvement in the EU single market, most notably on defence and green technologies. And Iceland’s government is considering a referendum on EU membership in 2027.
Europe’s security architecture is also being discussed and primarily shaped by the EU and in other formats rather than within EPoC. Over the last year, Moldova, Norway, North Macedonia and Albania signed bilateral security and defence partnerships with the EU, and the UK is expected to sign one at the EU-UK summit on 19 May. Iceland, for its part, has initiated a “dialogue on security and defence” with the EU in 2023. Concerning the future of Ukraine and the potential need to provide security guarantees to Kyiv, the tighter and more operational Coalition of the Willing led by France and the UK has taken centre stage.
Incentivising ownership and cooperation
EPoC’s founding rationale – political coordination in a fragmented Europe – remains compelling. Yet, its lack of structure, mixed engagement and weak output are placing its future at risk. If it wants to evolve into a meaningful platform, EPoC needs to clarify its role as a pan-European cooperation forum and establish minimum coordination mechanisms.
To do so, there is a need to incentivise ownership among its members. While taking into account the opposition towards the establishment of a permanent secretariat, future host countries should be decided a year in advance. Since EU hosts are the member states holding the rotating EU Council presidency, this innovation would concern the non-EU hosts. This would provide countries in charge with more time to prepare and coordinate preparatory and follow-up discussions, thereby generating more continuity between summits and increasing the likelihood of concrete policy initiatives.
The previous and next organising countries should work more closely together as an EpoC host duo, in particular to follow up from one summit to the other on what was discussed or agreed upon. This could include small working groups on specific issues or projects to guarantee a minimum steering and taking stock exercise during subsequent summits.
Host countries should also liaise more closely with EU institutions and other European bodies to increase the links and follow-up between political initiatives and projects that are initiated at EPoC summits – for instance on energy, cyber security or migration – and projects undertaken in the context of the EU, NATO or other structures.
Precisely because of the absence of clear steering, the impetus for these small steps should come from leaders who have the most interest in the EPoC. This points mainly to the EPoC's initiator, Macron, who should launch the discussion on the future of the Community. If EPoC fails to deliver strategic relevance or diplomatic durability, it may go down as a well-intentioned but ultimately redundant experiment in European diplomacy.
Eric Maurice is a Policy Analyst in the European Politics and Institutions Programme at the European Policy Centre.
Tabea Schaumann is a Programme Assistant in the European Politics and Institutions Programme at the European Policy Centre.
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