Although Moscow’s relations with North Korea may appear desperate and short-lived, deepening ties with Pyongyang are consistent with Russia’s long-term foreign and security policy thinking. The institutionalisation of the Indo-Pacific front against Ukraine presents Moscow with more opportunities than risks. With Russia preparing for more war, it is in the strategic security interests of Europe, NATO, Tokyo, Seoul, Canberra, Wellington and other like-minded partners to present a united front that commits to Ukraine’s victory, and out-thinks, out-supplies and outlasts Russia.
“North Korea will back Russia until it achieves victory in Ukraine.” That was how North Korea Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui described Pyongyang’s relationship with Moscow, just days after between 10,000 and 12,000 North Korean troops entered Russia on their way to its Kursk Oblast region, which borders Ukraine.
Pyongyang’s commitment to Russia’s victory in Ukraine must be seen in the scope of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, signed in June 2024, which provides for mutual aid in the event that either country faces armed aggression. It builds on the joint declaration of 2000, which pledged to “establish urgent bilateral contact in the event that either is threatened by an act of aggression, or a situation arises threatening peace and security or whenever consultations and interaction are necessary.” From Russia’s perspective, treaty-based ties with Pyongyang are driven by wartime needs for munitions and workforce, and serve Putin’s short and long-term objectives at home and abroad.
Russia’s objectives
Russia’s first objective in its relations with North Korea stems from structural military problems. Russia’s high-readiness units are depleted. On the 1,000-kilometre frontline with Ukraine, the daily loss of soldiers is estimated at around 1,000 to 1,200 troops. Moreover, Russia has been struggling to repel Ukraine’s military incursion into Kursk (some 15 battalions have been lost in Kursk alone), leading to the declaration of a “state of emergency”.
Although military conscription remains politically sensitive, Moscow has been incentivising volunteer-civilians to join the army. The partial mobilisation of 300.000 Russian reservists in 2022 saw hundreds of thousands of Russians flee the country. Putin does not want to (nor does he have to) announce another politically risky mobilisation for the time being, so cooperation with Pyongyang, which helps Russia address issues like the shortage of munitions and workforce, is expedient for him, politically and militarily.
Second, “sparing” the Russians now, especially in the key cities of Moscow, St Petersburg or Novosibirsk - by using non-Russian fighters - buys Putin time in which to reconstitute its military in preparation for other possible attacks in and beyond Ukraine, undermining regional and global security. Putin has recently announced the objective to progressively transform Russia’s army into the second largest in the world after China’s, increasing it by 180.000 troops to 1.5 million active-duty military personnel.
The third point is that Russia’s ties with North Korea are in alignment with Putin’s vision of the world and Russia’s foreign policy concept, which sets out Moscow’s long-term priorities. It describes Russia as “a vast Eurasian and Euro-Pacific power” defined in opposition to the West. The Concept outlines Russia’s grievances and re-categorises Russia’s foreign policy priorities with the Arctic, Eurasia, the Indo-Pacific and the Global South as top priorities. Moreover, closer cooperation between the US, Japan and South Korea makes Putin uneasy, because he sees it as American militarisation of the Indo-Pacific. Thus, for Russia, how better to counter the perceived expansionism of the US in the Indo-Pacific than by propping up North Korea’s military and nuclear capabilities on the Korean Peninsula.
Nuclear deterrence is the fourth reason for Russia’s ties with North Korea. What distinguishes North Korean troops from other foreign mercenaries used by Russia over the past few years in its war against Ukraine is the fact that they come from a nuclear capable country and are bound by a formal treaty. Indeed, Russia has been offering lucrative packages for thousands of foreign recruits from across the Global South: Somalia, Sierra Leone, Cuba, and some 15,000 Nepalis. But the direct involvement of another nuclear power against Ukraine serves as a deterrent to the West in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres.
Fifth, since the Western liberal order, in Putin’s mind, is in decline and the new world order is rising, Moscow is simply seizing the opportunity to restore Russia’s great-power status, or “derzhavnost”, which for Moscow is existential. Practical cooperation with North Korea (and other like-minded partners) aids this. In other words, Russia is using North Korea as part of a greater geopolitical realignment, similar to the way in which Moscow has been pulling the BRICS nations (as well as the UN Secretary-General Guterres) into its orbit. This was seen during the 16th BRICS Summit, which gathered all member states (they account for 45% of the world’s population and 28% of the global economy). Should Russia’s ties with Pyongyang cause instability and concern for the West and the non-BRICS, and if it sows confusion and ambiguity, then as far as Putin is concerned, Russia gains a strategic advantage.
Sixth, there is an historic precedent. Both Moscow and Pyongyang enjoyed good relations during the Cold War period, especially when the former Soviet Union was supplying vital aid (diplomatic, military, tactical and financial) to North Korea in its war against South Korea. Pyongyang was one of the first places Putin visited after assuming office in 2000. During that visit, Russia and North Korea agreed to consult one another in the event of a security threat.
In this regard, the delivery of food, cash, military and satellite technology capabilities to North Korea in exchange for artillery shells, ballistic missiles and troops makes short- and long-term political and military sense for Russia. It is an investment in Russia’s war economy and global ambitions.
Outlook and recommendations
Russia’s relationship with North Korea will be as sustainable as the Western and wider international community of policymakers allows it to be. If the West does not stop Putin now, he will feel motivated to become more aggressive in the future.
A portion of the North Korean troops in the Kursk Oblast are expected to be cannon fodder in Russia’s “meat grinder” strategy. However, the arrival of 10,000 to 12,000 soldiers – around 1% of North Korea’s total armed forces – is probably just the first of multiple deployments of North Korean forces to Russia, in support of Moscow’s goal to progressively wear out the Ukrainians and create conditions for Russia’s piecemeal victory in Ukraine. This is as much about experimentation and risk-taking on the part of Putin as it is about the global reach of Russia's war mobilisation efforts against Ukraine.
In this regard, the EU and wider Europe, as well as NATO and like-minded partners, should commit to Ukraine’s victory strategy, a united front underpinned by a long-term plan to out-think and out-produce Russia. This must go together with security guarantees for Ukraine in the spirit of Article 5, with protection of Ukraine’s airspace a bare minimum. Raising NATO’s defence investment target to 3% or 4% of GDP, supplying Kyiv with all that it needs for a lasting victory, and doubling down on sanctions enforcement on Russia (the UK has taken an exemplary role in this), can significantly raise the cost for Moscow. Similarly, the EU, wider Europe and NATO should intensify practical cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners at bilateral and multilateral levels and in the defence industry, as well as over new technologies, maritime and cybersecurity exercises, nuclear non-proliferation and space.
Russia is not going to dismiss the treaty-based relationship with North Korea. On the contrary, unless Putin is stopped, Moscow will likely find ways to deepen and further expand the war in Ukraine as part of Putin’s wider efforts to change the international world order. Given that both Russia and Ukraine depend on third countries to sustain their war effort, the country which receives greater support will prevail.
Maria Martisiute is a Policy Analyst at the European Policy Centre focusing on transnationalisation and strategic analysis.
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